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ABSTRACT 
Humanness is an important social dimension that groups strive for (Bain, Vaes, & 
Leyens, 2014; Haslam, 2006; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007). A first 
research program designed by Leyens and colleagues (2000) has shown that ingroup members 
tended to consider themselves as uniquely human while outgroups fell short on that 
dimension. Importantly, dehumanization was thought to be dependent on ethnocentric 
motives and, as such, could be observed in both low and high status groups (Leyens et al., 
2003). Whereas an initial set of data confirmed this assumption (Demoulin et al., 2005; 
Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002; Paladino & Vaes, 2009), this assumption has come 
under increased pressure as new data seem to suggest that, at least in some situations, group 
status is significantly linked to dehumanisation (Cappozza, Andrighetto, Di Bernardo, & 
Falvo, 2012; Harris & Fiske, 2006; Iatridis, 2013; Jones-Lumby & Haslam, 2005; Vaes & 
Paladino, 2010). 
To test the role of intergroup status on the attribution of uniquely human features to 
ingroups and outgroups, a first research paper aimed at experimentally varying the social 
perception of an ingroup and an outgroup on competence – as a proxy of status – and warmth 
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Furthermore, we have done so in an otherwise minimal 
intergroup situation to control for possible confounding variables. Results confirmed that only 
members of groups high on competence dehumanised the outgroup. Interestingly, this 
moderation was observed on the attribution of uniquely human emotions, an 
operationalisation of humanness that is thought to be less influenced by intergroup differences 
on socio-structural variables (Leyens, 2009).   
In the two subsequent papers we focus on the perspective of low status groups 
explaining when and why low status groups sometimes do and other times do not dehumanize 
others. We started to explore the role of outgroup identification, confirming in a correlational 
study with Gypsy minority members that those who wish to assimilate dehumanise the 
majority outgroup less (Study 1). Studies 2 and 3, conducted with immigrants in Portugal and 
Italy, confirmed that this result is extendable to an acculturation framework based on contact 
and culture adoption. Again, immigrants who preferred to assimilate with the host culture 
tended to dehumanize the majority group less. As such, we identified a first source of 
variability in dehumanization processes perpetrated by low-status groups.  
Subsequently, the pervasiveness of intergroup dehumanisation was tested 
disentangling group status and power. As such, power was manipulated among low status 
groups in a laboratory (Study 1) and in a natural setting (Study 2). Results confirmed that 
when low status groups were given some control on the outcome’s of a high status outgroup 
(i.e. power) they dehumanise the members of this outgroup to a greater extent than when they 
were given no control at all.   
Results are discussed in terms of the extent to which ethnocentric motives underlie 
dehumanisation and future research is outlined.  
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Chapter I. Dehumanisation 
“Are we not human beings too?” - asks A., an asylum seeker, whose open letter was 
published on the website of the Scottish Refugee Council (2011). A.’s question represents the 
query underlying all the research undertaken within the scope of this thesis.  
This is not a new question within Social Psychology. Long has been the tradition of 
exploring the conditions in which other groups are seen on the outside boundary of humanity. 
This work translated into concepts as delegitimation (Bar-Tal, 1989), the psychology of 
Evilness (Staub, 1989; 1999) or moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990), and was mostly described 
in intergroup contexts that were marked by violence and conflict. More recently, however, the 
concept of dehumanisation
1
 has been adapted to a subtle bias that consists in the scaling of 
groups in terms of humanness (for reviews see Demoulin et al., 2004b; Haslam, 2006; 
Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain,  2008; Leyens et al, 2000; 2001; 2003; Leyens, 
Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007; Vaes, Leyens, Paladino, & Miranda, 2012). It is 
under that framework that the research presented here will be conducted.  
Returning to A’s. query, this thesis will focus on the dynamics between the boundary 
conditions of dehumanisation and its pervasive tendency among low status groups: Are low 
status groups human too? When does ones’ placement within the hierarchy of a given society 
influence the ascription of a deep seated dimension of value that is humanness? 
Emotional Infrahumanisation Theory 
In the turn of the millennium humanness was thrown to the spotlight as a social 
resource that groups strive for (Leyens et al, 2000). Leyens and colleagues developed a theory 
that starts from the recognition that there are features identified in lay theories as uniquely 
human. These include among others intelligence, uniquely human emotions (i.e., 
‘sentimentos’), language, and sociability (Chulvi & Perez, 2003; Leyens et al., 2000; Miranda, 
2006). Some of these features had already been accounted for in the dynamics of social 
competition (e.g., intelligence by Crocker, Major, & Steel, 1998). Furthermore, at the time 
there was a renewed interest in understanding the emotional component of intergroup 
differences (Brewer, 1999; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick., 1999; Smith, 1993). As such, the road 
was paved for an enduring focus on the study of uniquely human emotions as a proxy of 
people’s humanness and further extending the work on emotional prejudice.  
                                                 
1
 A recent surge of interest into the research on dehumanisation has led to a correspondent abundant amount of 
terms to name the phenomenon. For reasons of simplicity we will use the term dehumanisation to refer to this 
subtle bias, using specific terminology only when referring directly to specific theories.  
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The reliability of this idea was tested in a cross-cultural normative study on lay 
theories of emotion (Demoulin et al, 2004a). The results reinforced the proposed distinction 
between primary or non-uniquely human (e.g., joy, anger) and secondary or uniquely human 
emotions (e.g., admiration, disappointment). These emotions varied not only on human 
uniqueness, but also on other core dimensions. Uniquely human emotions are shared less 
across cultures, considered less visible to others, less durable and experienced later in human 
development. Additionally Rodriguez-Torres and colleagues (2005) found evidence of the 
spontaneous use of the uniquely human vs. non-uniquely human categorisation of emotions. 
Adapting the ‘who says what to whom’ paradigm (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978), 
the authors demonstrated that the proposed categorisation of emotions behaved like other 
meaningful categorisations. This result contested the interpretation of the differentiation 
between uniquely and non-uniquely emotions as an experimental artefact.      
The validity of the emotional infrahumanisation theory was analysed testing the 
hypothesis that uniquely human emotions are preferentially linked with the ingroup rather 
than with outgroups. At the same time, no bias should be expected regarding the association 
of non-uniquely human emotions to groups, as they are shared by both humans and animals.  
Resorting in a first moment to an attribution paradigm, Leyens and colleagues (2001) 
showed a greater attribution of uniquely human emotions to the ingroup in comparison to the 
outgroup, while the non-uniquely human emotions were equally attributed to both groups. 
The paradigm consisted in a list of uniquely and non-uniquely human emotions (controlled for 
differences in desirability) and filler words, which participants had to ascribe to both the 
ingroup or the outgroup. The effect was further replicated using an attribution paradigm in a 
within-subjects design (Cortes, Demoulin, Rodríguez-Torres, Rodríguez-Pérez, & Leyens, 
2005; Gaunt, 2009), rating the likelihood of ingroup and outgroup members experiencing 
those emotions (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006) and asking participants to forecast the 
emotional reactions of ingroup and outgroup members (Gaunt, Sindic, & Leyens, 2005). 
The emotional infrahumanisation effect was subsequently tested in various association 
paradigms. In four experiments Paladino and colleagues (2002) recurred to the implicit 
association test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and verified for positive and 
negative emotions that participants are quicker responding to tasks in which ingroup names 
and uniquely human emotions and outgroup names and non-uniquely human emotions need to 
be categorized with the same response key (compatible tasks), compared to the reverse pairs 
(incompatible tasks). Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin and Leyens (2007) further contributed to this 
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argument by determining if the aforementioned IAT effect was indeed driven by the 
hypothesised association between ingroup and uniquely-human emotions and not by the 
alternative link between outgroup and non-uniquely human emotions. Their use of a lexical 
decision task (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997) followed other adaptations of other well 
established empirical paradigms retrieved to further solidify the emotional infrahumanisation 
effect.  
This was the case of the Process-Dissociation Procedure (Jacoby, 1991) through which 
Gaunt, Leyens and Demoulin (2002) found evidence that participants intentionally recalled 
more outgroup uniquely human emotions than uniquely human emotions experienced by the 
ingroup. Again this effect did not extend to non-uniquely human emotions. This means that 
while uniquely human emotions are automatically associated to the ingroup, only through a 
control process, requiring an effort, can people associate them to the outgroup. In line with 
this finding, Gaunt, Leyens and Sindic (2004) asked participants to rate the extent to which an 
ingrouper or an outgrouper did indeed experience a given uniquely or non-uniquely human 
emotion, as expressed in an essay. The experimental situations were built in such a way that 
participants were given the possibility of a situational discount. Specifically, in half of the 
conditions the actor had been constraint to express a particular emotion or had been given free 
choice. As hypothesised, participants were motivated to reason that an outgrouper had not 
experienced any uniquely human emotions, and recurred to situational explanations when 
they were available. Demoulin and colleagues (2005), using the Wason Selection Task 
(Wason, 1968), also contributed to establish that the motivation to humanise the ingroup and 
infrahumanise an outgroup influences information processing of pairs of ingroup and 
outgroup members and uniquely and non-uniquely human emotions.  
One alternative explanation of the pattern of preferential attribution of uniquely human 
emotions to the ingroup compared to the outgroup could lie in the fact that people have a 
greater familiarity with members of the first compared to those of the latter group. In fact, 
uniquely human emotions are less visible and thus might only be inferred in contexts familiar 
to the individual. In a series of studies, Cortes and colleagues (2005) discarded this alternative 
explanation, showing that participants did not attribute more secondary emotions to the highly 
familiar self compared to the ingroup or the outgroup (Study 1 and 2), nor did they attribute 
secondary emotions proportionally to outgroups that differed in terms of familiarity (Study 3).  
The last assumption of the Infrahumanisation Theory is that what is at stake in the 
differential attribution of uniquely and non-uniquely emotions to ingroup and outgroups is to 
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definition of one’s group as fully human. Sustaining this argument is the work by Vaes, 
Paladino and Leyens (2006), in which participants used more uniquely human words in a 
word fragment completion task when primed with uniquely human emotions expressed by 
ingroup (vs. outgroup) members. Boccato, Capozza, Falvo and Durante (2008) advanced this 
argument by showing that associations of the ingroup (compared to the outgroup) and humans 
(compared to animals) are always stronger. 
Emotional Infrahumanisation Theory was first extended to include the denial of 
outgroup humanness based on non-emotional human features. Viki, Winchester, Titshall and 
Chisango (2006) accomplished this task by using human-related (e.g., citizen) and animal-
related (e.g., creature) words. The studies consisted of an IAT or of an attribution task and in 
all studies participants differentiated the ingroup from the outgroup based on human-related 
words, whereas no such distinction was made regarding animal-related words. Another 
operationalisation of uniquely humanness was used in the work by Vaes and Paladino (2010), 
in which the authors resorted to traits deemed stereotypical of the groups considered. 
Infrahumanisation was conceptualised as deriving directly from Social Identity Theory 
(SIT, Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, it represented an innovation as it extended the need 
for intergroup differentiation to a non-valence-based relevant dimension of comparison. The 
results obtained by Leyens and colleagues (2001) reinforced infrahumanisation’s 
independence – and often coexistence – from a valence-based ingroup bias, as participants 
ascribed both desirable and undesirable uniquely human emotions to their ingroup. Kofta, 
Mirosławska and Błogowska (2008) found indeed that both an ingroup bias and an 
infrahumanisation bias were elicited in an adapted version of the minimal group paradigm, 
but independently from one another. Demoulin and colleagues (2009) further explored the 
role of mere social categorisation on infrahumanisation, describing its absence when the 
categorisation criterion was random. However, when adding even little meaning, to this 
criterion (e.g., colour preferences), an infrahumanisation pattern was observed.  
SIT is a theory of ingroup love, as Brewer (1999) labelled it. In the classic minimal 
group paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), participants only had the 
opportunity to favour their ingroup, even if more than the extent to which they favoured the 
outgroup. They were not experimentally allowed to only derogate the other social category. 
Infrahumanisation, on the other hand, is theorised as directly descending from ethnocentrism. 
After Sumner (1906), Levine and Campbell (1972) defined ethnocentrism as a syndrome 
composed of facets related to ingroup favouritism (e.g., evaluate one’s group as strong), but 
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also to outgroup derogation (e.g., referencing the outgroup as a bad example in young 
people’s education). As such, ethnocentrism refers to the lay theory through which values are 
scaled in terms of the ingroup and was translated in the Infrahumanisation Theory as the 
assumption that ingroups are experienced as fully human while outgroups are not.  
Concurrently, Leyens and colleagues (2000; 2001; 2003) linked infrahumanisation to 
psychological essentialism. Allport (1954) was the first to describe a group essence as an 
output of the simplifying nature of social categorisation that refers to the belief that there is 
something indwelling to the group at hand. Understanding why groups are perceived different 
by substance and not contingency has to pass through Rothbart and Taylor’s (1992) 
contribution. According to these authors lay theories distinguish natural and artificial 
categories and social categories are modelled after the first type. As such, they share natural 
categories’ properties, as high inductive potential and high unalterability of group 
characteristics and of memberships. Haslam and colleagues tested the extent to which 
uniquely human traits can be defined in terms of essentialist beliefs (Haslam, Bain, Douge, 
Lee, & Bastian, 2005, Study 1). Drawing on Haslam, Bain and Bissett’s (2004) 
operationalization of essentialist beliefs, the authors found that only one out of four correlated 
positively with uniquely humanness (immutability), whereas the others correlated negatively 
or not at all (consistency, inherence and informativeness). In response, Leyens (2009) raised 
the possibility that infrahumanisation can still be conceptualized as the denial of the human 
essence, if we take into consideration a classical or broader definition of essence (Medin, 
1989), or what Gelman and Hirschfeld (1999) name the sortal sense. However, no empirical 
evidence sustains this association with essence (for a review see Bain, 2014).  As such 
infrahumanisation should be understood in terms of differences, which need not to be discrete, 
but can be graded. So that, differences in humanness can be represented in relation to the 
degree to which groups are seen as examples of humanity (Bain, 2014; Leyens, 2009).  
Infrahumanisation Theory is indeed in line with Self Categorisation Theory (Turner, 
1987/1990) to the extent that it considered “humanity” as an example of the superordinate 
category. According to this theory, there are three levels of abstraction of the self: the 
interpersonal, the intergroup and the superordinate or interspecies. These levels are 
interdependent in the sense that the definition of the self at one level reflects comparisons in 
relation to the next higher level. Drawing from the metacontrast principle (Campbell, 1958), 
Turner (1987/1990) introduces the concept of prototypicality referring to the quality of an 
individual being representative of the group or a group being representative of the 
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superordinate level. Self Categorisation Theory defends that the evaluation of a group 
depends on its’ degree of prototypicality from the superordinate level and as such a group is 
evaluated favourably when it is representative of humanity and vice-versa. Deriving from this 
theory, the Ingroup Projection Model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) defends that ingroup 
members consider their group more prototypical of the superordinate category than the 
outgroup, which is seen as less inclusive of that category. This account is still in line with an 
ethnocentric motivation in infrahumanisation, to the extent that the human superordinate 
category can be represented in an ethnocentric way, that is, through the projection of ingroup 
features. 
Human Nature and Human Uniqueness 
Haslam and colleagues (2005) broaden the definition of dehumanisation by 
comprehending other senses of humanness in the analysis of dehumanisation. Specifically 
they resorted to Kagan’s (2004) analysis of the definition of any object in general, and of 
humanness in particular. Kagan (2004) signals how humanness can be defined through the 
listing of its core traits, but also – and most frequently – by its comparison to other related 
categories (e.g. apes). Haslam and colleagues (2005) have drawn from the personality traits 
organized in five dimensions (agreeableness, consciousness, extraversion, neuroticism and 
openness) of the Five Factor Model (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and values organized according 
to Schwartz’s (1992) taxonomy (openness to change, self-enhancement, conservation and 
self-transcendence). The authors showed, first of all, that the rating of these traits on their 
uniquely humanness, i.e., human uniqueness, and their centrality in the definition of 
humanness, i.e. human nature, represented indeed different constructs, which were either not 
or even negatively correlated. The concept of human nature involves emotionality, warmth, 
cognitive openness, agency, and depth, whereas human uniqueness comprehends civility, 
refinement, moral sensibility, rationality and maturity. Most importantly these two different 
senses of humanness fuel different types of dehumanisation: mechanistic dehumanisation 
takes place when outgroups are deprived of human nature traits and animalistic 
dehumanisation when uniquely human traits are denied to others, drawing a direct parallel 
with the infrahumanisation bias (for a review see Haslam, Loughnan et al., 2008).  
These two senses of humanness distinguish themselves from one another in two 
aspects. One the one hand, human nature traits are, unlike uniquely human traits, associated 
with essentialist believes, such as consistency, inherence, informativeness (Haslam et al., 
2005) and having nature as cause (Bain, 2014). One the other hand, a self-humanisation 
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effect, meaning that the self is ascribed more in terms of humanness compared to a 
generalized other, can be observed on human nature traits, while there is no evidence of such 
effect regarding human uniqueness (Cortes et al., 2005; Haslam et al., 2005, Studies 3 and 4; 
Haslam, Loughnan, Reynolds, & Wilson, 2007; Loughnan et al., 2010). 
Finally, the two types of humanness are contextually determined, meaning that 
different groups use human nature (e.g., Australians), uniquely humanness (e.g., Chinese) or 
both (e.g., Italians) to differentiate from their ingroup from several outgroups (Bain, Park, 
Kwok, & Haslam, 2009; Bain, Vaes, Haslam, Kashima, & Guan, 2012). 
Attribute, Metaphor and Target Based Approaches to Dehumanisation  
It is possible to describe two approaches to the process of dehumanisation: an 
attribute- and a metaphor-based approach (Longhnan, Haslam, & Kashima, 2009). The first is 
represented by most of the aforementioned research and constitutes the denial of traits 
(attributes) to an outgroup. The second is already possible to foresee when Haslam, Loughnan 
and colleagues (2008) linked the denial of uniquely human and human nature attributes to the 
association with animals and robots. Loughnan and Haslam (2007) used a go/no-go 
association task to verify the proposed implicit association with animals and members of an 
animalistically dehumanised group (i.e., artists) and the one with automata and a 
mechanistically dehumanised group (i.e., business men). This aspect was further tested in 
subsequent research (Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & Suitner, 2008; Loughnan et al., 
2009; Saminaden, Loughnan, & Haslam, 2010).  
A similar reasoning lies at the basis of yet another theoretical contribution in the 
dehumanisation area. Pérez, Moscovici and Chulvi (2002; 2007) proposed the concept of 
ontologisation as a stage where groups are represented outside the social map. This would 
take place through the link between culture and nature traits to the human and the animal 
identity. The representation of minorities through (positive) nature traits is argued to 
accommodate more than their view as animals, but as wild animals, which in turn would lead 
to their expulsion from any human/domestic category.    
Goff, Eberhardt, Williams and Jackson (2008) embodied the metaphoric approach by 
testing the association between a particular group and a pervasive animal metaphor: the black-
ape association. In one of their studies the subliminal priming of black faces (compared to 
white faces) facilitated the identification of degraded images of big apes (compared with other 
animals). Also, Capozza, Boccato, Andrighetto and Falvo (2009) asked participants to 
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categorise ambiguous human, ape and ambiguous faces that were present varying their 
membership. As hypothesised participants were less prone to exclude ambiguous human/ape 
faces from outgroup membership.  
Despite the theoretical interchangeability of attribute-based and metaphor-based 
dehumanisation in the literature, Loughnan and colleagues (2009) were the first to test this 
assumption. Four novel groups were presented as lacking uniquely human attributes, human 
nature attributes, depicted as animals or robots. Participants were capable, when asked to infer 
the attribute-based from the metaphor-based dehumanisation and vice-versa.  
A third approach to dehumanisation was labelled target-based approach (Vaes & 
Paladino, 2010) and proposes that not only are uniquely human features more attributed to the 
ingroup, but that ingroup attributes are per se judged to be more uniquely human. This can be 
considered an extension of the ingroup projection model (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & 
Boettcher, 2004; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003), in the sense that the 
projection of group features to the superordinate category can accommodate an 
operationalization of this latter category as humanness. Paladino and Vaes (2009) presented 
participants with a set of equally human traits that were said to be characteristic of ingroup or 
outgroup members. As hypothesised, ingroup traits were considered more uniquely human 
across three different intergroup contexts. 
Dehumanisation and its Consequences 
The novelty of these new approaches to dehumanisation comes from its pervasiveness 
in daily life interactions between groups. However, the subtle nature of dehumanisation does 
not reflect necessarily in subtle consequences for the dehumanised.  
Vaes, Paladino and Leyens (2002) were the first to explore what is at stake in the 
differential attribution of uniquely human emotions. Drawing from research that links the 
perception of affective similarity to feelings of empathy (Houston, 1990) and empathy to 
prosocial behaviour (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981), the authors 
argued and demonstrated that perceiving uniquely human emotions in others would increase 
prosocial behaviour towards them. Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, and Giovanazzi (2003) 
were able to extend this effect to an intergroup context, showing the benefits of the expression 
of uniquely human emotions only for the ingroup (Studies 1 and 2) and asserting the 
meditational role of similarity in this process (Study 3). Moreover, the author’s last study 
allowed establishing that the consequences of expressing uniquely human emotions are dual, 
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as it leads participants to approach members of the ingroup and simultaneously to avoid 
members of the outgroup. This is especially relevant as it again stresses the double nature of 
ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation involved in dehumanisation (Leyens et al., 
2003). An ecological validation of this argument was obtained by Cuddy, Rock and Norton 
(2007), who demonstrated how inferences of uniquely human emotions of victims of 
Hurricane Katrina predicted helping behaviours towards them.  
Concurrently, the perception of uniquely human emotions was described as improving 
the ability to take others’ perspective (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2004), as increasing 
conformity towards political messages transmitted by a candidate of the same affiliation 
(Vaes, Paladino, & Magagnotti, 2011), as increasing intergroup forgiveness in post-conflict 
situations (Tam, et al., 2007), the support for reparation policies after wrong doing (Zebel, 
Zimmermann, Viki, & Doosje, 2008) and of the empathy felt for a victim group (Cehajic, 
Brown, & Gonzalez, 2009). Also, an interesting path has been taken by Wohl, Hornsey and 
Bennett (2012) in establishing the role of such emotions in the success of outgroup apologies. 
In order for an outgroup apology to succeed one has to infer some specific uniquely human 
emotions (as guilt). However, in line with Vaes and colleagues (2003), the expression of those 
emotions by an outgroup member decreases the trustworthiness of the apology, condemning it 
to failure. Interestingly, the authors found that this effect can be reserved if an ingroup 
member serves as a proxy of the outgroup apology.   
Also, Leyens and colleagues (2003) originally associated infrahumanisation and 
nationalism, conceptualising the first as an implicit facet of the latter. Viki and Calitri (2008) 
tested this proposed association and described a positive correlation between nationalism, but 
not patriotism and the differential attribution of uniquely human emotions, further reinforcing 
the co-existence of ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation. Leyens and colleagues 
(2003) also argued that this outgroup derogation component could work as a defensive 
mechanism, which allowed people to be in contact on a daily basis with news of genocides 
and war perpetrated against some outgroups. Resuming this line of reasoning, Vaes and 
Muratore (2013) have studied a health care workers cohort and shown that describing the 
suffering of a (fictitious) terminal patient in terms of uniquely human emotions is positively 
correlated with the burnout levels of those professionals.  
Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam and Koval (2011) compared the two senses of 
humanness focussing on the extent to which they might have different consequences, 
particularly in the realm of moral status. The authors found some major differences, as 
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persons seen as lacking human nature are not considered responsible enough to be blamed and 
should therefore be rehabilitated. On the other hand, an agent high on human uniqueness is 
deemed responsible and can therefore be accounted and punished for his/her actions.  
Despite the predominance of research on the consequences of dehumanisation of an 
attribute-based, and particularly and emotional-based, approach, Goff and colleagues (2008) 
contributed to the understanding of the consequences of the persistence of dehumanizing 
metaphors in the case of the black-ape association. The authors demonstrated in a laboratory 
setting how the activation of apes, increased the perceived legitimacy of a police battering 
regarding a black individual (Study 5). Also, a last study allowed linking dehumanising 
metaphors in actual news referring to alleged black criminals and the severity of their 
convictions. 
Considering its widespread nature, its consequences in everyday life contexts and the 
fact that it emerges as early as 6/7 years old (Martin, Bennett, & Murray, 2008), it is 
important to understand the boundary conditions of processes of subtle dehumanization. As 
Leyens and colleagues (2003) have pointed out: “Because infra-humanization exists does not 
mean that it has to exist. However, to help fostering its absence, it might be beneficial to 
realize its existence first” (p. 714). And it is exactly with that in mind that we move forward 
to the next chapter. 
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Chapter II. Pervasiveness and Boundaries of Dehumanisation 
In the last years we have witnessed an effort to study the conditions that might 
constitute a boundary to the otherwise pervasive phenomenon of dehumanization (Leyens, 
2009; Vaes et al., 2012).  
Paladino, Vaes, Castano, Demoulin and Leyens (2004) were the first to identify a 
variable fitting this purpose. These authors showed that when group members’ identification 
is low, they will dehumanise to a lesser extent. Leyens (2009) interprets identification as a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for dehumanisation, as there is evidence of the same 
group only dehumanising some outgroups (e.g. Cortes et al., 2005; Vaes & Paladino, 2010). 
Demoulin and colleagues (2009) further contributed to this argument introducing the 
meaningfulness of the criterion for intergroup categorisation. In fact, only when provided with 
a meaningful categorisation (compared to a random one) did participants dehumanise the 
outgroup, and this effect was mediated by ingroup identification. Gaunt (2009) extended the 
moderating effect to include identification with a superordinate category and the perception 
that the outgroup identifies with that category. In two studies with Israeli Jews and Israeli 
Arabs the identification with the superordinate category of Israeli significantly decreased 
dehumanisation between both groups.  
Moving away from an emotional infrahumanisation paradigm present in the previous 
studies to a measure of the attribution of humanlike mental states (e.g., being capable of doing 
things on purpose), Waytz and Epley (2012) found that when one feels connected to 
significant others, the distance towards remote others increases, leading to a dehumanisation 
of the latter.  
As mentioned before, Viki and Calitri (2008) also found a positive correlation between 
dehumanisation and one of the expressions of identification towards national groups, 
nationalism. Roccas, Klar and Liviatan (2006) proposed an approach to ingroup identification 
that encompassed both an attachment to the ingroup and its glorification, the latter reflecting a 
comparative superiority with outgroups. Leidner, Castano, Zaiser and Giner-Sorolla (2010) 
explored the role of both aspects of ingroup identification and found that ingroup 
glorification, but not ingroup attachment was associated with a higher dehumanisation of 
outgroups. There is, however, a substantial difference between these studies in the way they 
impact and inform the dehumanisation process. While ingroup identification influences 
dehumanisation by increasing the degree to which the ingroup is considered human, 
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nationalism and ingroup glorification especially decrease the humanness that is attributed to 
the outgroup.  
Vaes and colleagues (2012) proposed a framework to classify the moderators of 
dehumanisation differentiating between variables that are related to the boundaries between 
groups, the nature of the relations between those groups and the ideologies of their members. 
The studies described until this point can be grouped in the “boundary” class, as identification 
in its different expressions is an expression of social categorisation and the way we are 
attached to these categories.  
One other variable must however be considered in this domain, that is, existential 
concerns. Belonging to a group can indeed constitute a psychological buffer for the existential 
terror of death as its existence is less finite compared to that of the individual (Castano, 
Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002). Vaes, Heflick and Goldenberg (2010) extended this idea 
showing that people emphasise the uniquely human aspects of their ingroup when death-
thoughts are made salient. These findings suggest that attributing uniquely human 
characteristics to the ingroup that set us apart from our animal and finite nature helps to fence 
off people’s existential fear of death. 
A second class of moderators relates to people’s ideologies, i.e. shared believes that 
influence our interpretation of the world (Jost, 2006). Ideologies have shown to account for 
half the variability in prejudice measures (Hodson & Esses, 2005). In line with this finding, 
high right-wing authoritarianism (Hodson & Costello, 2007; Leidner et al., 2010) and 
conservatism (DeLuca-McLean & Castano, 2009) have shown to increase dehumanisation. 
Also, drawing on Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius, Liu, Shaw, & Pratto, 1994), Leidner 
and colleagues (2010) reported that an individual’s endorsement of a hierarchical conception 
of society is positively related to the dehumanization of immigrants. In addition, both Hodson 
and Costello (2007) and Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson and Mihic (2008) showed that 
dehumanisation has a meditational role in explaining the association between social 
dominance orientation and prejudice.  
The last class of moderators in the framework proposed by Vaes and colleagues 
(2012) pertains to the socio-structural relations between groups. According to Realistic 
Conflict Theory (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1954/1961) it is the nature of the 
relationships between groups that determine the presence or absence of prejudice and 
discrimination. Alike ingroup bias (Tajfel et al., 1971), intergroup conflict is not a necessary 
condition for the emergence of dehumanisation (e.g., Demoulin et al., 2009). On the other 
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hand, there is cooperation, which has been neurobiologically induced and proved to increase 
ingroup humanness (De Dreu, Greer, Van Kleef, Shalvi, & Handgraaf, 2011). These authors 
have shown that the administration of oxytocin led to an increase of cooperation only 
regarding ingroup members and the correlated association between uniquely human emotions 
and the ingroup (but not the outgroup).  
One of the variables that pertain to the relation between groups is the perception that 
an outgroup constitutes a symbolic threat, that challenges ingroup values, costumes and its 
identity. A serious of correlational studies were conducted where the relation between 
symbolic threat and dehumanisation was demonstrated (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; 
Cehajic et al., 2009; Cuddy et al., 2007; Delgado, Rodriguez.Pérez, Vaes, Leyens, & 
Betancor, 2009; Tam et al., 2007; Zebel et al., 2008). However, Pereira, Vala and Leyens 
(2009) were the first to test it experimentally. These authors manipulated the perception of 
humanness of an outgroup which resulted in a greater perception that that outgroup did not 
conform to the values of society. Moreover, this perception of symbolic threat mediated the 
relationship between dehumanisation and the willingness to engage in discriminatory 
behaviour only when an egalitarian (vs. a meritocratic) norm was active. This suggests that 
participants perceive the outgroup as a threat to justify the behavioural output of their 
derogatory attitude.  
Finally, we wish to discuss the role of variables that rank groups vertically on the 
dehumanisation process. This discussion will be held in a separate section because it relates 
directly to the goals of this thesis.  
Dehumanisation and Group Status 
Status has been a central construct in the study of intergroup relations and represents a 
particular challenge to dehumanisation theory. The publication of the minimal group 
paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) led however to a period of intense research 
on the socio-psychological variables which determine intergroup behaviour. Tajfel (1982) 
himself alerted to the fact that “the focus on ethnocentric variables sometimes led to a neglect 
of the role of social constrains of social situations” (p.18). According to Social Identity 
Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) status is a result of intergroup comparison and is of symbolic 
nature as it refers to a relative position of groups in a social hierarchy based on prestige. Most 
societies are made of different social classes and ethno-linguistic groups that can in fact be 
ranked according to perceived prestige.  
16 
 
There is a long tradition of analysing the relation – or conflict – between this 
motivation and the social contingencies of intergroup behaviour (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Tajfel, 
1982). The differences in the discrimination patterns between high and low status groups, 
both in natural (Doise & Sinclair, 1973) and in laboratory settings (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987, 
for a review see Brown, 2000), are not interpreted as the passive acceptance of an inferior 
status (Turner & Brown, 1978).  For instance, Reichl (1997) found that low status groups 
differentiate positively in dimensions unrelated to status, suggesting that the motivation to 
favourably compare one’s group with outgroups is still present in low-status groups despite 
structural and realistic hardships in pursuing this goal.  
Another point of view, however, is made by System Justification Theory contesting 
the idea that “the advantaged are relentlessly looking to cash in on their dominance and the 
disadvantaged are proud revolutionaries-in-waiting” (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004, p. 883). 
Jost and Banaji (1994) argue that people engage in ego, group and system justifications. In the 
case of dominant groups, the motivation to hold a favourable image of one’s group and the 
motivation to defend and legitimate the status quo are aligned. However, as to dominated 
groups, Jost and Banaji (1994) posit that the later motivation may withhold low status groups 
from favourably differentiating from high-status outgroups.   
Leyens and colleagues (2000) initially considered that this debate does not need to be 
extrapolated to the realm of dehumanisation. In fact, dehumanisation was described as a 
pervasive process, 1) that is independent from ingroup favouritism; 2) driven by ethnocentric 
motives; and 3) given that the attribution of uniquely human emotions was proposed to be 
independent from status, and social creativity processes, it is also available to low status 
groups. Indeed in a first study, Leyens and colleagues (2001) demonstrated that both high-
status (mainland Spanish) and low-status groups (Canarians) did differentiate their group from 
the proposed outgroup attributing them less uniquely human emotions. The authors argued 
that whereas some uniquely human features, as intelligence and language (Crocker, Major, & 
Steel, 1998), are bounded to social structure of society, emotions are less so. As such, 
uniquely human emotions paved the way for a use of a social creativity strategy which 
allowed low-status group to dehumanise high-status groups too. Following this initial 
endeavour, several studies already described in Chapter I, demonstrated through different 
experimental paradigms that dehumanisation based on uniquely human emotions did take 
place regardless of group status (Cortes et al., 2005; Demoulin et al., 2005; Paladino et al., 
2002). All these studies based this conclusion on perceptions towards national/regional groups 
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(e.g. Flemish vs. Dutch speaking Belgians), as did the first study that extended this effect to 
non-emotional dehumanisation. Specifically, Paladino and Vaes (2009) showed that typical 
traits of the ingroup are also considered more uniquely human, regardless of the fact that the 
ingroup had a high or a low status compared to the outgroup.  
Despite this initially straightforward evidence that status did not constitute a boundary 
condition of dehumanisation, more recent insights raised doubts on the tenability of this 
claim. Haslam and colleagues (2005; 2008), for example, discussing the content of the two 
senses of humanness referred to the fact that uniquely humanness includes some dimensions 
related to competence (e.g., intelligence). This fundamental dimension of social perception is 
in turn considered informative of group status and as is often used as a proxy of the latter 
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Jones-Lumby and Haslam (2005) drew a map of the two 
senses of humanness and the fundamental dimensions of social perception and observed that 
high status social groups are often considered concomitantly high on one or both senses of 
humanness.  
Specifically drawing on the Stereotype Content Model (SCM, Fiske et al., 2007), 
Harris and Fiske (2006; 2009) predicted that members of groups which are both low on 
competence and warmth (e.g. homeless) would be dehumanised. Moving beyond self-reports, 
the authors presented participants with a set of images of people varying according to their 
group membership within the four quadrants of the SCM, together with control objects that 
were pretested to elicit the same emotions in participants. Through a functional magnetic 
resonance imaging, these authors found that both low competence – low warmth group 
members and their control pictures (e.g. vomit), elicited disgust reactions, and, unlike group 
members that were located in the in other quadrants, they did not activate the medial pre-
frontal cortex, an area known to be associated with social cognition.  
Vaes and Paladino (2010) followed this argument testing a large set of intergroup 
contexts that varied in terms of competence and warmth of the proposed outgroups (e.g. 
Germans, Brazilians, Gypsies). The authors described an overall pervasive tendency to 
dehumanise the outgroups in comparison to the ingroup. Furthermore, there was a consistent 
trend to dehumanise those outgroups considered low on competence to a greater extent.  
Capozza, Andrighetto, Di Bernardo and Falvo (2012) tested the status effect of 
dehumanisation in minimal intergroup contexts. Manipulating ingroup status directly. These 
authors showed through and IAT that only high status group members dehumanised the lower 
status outgroup and through a GNAT that this effect was driven by both a greater association 
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between the ingroup and humanness and between the outgroup and animality. Given that this 
was the first evidence that low status groups did not dehumanise the high status outgroup, 
these authors referred to the impossibility of using a social creativity strategy in non-
emotional dehumanisation to explain their findings.  
Iatridis (2013) further explored the role of status on emotional dehumanisation, 
advancing the hypothesis that low-status groups do not attribute more uniquely human 
emotions to their group in comparison to the high status outgroup. The author argues that a 
claim for the generalizability of dehumanisation should stand in empirical evidence in 
intergroup setting defined through diverse categorisation criteria. Following this argument, his 
studies took place in the context of occupational groups (e.g. blue-collar vs. white-collar 
workers), in which low status groups were found to manifest an outgroup favouritism bias. 
Iatridis (2013) argues that it might be the case that occupational categories endow 
consensually accepted status differences and that, as such, both high and low status groups 
legitimize the status differences (Jost & Banaji, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
The picture of the role of this relational variable is completed, considering the work of 
Lammers and Stapel (2011) who focused on another stratification variable, that is, power. 
Participants’ personal sense of power was measured (Study 1) or manipulated (Study 2) using 
a power priming paradigm (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). In both cases, the greater 
the sense of power, the greater the dehumanization of the outgroup.  
Taken together, the literature on intergroup dehumanisation shows an important 
inconsistency, especially considering the nature of group status as its boundary condition.  
Overview of the Studies 
Despite the large number of studies that vary in many ways, it is still not possible to 
definitely state to what extent and under what conditions status constitutes a boundary 
condition that moderates outgroup dehumanisation.  
The inconsistent effects cannot be limited to the operationalization of humanness in 
emotional and non emotional terms, as there is evidence of independence from status using 
the former (e.g., Leyens et al., 2001) and the latter (Paladino & Vaes, 2009) 
operationalization. At the same time, also the dependence of outgroup dehumanization on 
status differences has been verified using both types of measures (e.g., Iatridis, 2013; Vaes & 
Paladino, 2010, respectively). Capozza and colleagues (2012) made an important contribution 
by transferring this debate to the laboratory, in which a minimal group setting helped to 
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surpass the plethora of variability and minimized the influence of confounding variables that 
are typically found in real intergroup contexts. Yet, in doing so, the authors did not include an 
emotional-based operationalisation of dehumanisation, leaving the door open to interpret the 
absence of dehumanisation by low-competence groups in terms of a lack of ability to be 
socially creative.  
As such, the first goal of this thesis is to contribute to further understand the 
moderating role of competence (as a proxy of status) in the process of dehumanisation. This 
goal is tackled in Paper 1 - “Stereotypes and Dehumanisation: Competence (but not Warmth) 
Moderating the Attribution of Uniquely Human Emotions in a Minimal Group Paradigm” 
(Miranda, Gouveia-Pereira, & Vaes, 2014a) – in which we build on the previous literature by 
extending the moderating role of competence/status in several ways. Like Vaes and Paladino 
(2010), the design includes a wide range of social groups that vary on the fundamental 
dimensions of social perception – competence and warmth – manipulating not only the social 
perception of the outgroups but also of participants’ ingroup. As in Capozza and colleagues 
(2012), the intergroup setting will be an otherwise minimal one, but the proposed 
differentiation will be based on the classic emotion attribution paradigm by Leyens and 
colleagues (2001).  
The second goal of this thesis is to open different pathways with the aim to integrate the 
above-mentioned inconsistent findings on the role of status on dehumanization processes. In 
Paper 2 – “When in Rome... Identification and Acculturation strategies among minority 
members moderate the dehumanisation of the majority outgroup” (Miranda, Gouveia-Pereira, 
& Vaes, 2014b) – we focus on low status group members and investigate the impact of the 
identification with the outgroup. We argue that this variable is relevant in some intergroup 
contexts (e.g., migrants, cultural minorities and even some occupational groups) in which 
intergroup mobility might be a desirable outcome. Building on insights from research on 
ingroup identification (Demoulin et al., 2009; Paladino et al., 2004) and from identification 
with a superordinate category (Gaunt, 2009), we predict that identifying oneself with a high-
status outgroup, while distancing from the original ingroup will make members of low-status 
groups dehumanise the high status outgroup to a lesser extent.  
Specifically, we will ground our research on the typology of group acculturation 
(Snauwaert, Soenens, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2003), drawing a parallel between group 
identification studies in dehumanisation and an identification approach to acculturation 
(Hutnik, 1986). A parallel can be drawn between the fourfold model of identification (Hutnik, 
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1986) and the boundaries moderators that Vaes and colleagues (2012) proposed as a 
framework in dehumanisation. We will test if this categorisation effect is extendable to other 
approaches of acculturation - contact (Berry, 1980) and ideology (Bourhis, Moïse, Perrault, & 
Senécal, 1997) - which in turn can be directly linked to relations and ideologies moderators, 
according the aforementioned framework.  
In parallel, another integration hypothesis will be assessed. In Paper 3 – “When the 
small feel strong enough: The role of power in outgroup dehumanization by low status 
groups” (Miranda, Vaes, & Gouveia-Pereira, 2014) – we tested the hypothesis that another, 
yet undetected, confounding variable was responsible for the inconsistency in dehumanisation 
patterns amongst low-status groups, that is, power.  For instance, even if Italians perceive that 
they are less competent than Japanese, we might expect them to feel nevertheless in control 
over their own future (Vaes & Paladino, 2010). On the contrary, the same logic might not 
apply to blue collar workers working with white collar workers. As described above, power 
increases dehumanisation processes (Gwinn, Judd, & Park, 2013; Lammers & Stapel, 2010) 
and power is often (Fiske, 2010), but not always (Boldry & Gaertner, 2006), associated to 
status. Furthermore, while the latter is of symbolic nature, the first refers to an instrumental 
aspect, a resource that allows control over group results (Fiske, 1993). As such, our goal is to 
extend Sachdev and Bourhis’ (1991) findings that power allows low status groups to display 
ingroup bias to the realm of outgroup dehumanization.  
While the rational for each specific hypothesis will be thoroughly addressed in each 
paper, we wish to highlight that a transversal question underlies all the research that is 
presented here: Even if the universal display of a dehumanisation bias is under pressure, does 
this challenge the assumption of an ethnocentric motivation to dehumanise? That is, even if 
low-status groups do not dehumanise high-status outgroups, do they do so because they 
consensually accept their inferiority and are motivated to justify it to sustain the larger social 
system (Jost & Banaji, 1994)? Or, in contrast, when outgroup identification is not at stake or 
when given sufficient resources (like power), will low-status groups be able to differentiate 
from high status groups on the basis of the fundamental dimension of perception that is 
humanness? 
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Stereotypes and dehumanisation: Competence (but not warmth) moderating the 
attribution of uniquely human emotions in a minimal group paradigm* 
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Abstract 
The issue whether group status and competence moderate the differential attribution of 
uniquely human features to ingroups and outgroups is yet unresolved, with empirical evidence 
pointing either way. The existing studies on this issue vary in design, intergroup context and 
operationalizations of the main dependent measures. Our aim is to experimentally vary 
ingroup and outgroup competence and warmth in an otherwise minimal intergroup situation. 
Results confirmed the hypothesis that high ingroup competence, but not low ingroup 
competence, was accompanied with a differential attribution of uniquely human emotions to 
ingroup and outgroup, but not of non-uniquely human emotions. Moreover, we found that 
warmth does not predict the same emotional dehumanisation pattern, being however 
associated with both granting and denying emotions based on their desirability. Results will 
be discussed within a stereotype content account of the dehumanisation bias.  
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Infrahumanisation theory has contributed to the field of intergroup relations 
introducing humanness as a relevant dimension of social comparison (Demoulin et al., 2004b; 
Leyens et al., 2000; 2001; 2003; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007). Their 
focus was primarily on emotions, complementing the trend of turning emotions central to the 
analysis of social identity and intergroup differentiation (Brewer, 1999; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & 
                                                 
2
 Unidade de Investigação em Psicologia Cognitiva do Desenvolvimento e da Educação, ISPA – Instituto 
Universitário, Lisbon, Portugal 
 
3
 Dipartimento di Psicologia dello Sviluppo e della Socializzazione, University of Padova, Padova, Italy  
 
* Paper submitted to Group Processes and Intergroup Relations. 
 
†
  Correspondence to: Mariana Pires de Miranda, ISPA- Instituto Universitário, R. Jardim do Tabaco, 34, 1149 -
041, Lisbon, Portugal; E-mail: mmiranda@ispa.pt 
24 
 
Glick., 1999; Smith, 1993). The authors proposed a distinction between primary or non-
uniquely human (e.g., joy, surprise, fear, anger) and secondary or uniquely human emotions 
(e.g., hope, admiration, remorse, disappointment). These emotions have been shown to vary in 
lay theory in the extent to which they are uniquely associated with human beings, with 
primary emotions being associated with both animals and humans, while secondary emotions 
are seen as an exclusively human capacity (Demoulin, Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez, 
Rodriguez, & Dovidio 2004a).  Based on this typology, Leyens and colleagues (2001) 
developed an attribution paradigm that allowed them to identify an emotional dehumanisation 
effect which translated in to a greater attribution of uniquely human emotions to the ingroup 
in comparison to the outgroup while the non-uniquely human emotions are attributed equally 
to both groups. Moreover, this effect was not qualified by the desirability of the emotions, 
presenting itself as an independent effect from a valence based group bias (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979).  
This effect was further established in other experimental paradigms. Paladino and 
colleagues (2002) adapted the implicit association test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998) and found that participants were quicker to associate uniquely human emotions to the 
ingroup and non-uniquely human emotions to the outgroup compared to the reverse 
combination. Bocatto, Cortes, Demoulin and Leyens (2007) using a lexical decision task 
(adapted from Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997) demonstrated that the latter effect was driven 
by the association between the ingroup and uniquely human emotions and not by the 
association of outgroups with non-uniquely human ones. More evidence of an emotional 
dehumanisation effect came from Vaes, Paladino and Leyens (2006), who primed participants 
with ingroup and outgroup members expressing either uniquely or non-uniquely human 
emotions, and found that when primed with uniquely human emotions expressed by a member 
of the ingroup, participants completed a word fragment completion task using more uniquely 
human words.  
This focus on emotions created some ambiguity as to whether the social-structural 
relations that define the intergroup context could moderate the dehumanisation effect. On the 
one hand, previous emotion research accentuated the degree to which emotion perception is 
tied to socio-structural relations and in particular to power and status (Kemper, 1999). For 
instance, Tiedens and colleagues have found that group status is linked to the perception of 
specific emotions and that perceiving specific emotions determines the conferral of status 
(Tiedens, 2001; Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000). On the other hand, Leyens and 
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colleagues (2001) provided evidence for the idea that both low and high status groups can 
claim uniquely human emotions to the same extent. Leyens and colleagues (2003) argued that 
a social creativity process in choosing the dimension of social comparison could be what 
allowed low status groups to favourably compete with high status groups to claim full 
humanness through the attribution of uniquely human emotions. As such, dehumanisation 
based on the ascription of uniquely human emotions to the ingroup should, unlike other 
uniquely human features (e.g. language and intelligence), take place regardless of variations 
in group status. Indeed, a first set of studies showed that group status was unrelated to 
emotional dehumanisation (Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2007; Cortes, Demoulin, 
Rodríguez-Torres, Rodríguez-Pérez, & Leyens, 2005; Demoulin et al., 2005; Leyens et al., 
2001; Paladino et al., 2002; Paladino & Vaes, 2009).  
Meanwhile, the study of dehumanisation has been extended to measuring other 
uniquely human traits besides emotions (Vaes & Paladino, 2010; Viki, Winchester, Titshall, 
& Chisango, 2006) and including other dimensions of humanness (Bain, Park, Kwok, & 
Haslam, 2009; Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005)
4
. Haslam and his team presented 
an analysis of humanness that encompasses two dimensions. On the one hand, uniquely 
humanness is defined by comparison with non-humans (i.e., animals) and its denial to a group 
was named animalistic dehumanisation. On the other hand, mechanistic dehumanisation can 
also be observed and consists in the denial of core – not necessarily unique - traits of 
humanness, coined as human nature (see Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 2008 for a 
review).  
The authors mapped these two dimensions of humanness onto the two fundamental 
dimensions of social perception, warmth and competence, proposed by Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, and 
Glick (1999). Initially, they based their analysis on the correlation of both dimensions of 
humanness with the traits of the five-factor model (Costa & McCrae, 1989). Human nature is 
related to a general sense of emotionality that does not confine itself to warmth or 
agreeableness, including both positive and negative traits. Human uniqueness, while also 
including non-competence related characteristics (e.g. refinement), also encompasses 
dimensions related to competence (e.g. intelligence and consciousness) (Haslam et al., 2005; 
2008).  
                                                 
4
 Recently the term dehumanisation has been gaining ground to refer to any difference in viewing others as less 
human in detriment of the term infrahumanisation. In this article we will therefore use dehumanisation as the 
scaling of groups in terms of humanness. 
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The attribution or denial of warmth and competence are directly related to the socio-
structural relations between the groups at hand (Fiske et al., 2007). While the level of 
competition between groups is inversely related with the attribution of warmth, status 
prescribes whether a group and its members will be seen as competent or not. Therefore, 
differences in competence have been interpreted often as a proxy of status differences. More 
evidence that status, through its link with competence, does have an impact on 
dehumanisation comes from Harris and Fiske (2006). Focussing on the neural correlates of 
dehumanisation, these authors observed that members of low competence (and low warmth) 
outgroups do not activate the medial pre-frontal cortex, a part of the brain that is exclusively 
associated with social (compared to object) perception.  
More recently, Vaes and Paladino (2010) measured dehumanisation comparing 
different intergroup contexts according to the dimensions of the Stereotype Content Model 
(Fiske et al., 2002). The authors described a persistent dehumanisation effect in favour of the 
ingroup, but the strength of this effect varied as a function of the perceived competence, but 
not the perceived warmth of the outgroup. The more the outgroup was perceived as 
competent, the less the outgroup was seen as less human. Following these findings, other 
recent studies have found status effects reporting that the outgroup was only dehumanised 
relative to the ingroup when the former had lower status or was seen as less competent 
compared to the ingroup (Capozza, Andrighetto, Di Bernardo, & Falvo, 2012; Miranda, 
Gouveia-Pereira, & Vaes, In press). Focusing on emotional dehumanisation, Iatridis (2013; 
see also Rohmann, Niedenthal, Brauer, Castano, & Leyens, 2009) managed to demonstrate a 
similar effect showing that people refrained from attributing more uniquely human emotions 
to the ingroup when confronted with a higher status outgroup. His explanation focused on the 
different nature of the group categorizations. Iatridis (2013), unlike previous researcher who 
focused on national, regional or ethnical intergroup contexts, looked at the role of status 
differences in occupational groups. Given that status differences are more consensual and 
perceived as legitimate in occupational groups, status will be especially important in these 
intergroup situations. 
Taken together, the literature on dehumanisation shows an important inconsistency 
surrounding the moderating role of intergroup status differences. It is important to note, 
however, that this inconsistency is accompanied by a great deal of variation in study designs, 
intergroup contexts and operationalizations of the dependent measures.  
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The Present Research 
With the aim to resolve the above-mentioned inconsistencies, it is important to analyse 
the emotional dehumanisation effect in an intergroup setting that only systematically varies 
the perceived competence and warmth of an ingroup and an outgroup. Capozza and 
colleagues (2012) have already used an experimental design that included a status 
manipulation in a minimal group setting. Nevertheless the dependent variable used was 
unrelated to emotions. As such, it is still possible to argue that low status participants in this 
study were unable to dehumanise a high status group because uniquely humanness was 
operationalised in terms of traits that are too closely lined up with the stereotype of a high 
status group (e.g., intelligence, rationality). In this way, using the original measures that were 
proposed by Leyens and colleagues (2001), we can verify whether perceived differences in 
status and competence are indeed central to observing an emotional dehumanisation effect. 
Moreover, the only study that manipulated both warmth and competence was that of Vaes and 
Paladino (2010), in which, however, the ingroup was kept the same. Producing systematic 
variations or at least controlling for both competence and warmth is especially relevant when 
considering the possibility of a compensation effect so that low competence groups are 
perceived to be warm and low warmth groups are seen as highly competent (Kervyn, Yzerbyt, 
& Judd, 2010). Taking into consideration the primacy of warmth over competence in the 
perception of others (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007), measuring or manipulating only competence 
or status (e.g., Iatridis, 2013) may be obscuring an effect of warmth. As such, we will 
experimentally create groups using the minimal group paradigm that will only vary in terms 
of these fundamental dimensions of social perception. 
Considering the established relationship between competence and status and uniquely 
humanness (Haslam et al., 2005; Vaes & Paladino, 2010), we hypothesise that variations in 
competence associated to the ingroup will produce variations in the attribution of uniquely 
human emotions to the ingroup and the outgroup. Specifically, we expect that the differential 
attribution of uniquely human emotions, when controlling for the non-uniquely human 
emotions, will only take place when its members can be perceived as high in competence. 
Importantly, we operationalised dehumanisation using uniquely and non-uniquely human 
emotions, since they are theoretically the most conservative in revealing an effect of 
competence on dehumanisation (Leyens et al., 2001).  
Given that ingroup identification is correlated with perceptions of competence and 
warmth (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007) and with the dehumanisation effect as well 
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(Demoulin et al., 2009; Miranda et al., in press; Paladino, Vaes, Castano, Demoulin, & 
Leyens, 2004), in our analyses ingroup identification will be controlled for. 
Method 
Participants and design. 
Participants were 127 undergraduate Psychology students at a Portuguese university, 
17 of whom were excluded as not being Portuguese native speakers. 80% were female and the 
sample’s mean age was 24.85 years old (SD = 8.23). Based on the quadrants of the Stereotype 
Content Model (Fiske et al., 2002), participants were assigned to one of three ingroups: high 
competence and high warmth, high competence and low warmth or low competence and high 
warmth. No low competence and low warmth ingroup was proposed as there is no evidence 
such ingroups exist in a natural setting (Cuddy et al., 2009). These ingroups were compared 
with an outgroup that could represent all four of the quadrants varying competence and 
warmth. Importantly, however, and given our focus on asymmetries in warmth and 
competence, no intergroup settings where groups were symmetrical on both competence and 
warmth were created. As a result, participants were randomly assigned to one of nine 
experimental conditions. Cell size ranged from 10 to 14 participants. Also, the order in which 
the dependent variables were answered for the ingroup first or for the outgroup first was 
counterbalanced. 
Procedure and materials. 
Participants were greeted upon arrival at the laboratory and took part in the study in 
exchange for course credits. They were informed that the International Agency for Global 
Solutions in Development formed a method for creating work groups, through individual 
profiles. Also, participants were told that research had allowed the Agency to compare these 
groups and predict both the interactions of its members and their way of managing their tasks. 
The bogus test was presented as a free association task and participants were asked to 
generate new words from the “verbal stimuli” that were presented. These were in fact twenty 
non-words pre-tested as neutral (Domingos & Garcia-Marques, 2008; sample stimulus: 
“cantasia”). Subsequently, participants were told to read a news story (neutral as to mood, 
Garcia-Marques, 2005) to allow enough time for the computer to compare individual results 
and generate the working groups. After around 3 minutes had elapsed, participants were given 
false feedback on the fake ingroup and a fake outgroup that had been formed. The feedback 
comprised information related to high or low competence and warmth, following the 
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experimental design. The feedback of a low competence, high warmth ingroup sounded as 
follows:  
Your group is made up of easygoing people. So, they often organise social gatherings outside 
the work context. Also, they are welcoming when they meet people outside their group. 
Whenever they have to choose which task to work on, the members of this group select tasks 
that are related to environmental topics, but that do not have high visibility or importance. 
There is no investment in the detailed planning of the tasks, so often the deadlines are not met. 
However, all members cooperate with each other in all phases of the task completion. Due to 
their commitment to issues that are unrelated to the task, namely the positive interaction 
between its members, this group is not a group of high prestige. This reflects itself in the fact 
that they are hardly ever invited to lectures in conferences. 
After reading the feedback for the ingroup and for the outgroup, participants were 
asked to complete the ingroup identification scale, an emotional dehumanisation measure and 
the manipulation checks for ingroup and outgroup competence and warmth. Finally, 
participants were asked to provide some demographic information. All rating scales were 
presented in a 7-point format. At the end, all participants were thanked and fully debriefed.  
Identification scale. 
The identification scale consisted of six affirmations (Miranda et al., in press; sample 
item: “Belonging to the ingroup is important to me”) and participants indicated their 
agreement to each one of them using a seven points scale, ranging from 1 = totally disagree to 
7 = totally agree (α = .91). 
Emotional dehumanisation measure. 
The measure used here was adapted from Leyens and colleagues (2001). As such 
participants saw a list of 16 emotions and were asked to pick those they would use to describe 
the ingroup. The same was done for the attribution of emotions to the outgroup. 
A pretest was conducted in order to identify four groups of four emotions: the 
uniquely human (uh) desirable (des) emotions (e.g. “esperança” [hope]; Muh = 5.80, SDuh = 
0.81, Mdes = 6.51, SDdes = 0.37); the uniquely human undesirable emotions (e.g. “angústia” 
[anguish]; Muh = 5.39, SDuh = 0.87, Mdes = 1.90, SDdes = 0.69), the non-uniquely human 
desirable emotions (e.g. “prazer” [pleasure]; Muh = 3.41, SDuh = 1.15, Mdes = 6.65, SDdes = 
0.42) and the non-uniquely human undesirable emotions (e.g. “medo” [fear]; Muh = 3.42, SDuh 
= 1.02, Mdes = 1.90, SDdes = 0.61). The analysis performed assured that these emotions were 
30 
 
orthogonal as to their level of uniquely humanness and desirability. As such uniquely human 
emotions were judged as more uniquely human than the non-uniquely human emotions (F(1, 
26) = 130.830, p ≤ .0001, ηp
2 
 = .834), but did not differ in terms of valence (F(1, 26) = 1.367, 
p = .253). At the same time, the desirable emotions were evaluated as more desirable than the 
undesirable emotions (F(1, 28) = 2231.481, p ≤ .0001, ηp
2
 = .988) and this effect was not 
qualified by the human uniqueness of the emotions (F (1, 28) = .215, p = .646).  
Manipulation checks. 
In order to check our manipulations, participants were asked to attribute 5 competence 
and 5 sociability traits (adapted from Fiske et al., 2002) to both the ingroup and the outgroup, 
using 7-point rating scales  (all α’s ≥ .832).  
Results 
The order factor did not show any consistent pattern in the analyses and was therefore 
discarded from the following analyses. 
Manipulation checks. 
We performed a MANOVA with the rating given to ingroup and outgroup competence 
as a dependent variable, introducing the high or low competence manipulation feedback as a 
between-subject factor
5
. Results show that when the ingroup was given high competence the 
rating of competence for the ingroup (M = 5.90, SD = 0.92) was indeed higher than when in 
presence of a feedback of low ingroup competence (M = 5.22, SD = 1.00, F(1, 106) = 8.087, p 
= .005, ηp
2
 = .071). The outgroup competence feedback had no impact on the ingroup 
competence ratings (F(1, 106) = 1.988, p = .161). When looking at the outgroup competence 
ratings, they were higher when outgroup competence feedback was also high (Mhigh = 5.03, 
SDhigh = 1.43, Mlow = 3.96, SDlow = 1.35, F(1, 106) = 11.391, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .097). Again the 
ingroup competence feedback did not affect the outgroup competence ratings (F(1, 106) = 
.652, p = .421). 
A second MANOVA was carried out, this time to account for the groups’ perception 
in terms of warmth as a function of the warmth manipulation. Once more the manipulation 
worked, as ratings of outgroup warmth were higher when the feedback for the outgroup was 
high in this dimension (Mhigh = 5.01, SDhigh = 1.26, Mlow = 2.79, SDlow = 1.15, F(1, 106) = 
                                                 
5
 As explained in the method section, no equal competence and warmth intergroup settings were created, leading 
to an incomplete design. Analyses were run separately for competence and warmth manipulations, so to produce 
interpretable GLM without empty cells. 
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75.875, p ≤ .001, ηp
2
 = .417) and there was no influence of the ingroup warmth manipulation 
(F(1, 106) = .562, p = .445). In addition, ingroup warmth ratings were higher when the given 
feedback was in accordance (Mhigh = 5.93, SDhigh = 0.90, Mlow = 4.29, SDlow = 1. 15, F(1, 106) 
= 39.276, p ≤ .0001, ηp
2
 = .270). However, here the manipulations were not completely 
independent as there was also an influence of the feedback given on outgroup warmth on the 
ingroup warmth ratings. Specifically, these ratings for the ingroup were higher when the 
outgroup was depicted high rather than low in warmth (F(1, 106) = 4.022, p = .047, ηp
2
 = 
.037). 
Ingroup identification. 
Ingroup identification was calculated taking the mean of the six identification items. 
The mean ingroup identification was 5.05 (SD = 1.39), there was however a significant 
variation between the nine different intergroup settings, that ranged from the middle point of 
the scale (3.47) to almost the maximum (6.18) (F(1, 101) = 6.579, p ≤ .0001, ηp
2
 = .952). 
Hence, ingroup identification will be considered as a covariate in the remaining analyses. 
Emotional dehumanisation and stereotype content. 
Since we have an incomplete design, the analysis on the dehumanisation effect will be 
carried out separately for group competence and warmth. 
We performed an ANCOVA with uniquely humanness, desirability and target group 
as within-subject factors, ingroup and outgroup competence feedback as fixed between-
subject factor and identification as a covariate. Results revealed no overall dehumanisation 
effect. The uniquely humanness of emotions interacted marginally with the target group (F(1, 
105) = 2.800, p = .097, ηp
2
 = .026) suggesting that participants differentiated the ingroup from 
the outgroup to a greater extent when attributing non-uniquely human (F(1, 105) = 11.037, p 
= .001, ηp
2
 = .095) compared to uniquely human emotions (F(1, 105) = 3.047, p = .084, ηp
2
 = 
.028).  
Concerning our hypothesis that competence moderates dehumanisation, the attribution 
of emotions interacted significantly with ingroup competence (F(1, 105) = 4.459, p = .037, ηp
2
 
= .041), but not with outgroup competence (F(1, 105) = 1.206, p = .275) or with both (F < 1). 
Importantly, this significant interaction was not qualified by the desirability of the emotions 
(F(1, 105) = .674, p = .413), as none of the other effects were (all F’s < 1.17). As such, we 
will focus on the variations in the ingroup analysing the emotional dehumanisation in high 
and low competence ingroups separately (see Table 1). 
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Emotions Target 
High Ingroup Competence Low Ingroup Competence 
Mean
 a
 Std. Error Mean
 a
 Std. Error 
Non-Uniquely 
Human 
Ingroup 1.337 .062 1.511 .091 
Outgroup 1.263 .075 1.046 .098 
Uniquely 
Human 
Ingroup 1.290 .073 1.106 .120 
Outgroup 1.079
 
 .067 1.037 .112 
a. Covarying for identification.  
 
Table 1: Mean and standard errors of the attribution of uniquely human and non-uniquely 
human emotions to the ingroup and outgroup in the conditions of high and low ingroup 
competence. 
 
When the ingroup is depicted as having low competence there is no significant 
interaction between emotions and group target (F < 1). As predicted, the same interaction was 
significant when ingroup competence is high (F(1, 73) = 3.383, p = .07, ηp
2
 = .044). Contrast 
analysis with Sidak adjustment shows that this effect indeed corresponds to a greater 
attribution of uniquely human emotions to the ingroup in comparison to the outgroup (F(1, 
73) = 6.056, p = .016, ηp
2
 = .077). Furthermore, the difference in attribution did not extend to 
the non-uniquely human emotions (F < 1). Moreover, this effect is not qualified by ingroup 
identification (F(1, 73) = 2.597, p = .111) nor can it be explained by the desirability of the 
emotions (F < 1). 
The same analyses were carried out looking at variations in the attribution of uniquely 
human and non-uniquely human emotions to the ingroup and outgroup in terms of ingroup 
and outgroup warmth, but no significant effects emerged (all F’s < 1).  
Despite the fact that ingroup and outgroup warmth did not predict an emotional 
dehumanisation effect, it did correlated with the attribution of desirable and undesirable 
emotions to both ingroup and outgroup. An exploratory analysis of bivariate correlations 
showed that when ingroup warmth was high, participants attributed more desirable traits to 
the ingroup (r(110) = .335, p ≤ .001), more undesirable traits to the outgroup (r(110) = .367, p 
≤ .001), less undesirable traits to the ingroup (r(110) = -.212, p ≤ .026), and less desirable 
traits to the outgroup (r(110) = -.438, p ≤ .001). Results as to the effect of the manipulation of 
outgroup warmth perfectly mimic this pattern, as can be seen in Table 2. On the other hand, 
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no associations were found between the competence manipulation and the attribution of 
desirable and undesirable emotions (all p’s ≥ .238). 
 
  Competence manipulation Warmth manipulation 
Emotions Target Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
Desirable 
Ingroup ,039 -,085 ,335** -,257** 
Outgroup ,078 ,052 -,438** ,442** 
Undesirable 
Ingroup -,052 ,114 -,212* ,190* 
Outgroup ,046 -,086 ,367** -,406** 
* p ≤. 05; ** p ≤ .01;  
 
Table 2: Bivariate correlations between competence and warmth manipulations and the 
attribution of positive and negative emotions to ingroup and outgroup. 
 
Discussion  
This study aimed to isolate the role of perceived competence in determining the 
dehumanisation bias. As expected, the reported results showed that perceiving one’s group 
high in competence is a necessary condition for the display of a dehumanisation bias. 
This is particularly relevant when considering the fact that some group members locate 
their ingroups and their reference groups in quadrants other than the high competence – high 
warmth one. In a cross-cultural study, Cuddy and colleagues (2009) verified that ingroups and 
reference groups in individualistic societies are stereotypically viewed as high in both 
competence and warmth, while participants in more collectivist societies stereotype these 
groups in a less favourable way. In fact, much like the intergroup settings we recreated in our 
design, these groups could be found in a high competence – low warmth quadrant, a low 
competence – high warmth quadrant, or a middle competence – middle warmth area.  
Also, adding to the work by Iatridis (2013) and Capozza and colleagues (2012), we 
ruled out the possibility that variations in perceived group warmth have any effect on 
dehumanisation. One indeed needs to know others’ intentions (Fiske et al., 2002) to be able to 
position a group with respect to its warmth and predict patterns of prejudice and 
discrimination (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007).  However, perceived warmth in this study was 
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only related to a likability bias showing that perceived warmth was associated with the 
general attribution of positive emotionality. Group members who perceived their ingroup high 
on warmth or the outgroup low on this dimension attributed a significant greater amount of 
desirable emotions to their ingroup. This effect, however, did not influence the differential 
attribution of emotions based on their humanness.  
Intergroup differences in perceived competence, on the other hand, showed to predict 
the attribution of emotions on the basis of their humanness, independently of their desirability. 
Even though we do not want to claim that competence is never associated with a valence 
based intergroup bias, as has been frequently argued throughout the literature (e.g. Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979), our results suggest that when people are presented with emotions that can be 
simultaneously classified in terms of their desirability and human uniqueness, members of 
high competence groups chose to differentiate their group from the other based only on the 
latter dimension.  
In this study we did not find any evidence that variations in perceived outgroup  
competence were linked to changes in dehumanisation, a finding that is both in contrast with 
our hypothesis and results reported in previous research (Harris & Fiske, 2006; Vaes & 
Paladino, 2010). A post hoc explanation could be found in some of the specificities that 
characterise natural and minimal group settings. In fact, most of the former research was 
conducted in a natural setting studying national outgroups or chronically marginalized 
outgroups like homeless people. All these groups have a clear history and often a negative or 
conflicting relationship with the ingroup. In the minimal group paradigm adopted here, 
instead, it is likely that ingroup information took primacy over outgroup information limiting 
the effects of outgroup competence on dehumanisation.  
Finally, the results of the current study might provide new explanations for the 
inconsistent dehumanisation findings in group settings that are marked by asymmetries in 
perceived competence and status relations. From this study, one can conclude that low 
competence ingroups in the absence of any other socio-structural differences between groups 
will refrain from dehumanising a more competent outgroup. On the basis of this result, one 
could argue that low status groups consensually internalise their inferiority, and are motivated 
to maintain this inequality (Jost & Banaji, 1994), even renouncing to claim the humanness 
dimension to describe their ingroup. However, the multiple cases in which lower status groups 
do in fact dehumanise the higher status outgroups points otherwise. This is found to be the 
case of asymmetric national groups (Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2007; Cortes, 
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Demoulin, Rodríguez-Torres, Rodríguez-Pérez, & Leyens, 2005; Demoulin et al., 2005; 
Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002; Paladino & Vaes, 2009), where the existence of 
other variables might compensate the absence of status. For instance, the control over one’s 
group’s fate or power – which can be expected to be present in national groups, but not in 
minimal groups – has been shown to have an impact on dehumanisation (Lammers & Stapel, 
2011). Power is indeed associated to status in natural intergroup settings (Fiske, 2010) and in 
a context in which they are disentangled, granting a low status group control over the fate of a 
high status outgroup has shown to produce the significant dehumanisation of that outgroup 
(Miranda, Vaes, & Gouveia-Pereira, 2014).  
It is true that in the present minimal group paradigm, low competence participants had 
no other contextual cue to be socially creative. As such, this study clearly shows that the 
operationalisation of dehumanisation through uniquely human emotions is not sufficient to 
promote such social creativity, as first assumed (Leyens et al., 2001). The door is therefore 
opened for explaining competence/status inconsistencies in non-emotional terms. This can be 
an advantage considering that predictions of emotion attribution among high and low status 
groups are sometimes contradictory. For instance, in the face of negative outcomes, Tiedens 
(2000) has shown that people expect high status people to experience anger, whereas low 
status are perceived as guilty. These differences occur because some emotions are 
stereotypically related to status, partially because of differential agency appraisals. However, 
Demoulin and colleagues (2004a) have shown that anger is a prototypical non-uniquely 
human emotion, whereas guilt is a prototypical uniquely human emotion. As such, a 
prediction based on the dehumanisation literature would sustain the reverse effect of that 
reported by Tiedens (2000).  
All in all, this study further contributes to the understanding of the role of competence 
and status in moderating a dehumanisation bias. For the first time the role of this variable was 
investigated simultaneously with the other fundamental dimension of social perception – 
warmth – and limiting the influence of other confounding variables through the adoption of a 
minimal group paradigm. The observed results pave the road for the re-introduction of socio-
structural determinants, like status and competence, for a better understanding of the 
dynamics of people’s tendency to dehumanise. 
 
 
36 
 
Acknowledgments 
This research was funded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology in the 
form of a grant to the first author (SFRH/BD/32224/2006). 
 
References 
Abele, A., & Wojciszke, B. (2007). Agency and communion from the perspective of self 
versus others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 751-763. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.93.5.751 
Bain, P., Park, J., Kwok, C., & Haslam, N. (2009). Attributing human uniqueness and human 
nature to cultural groups: Distinct forms of subtle dehumanization. Group Processes 
and Intergroup Relations, 12, 789-805. doi:10.1177/1368430209340415 
Boccato, G., Cortes, B. P., Demoulin, S., & Leyens, J. Ph. (2007). The automaticity of infra-
humanization. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 987–999. 
doi:10.1002/ejsp.412 
Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love or outgroup hate? Journal 
of Social Issues, 55, 429-444. doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00126 
Capozza, D., Andrighetto, L., Di Bernardo, G. A., & Falvo, R. (2012). Does status affect 
intergroup perceptions of humanity? Group Processes Intergroup Relations, 15, 363-
377. doi:10.1177/1368430211426733 
Cortes, B. P., Demoulin, S., Rodríguez-Torres, R., Rodríguez-Pérez, A., & Leyens, J.-Ph. 
(2005). Infra-humanization of familiarity? Attribution of uniquely human emotions to 
the self, the ingroup, and the outgroup. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
31, 253-263. doi:10.1177/0146167204271421 
Costa, R. R., & McCrae, P. T. (1989). The structure of interpersonal traits: Wiggins's 
circumplex and the five-factor model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
56, 586-595. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.56.4.586 
Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., Glick, P. (2007). The BIAS map: Behaviors from intergroup 
affect and stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 631-648. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.92.4.631 
37 
 
Cuddy, A. J. C, Fiske, S. T., Kwan, V. S. Y., Glick, P., Demoulin, S., Leyens, J.-Ph. ... 
Ziegler, R. (2009). Stereotype content model across cultures: Towards universal 
similarities and some differences. British Journal of Social Psychology, 48, 1-33. 
doi:10.1348/014466608X314935 
Demoulin, S., Cortes, B. P., Viki, T. G., Rodríguez- Pérez, A., Rodríguez-Torres, R., 
Paladino, M. P., & Leyens, J.-Ph. (2009). The role of in-group identification in infra-
humanization. International Journal of Psychology, 44, 4–11. 
doi:10.1080/00207590802057654 
Demoulin, S., Leyens, J. Ph., Paladino, M. P., Rodriguez, R. T., Rodriguez, A. P., & Dovidio, 
J. F. (2004a). Dimensions of “uniquely” and “non-uniquely” emotions. Cognition and 
Emotion, 18, 71–96. doi:10.1080/02699930244000444 
Demoulin, S., Leyens, J.-Ph, Rodríguez-Torres, R., Rodríguez-Pérez, A., Paladino, M. P., & 
Fiske, S. (2005) Motivation to support a desired conclusion versus motivation to avoid 
an undesirable conclusion: The case of infra-humanization. International Journal of 
Psychology, 40, 416–428. doi:10.1080/00207590500184495 
Demoulin, S., Rodríguez-Torres, R., Rodríguez-Pérez, A., Vaes, J., Paladino, M. P., Gaunt, 
R., & Leyens, J.-Ph. (2004b). Emotional prejudice can lead to infrahumanization. In 
W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European Review of Social Psychology (Vol. 15, 
259–296). London: Psychology Press. doi:10.1080/10463280440000044 
Domingos, A., & Garcia-Marques, T. (2008). Normas de valência e familiaridade de não-
palavras portuguesas [Norms of valence and familiarity of Portuguese non-words]. 
Laboratório de Psicologia, 6, 49-75 
Fiske, S. (2010). Interpersonal stratification: Power, Status and Subordination. In S. Fiske, D. 
Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology – Volume Two (pp. 941 
- 982). New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
Fiske, S., Cuddy, A., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype 
Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow From Perceived Status and 
Competition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 878–902. 
doi:10.1037//0022-3514.82.6.878 
38 
 
Fiske, S., Xu, J., Cuddy, A., & Glick, P. (1999). (Dis)respecting versus (dis)liking: Status and 
interdependence predict ambivalent stereotypes of competence and warmth. Journal of 
Social Issues, 55, 473-489. doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00128 
Garcia-Marques, T. (2005). Fiquei Triste/Contente com a leitura deste artigo! A manipulação 
do estado de espírito através de histórias [I was Sad/Happy when I read this article! 
Mood manipulation through stories]. Laboratório de Psicologia, 3, 23-4. 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. K. L. (1998). Measuring individual 
differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 74, 1464–1480. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1464 
Harris, L. T., & Fiske, S. T. (2006).Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: Neuroimaging 
Responses to Extreme Out-Groups. Psychological Science, 17, 847-853. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01793.x 
Haslam, N., Bain, P., Douge, L., Lee, M., & Bastian, B. (2005). More human than you: 
Attributing humanness to self and others. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 89, 937–950. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.89.6.937 
Haslam, N., Loughnan, S., Kashima, Y., & Bain, P. (2008). Attributing and denying 
humanness to others. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social 
psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 55–85). Hove, UK: Psychology Press. 
Iatridis, T. (2013). Occupational status differences in attributions of uniquely human 
emotions. British Journal of Social Psychology, 52, 431-449. doi:10.1111/j.2044-
8309.2011.02094.x 
Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the 
production of false consciousness. British Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 1-27. 
doi:10.1111/j.2044-8309.1994.tb01008.x 
Kemper, T. (1991). Predicting emotions from social relations. Social Psychology Quarterly, 
54, 330-342. doi:10.2307/2786845 
Kervyn, N., Yzerbyt, V., & Judd, C. M. (2010). Compensation between warmth and 
competence: Antecedents and consequences of a negative relation between the two 
fundamental dimensions of social perception. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), 
European review of social psychology, 21, 155–187. 
doi:10.1080/13546805.2010.517997 
39 
 
Lammers, J., & Stapel, D. A. (2011). Power increases dehumanization. Group Processes & 
Intergroup relations, 14, 113-126. doi:10.1177/1368430210370042 
Leach, C. W., Ellemers, N., & Barreto, M. (2007). Group virtue: The importance of morality 
(vs. competence and sociability) in the positive evaluation of in-groups. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 234-249. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.93.2.234 
Leyens, J.-Ph., Paladino, M. P., Rodríguez-Torres, R., Vaes, J., Demoulin, S., Rodríguez-
Pérez, A., & Gaunt, R. (2000). The emotional side of prejudice: The attribution of 
secondary emotions to ingroups and outgroups. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 4, 186–197. doi:10.1207/S15327957PSPR0402_06 
Leyens, J.-Ph., Rodríguez-Pérez, A., Rodríguez-Torres, R., Gaunt, R., Paladino, M. P., Vaes, 
J., & Demoulin, S. (2001). Psychological essentialism and the differential attribution 
of uniquely human emotions to ingroups and outgroups. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 31, 395–411. doi:10.1002/ejsp.50 
Leyens, J.-Ph., Cortes, B., Demoulin, S., Dovidio, J., Fiske, S., Gaunt, R., … Vaes, J. (2003). 
Emotional prejudice, essentialism, and nationalism: The 2002 Tajfel lecture. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 703–717. doi:10.1002/ejsp.170 
Leyens, J. Ph., Demoulin, S., Vaes, J., Gaunt, R., & Paladino, M. P. (2007). Infra-
humanization: The wall of group differences. Journal of Social Issues and Policy 
Review, 1, 139-172. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-2409.2007.00006.x 
Miranda, M., Gouveia-Pereira, M., & Vaes, J. (in press). When in Rome... Identification and 
Acculturation strategies among minority members moderate the dehumanisation of the 
majority outgroup. European Journal of Social Psychology.  
Miranda, M., Vaes, J. & Gouveia-Pereira, M. (2014). When the small feel strong enough: The 
role of power in low status groups on outgroup dehumanization. Manuscript submitted 
for publication. 
Paladino, M. P., Leyens, J.-Ph., Rodríguez-Torres, R., Rodríguez-Pérez, A., Gaunt, R., & 
Demoulin, S. (2002). Differential association of uniquely and non uniquely human 
emotions to the ingroup and the outgroup. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 5, 
105–117. doi:10.1177/1368430202005002539 
40 
 
Paladino, M. P., & Vaes, J. (2009). Ours is human: On the pervasiveness of infra-
humanization in intergroup relations. British Journal of Social Psychology, 48, 237-
251. doi:10.1348/014466608X322882 
Paladino, M. P., Vaes, J., Castano, E., Demoulin, S., & Leyens, J.-Ph. (2004). Emotional 
infra-humanization in intergroup relations: The role of national identification in the 
attribution of primary and secondary emotions to Italians and Germans. Current 
Psychology of Cognition, 22, 519 –536 
Rohmann, A., Niedenthal, P.M., Brauer, M., Castano, E., & Leyens, J.-Ph. (2009). The 
attribution of primary and secondary emotions to the in-group and to the outgroup: 
The case of equal status countries. The Journal of Social Psychology,149, 709-730. 
doi:10.1080/00224540903348253 
Smith, E. R. (1993). Social Identity and Social Emotions - toward new conceptualizations of 
Prejudice. In D. Mackie, & D. Hamilton (Eds.), Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping 
(pp. 186-204). New York: Academic Press. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In W. Austin 
& S. Worchel (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (pp. 33-53). 
Monterey – California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co.  
Tiedens, L. Z. (2001). Anger and advancement versus sadness and subjugation: The effect of 
negative emotions expressions on social status conferral. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 80, 86-94. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.80.1.86 
Tiedens, L. Z., Ellsworth, P. C., & Mesquita, B. (2000). Stereotypes about sentiments and 
status: Emotional expectations for high- and low-status group members. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 560-574. doi:10.1177/0146167200267004 
Vaes, J. & Paladino, M. P. (2010). The uniquely human content of stereotypes. Group 
Processes and Intergroup Relations, 13, 23-39. doi:10.1177/1368430209347331 
Vaes, J., Paladino, M. P., & Leyens, J. Ph. (2006). Priming uniquely human emotions and the 
in-group (but not the out-group) activates humanity concepts. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 36, 169-181. doi:10.1002/ejsp.279 
Viki, G. T., Winchester, L., Titshall, L., & Chisango, T. (2006). Beyond secondary emotions: 
The infra- humanization of groups using human-related and animal-related words. 
Social Cognition, 24, 753–775. doi:10.1521/soco.2006.24.6.753 
41 
 
Wittenbrink, B., Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (1997). Evidence for racial prejudice at the implicit 
level and its relationship with questionnaire measures. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 72, 262–274. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.72.2.262 
 
 
43 
 
When in Rome… Identification and acculturation strategies among minority members 
moderate the dehumanisation of the majority outgroup* 
Mariana P. Miranda
6†
, Maria Gouveia-Pereira
6
, Jeroen Vaes
7
 
 
Abstract 
The study of humanness as a dimension of social judgment has received extensive attention 
over the past decade. Although the common reported finding is that people attribute more 
human characteristics to their ingroup than to the outgroup, similar tendencies are expected to 
be tempered for minority groups when judging the host society. In Study 1, carried out with 
Gypsy minority members, we tested the hypothesis that those group members who adopt an 
assimilative strategy identifying more with the host compared with the heritage culture will 
display the lowest levels of dehumanisation. In Studies 2 and 3, conducted with immigrants in 
Italy and in Portugal, respectively, the hypothesis was extended from an identification 
conceptualisation to an acculturation one. Despite significant variability in intergroup settings 
andmeasures, results confirmed our hypothesis that immigrants who choose to assimilate with 
the host culture dehumanise the outgroup less compared with those who adopt any of the 
other acculturation strategies. Implications for the ethnocentric nature of dehumanisation 
biases and for intergroup relations in general are discussed. 
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Humanness is a fundamental dimension of social judgment in intergroup relations and 
beyond (Bain, Vaes, & Leyens, 2014; Haslam, 2006; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & 
Paladino, 2007). In the past decade, a considerable amount of research has been developed on 
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the basis of this idea. Arguably, the first research programme designed by Leyens and his 
colleagues focused on intergroup relations and started from the principal Q2 of ethnocentrism 
(Leyens et al., 2000). These researchers hypothesised and found that ingroup members tended 
to consider themselves as uniquely human, whereas outgroups fell short on that dimension 
(for review, see Demoulin, Rodríguez-Torres, et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2007). Even though 
this finding has been replicated many times in a large variety of intergroup settings, a purely 
ethnocentric explanation of dehumanisation effects has come under increased pressure. When 
focusing on low-status ingroups, recent findings suggest that these groups may dehumanise 
high-status outgroups to a lesser extent or even not at all (Capozza, Andrighetto, Di Bernardo, 
& Falvo, 2012; Iatridis, 2013; Vaes & Paladino, 2010). The exploration of variability among 
low-status group members in dehumanising high-status outgroups has therefore gained a 
renewed interest. In this paper, we will focus on the combined role of ingroup and outgroup 
identifications in shaping the dehumanisation of the majority outgroup among cultural 
minorities and immigrants. Furthermore, we will bridge our findings from a group 
identification perspective to a framework in which acculturation strategies are analysed.  
Infrahumanisation and Dehumanisation 
Although early theories in intergroup relations emphasised the radical nature of the 
process of dehumanisation and its role in explaining violent conflict, genocide and war 
(Staub, 1989), more recent accounts have extended the concept proving its relevance in more 
subtle and everyday intergroup contexts. Infrahumanisation theory (Leyens et al., 2000) was 
introduced to give evidence of such subtle forms of dehumanisation. Leyens and colleagues 
used the distinction between secondary, or uniquely human and primary, and non-uniquely 
human emotions (Demoulin, Leyens, et al., 2004) to show that individuals do attribute more 
secondary emotions to the ingroup than to the outgroup, whereas no differences were 
observed in the attribution of primary emotions (Leyens et al., 2001). Ethnocentric motives 
have always been proposed to underlie this intergroup bias. Group members scale and rate 
others in reference to their own group that is seen as fully human, implying that others are 
designated as less human than the ingroup. Importantly, this effect was independent from the 
valence of the emotions, showing that this proposed infrahumanisation process was distinct 
from the well-established ingroup positivity bias (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Subsequent 
research extended the infrahumanisation results to other methodological paradigms (Boccato, 
Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2007; Paladino et al., 2002; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2006) 
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and to non-emotional uniquely human attributes (Vaes & Paladino, 2010; Viki, Winchester, 
Titshall, & Chisango, 2006). 
Besides uniquely human characteristics that set us apart from animals, Haslam and 
colleagues proposed that humanness could also be defined in a non-comparative way, through 
its core traits (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005). These core or central human 
attributes that involve emotionality, warmth, cognitive openness, agency and depth are 
referred to as human nature. Both senses of humanness, uniquely humanness and human 
nature, fuel differentiations between groups and are respectively referred to as animalistic and 
mechanistic dehumanisation (for a review, see Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 2008). 
The current studies focus on the relative denial of uniquely human traits between an ingroup 
and an outgroup, a process that can be named infrahumanisation or animalistic 
dehumanisation. For reasons of simplicity, we will adopt the term dehumanisation throughout 
the article to refer to the scaling of others on the uniquely human dimension (see also Vaes, 
Leyens, Paladino, & Miranda, 2012). 
Considering the negative outcomes that dehumanisation produces in the dehumanised 
(Goff, Eberhardt,Melissa, & Jackson, 2008; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 
2003), the search for limiting conditions of this effect attains an enhanced significance. 
Recent efforts have indeed explored the limits of the process of dehumanisation in general 
(for a review, Leyens, 2009), and of ingroup humanisation and outgroup dehumanisation 
separately (Vaes et al., 2012).  
Group Identification and Dehumanisation 
The degree to which one recognises to belong to a group and the value that is 
attributed to one’s group membership are both correlates of intergroup differentiation (Brown, 
Condor, Mathews, Wade, & Wiliams, 1986; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Paladino, Vaes, Castano, 
Demoulin, and Leyens (2004) extended this reasoning to the field of dehumanisation. 
Applying the emotional infrahumanisation paradigm, they showed that if members identify 
poorly with their group, they dehumanise to a lesser extent. Demoulin and colleagues (2009) 
replicated this effect, manipulating the meaningfulness of the categorisation underlying the 
social context—mere random categorisation or quasi-meaningful group choices based on 
favourite colour or job preferences. Results showed that dehumanisation only took place when 
the categories had some degree of meaningfulness and that this effect was mediated by 
ingroup identification (Demoulin et al., 2009). 
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A similar reasoning but applied to identification with theoutgroup was recently 
suggested to limit outgroup dehumanisation (Leyens, 2009). Indeed, if a person desires to 
belong to an outgroup, there should be no dehumanisation of that outgroup compared with the 
ingroup. To our knowledge, this hypothesis has never been empirically tested, but some 
indirect support stems from Gaunt’s (2009) research. Drawing from the common ingroup 
identity model (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kafati, 2000), the author argued that recategorising the 
ingroup and the outgroup in a higher order, inclusive category would reduce dehumanisation. 
Comparing Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs, Gaunt showed that the more one identifies with the 
superordinate—Israeli—category (Study 1) or the more one perceives the outgroup as 
identifying with this superordinate category (Study 2), the less the outgroup was differentiated 
in terms of uniquely human emotions. 
Despite Leyens’ (2009) suggestion that outgroup identification might be an important 
moderator of dehumanisation, until now, research has only focused on ingroup identification 
and identification with the superordinate category. This lacuna is likely because managing 
one’s identification with outgroups is psychologically relevant only for some groups. This 
tends to be the case of minority and/or immigrant group members (Berry, 2003; Hutnik, 
1986), who tend to occupy a low rank in the status hierarchy of a given society. Moreover, 
status studies within the dehumanisation framework have shown that low-status group 
members do dehumanise high-status outgroups (Boccato et al., 2006; Demoulin et al., 2005; 
Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002; Paladino & Vaes, 2009), drawing attention away 
from this socio-structural variable. However, recent findings within the context of different 
intergroup relations have emerged showing that low-status groups, in both natural settings and 
experimentally, dehumanise high-status outgroups to a lesser extent or even not at all 
(Capozza et al., 2012; Iatridis, 2013; Vaes & Paladino, 2010). These latest results diverge 
from a purely ethnocentric explanation of dehumanisation and warrant further research on 
when and why low-status groups stop dehumanising the dominant outgroup. 
Therefore, this paper aims to broaden our understanding of the relationship between 
identification and the dehumanisation bias among low-status groups, introducing outgroup 
identification in the equation. To do so, we will bring into play Hutnik’s (1986) quadripolar 
model, in which the author argues in favour of analysing ethnic minority’s identities through 
their identification with both the minority and majority groups. As such minority group 
members could be classified as acculturatives (high in both ingroup and outgroup 
identifications), dissociative (high in ingroup identification and low in outgroup 
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identification), assimilative (low in ingroup identification and high in outgroup identification) 
or marginal (low in both group identifications). 
We specifically hypothesise that all minority group members who identify with the 
majority outgroup, that is, acculturatives and assimilatives, should lower their tendency to 
dehumanise members of the host society to the same extent. Alternatively, one might expect 
that when both ingroup and outgroup identifications are high, the effect of outgroup 
identification on dehumanisation might be attenuated by a strong sense of ingroup 
identification. If identification with the ingroup can indeed exacerbate the relative diferences 
between the ingroup and the outgroup on the human dimension (Demoulin et al., 2009; 
Paladino et al., 2004), this variable could reduce the effects of outgroup acculturation on 
outgroup dehumanisation. Also, experiments on merging group identities have shown that 
ingroup bias is an apprehensive reaction in defence of the pre-merged ingroup identity 
following the merger even in a minimal group paradigm. This valence-based intergroup 
differentiation is therefore enhanced when pre-merger ingroup identity is higher (van 
Leeuwen, van Knippenberg, & Ellemers, 2003). 
Study 1: Ingroup and outgroup identification and dehumanisation 
Study 1 was designed to test the hypothesis that an assimilative identity strategy is 
associated to a lesser degree with relative group dehumanisation. Participants were members 
of the Gypsy minority group living in the Lisbon metropolitan area, and the proposed 
outgroup was the Portuguese majority. Gypsies constitute a minority in the Portuguese culture 
for approximately 500 years (Costa, 1993). In the last 20 years, we have witnessed the 
settlement of Gypsy families in social housing (e.g. through the National Special Re-housing 
Programme) and an increased contact with host institutions. Because of the implementation of 
a social integration policy, many Gypsy families benefitted from subsidies if they enrolled 
their school-aged children in public schools. 
The dehumanisation measure was defined using a bottomup approach, which allowed 
us to guarantee an ecologically valid representation of what human uniqueness means in this 
sample. 
Participants. 
Eleven female and 19 male (N = 30) participants, who belonged to the Gypsy minority 
in Portugal ranging in age from 12 to 18 years old (M = 13.83, standard deviation [SD] = 
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1.74) volunteered to participate. They were all enrolled in Portuguese schools, attending the 
third to eight grades (Median = fourth grade), with 96.6% having failed at least one time. 
Questionnaire. 
 We started by asking participants to list uniquely human features. Afterwards, each 
participant rated, on a 7-point scale, the probability that each of the uniquely human features 
that they themselves had listed described the members of the ingroup (typical Gypsies) and 
the members of the outgroup (typical Portuguese). Participants were then asked to rate the 
valence of each uniquely human characteristic (from 1 = very negative to 7 = very positive). 
This dehumanisation measure has the benefit of being ecologically valid and the best fit for a 
population with limited literacy.  
The questionnaire continued with two identification scales, one for the ingroup and 
one for the outgroup. Each of them comprised six questions  (‘Belonging to the 
ingroup/outgroup is important to me’; ‘I am proud of belonging to the ingroup/outgroup’; 
‘Sometimes, I feel uncomfortable when I think I am a member of the ingroup/outgroup’ 
(reverse-scored); ‘Overall, I feel happy for being a member of the ingroup/outgroup’; ‘I feel I 
would not like to belong to the ingroup/outgroup’ (reverse-scored); ‘I identify with the 
ingroup/outgroup’), which participants answered using a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 = 
totally disagree to 7 = totally agree. Demographic information (gender, age and information 
about school attendance) was asked at the end of the questionnaire. 
Procedure. 
A non-Gypsy Portuguese experimenter approached participants in the area of Lisbon, 
Portugal. The questionnaire was presented as a game. Because of the overall low literacy 
abilities of participants, each questionnaire was collected individually, and each question was 
read out loud. On the other hand, confidentiality of answers was assured by covering the 
questionnaire to experimenter eyes each time participants gave an answer. The completion of 
the questionnaire took from 30 minutes to 1 hour, after which participants were thanked and 
debriefed 
Results and discussion. 
Participants listed a mean of 5.2 uniquely human characteristics (SD = 2.38), which 
were positive overall (M = 6.05, SD = 1). Two indices comprising the attribution of human 
uniqueness were calculated, averaging the scores of ingroup and outgroup typicality of all the 
uniquely human attributes. The dehumanisation index was computed by subtracting the 
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outgroup uniquely humanness index from that of the ingroup. As a result, positive values 
correspond with the dehumanisation of the outgroup, whereas negative values indicate that the 
ingroup was dehumanised. Results show that overall the Gypsy participants did not 
differentiate their ingroup from the high-status Portuguese outgroup on the human dimension. 
Indeed, the dehumanisation index was not significantly different from zero, indicating that 
both groups are seen as equally human (M = -0.004, SD = 1.26, t(29) = -0.017, p = .99).  
After reversing negative items, an ingroup identification index was computed by 
averaging the six items of the ingroup identification scale (α = .59, M = 5.93, SD = 0.96). The 
same was carried out for the outgroup identification items (α = .79, M = 4.29, SD= 1.65). The 
two group identification scales were not significantly correlated (r = .068, p = .723), and 
ingroup identification was significantly higher than participants’ identification with the 
outgroup, t(29) = 4.87, p <.001, d =1.81. 
The association between ingroup and outgroup identifications and dehumanisation 
was tested in a hierarchical multiple regression, after centring the predictor variables. Results 
show that ingroup identification was positively associated to dehumanisation (b = 0.385, SE = 
0.219, p = .03) and that outgroup identification predicted dehumanisation negatively (b = -
0.271, SE = 0.128, p = .04). This first step model accounted for 25.5% of variance in 
participants’ dehumanisation scores, F(2, 27) = 4.62, p = .02. The interaction between ingroup 
and outgroup identifications was inserted as a predictor in the second step. Neither the change 
in R-square (Fchange(1, 26) = .000, p = .997) nor the interaction term itself (b = 0.001, SE = 
0.186, p = .997) proved to be significant.  
Even though the interaction effect was not significant, our hypothesis that argued in 
favour of a decrease of the dehumanisation bias in minority group members who prefer an 
assimilative strategy was tested by looking at the influence of the four different identification 
strategies in more detail. Therefore, the ingroup and outgroup identifications variables were 
re-coded through a median split, mapping the preferred identification strategies from the 
combination of these two new variables. Following Hutnik’s (1986) typology, we defined 
four clusters according to participants’ identification strategy, which showed variations in the 
dehumanisation bias (Figure 1): the acculturative (M = 0.06, SD = 1), the assimilative (M = -
0.85, SD = 1.05), the dissociative (M = 0.93, SD = 1.43) and the marginal (M = -0.15, SD = 
1.14).  
A direct test of our hypothesis was conducted through a planned contrast analysis, in 
which we compared the dehumanisation bias in participants with an assimilative strategy to 
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all other clusters (-3, 1, 1, 1). Results show that as hypothesised, the dehumanisation bias is 
lower in the assimilative cluster, t(26) = 2.25, p = .033, d = 0.88. In this cluster, participants 
even tended to humanise the majority outgroup compared with the minority ingroup.  
An alternative hypothesis was discarded as the planned contrast testing an 
acculturative identity reflecting a lower score in the dehumanisation index proved non-
significant (t(26) = -0.176, p = .862). We also contrasted the dissociative identity against all 
other identification strategies, and results show that participants in this quadrant mimic 
majority behaviour, dehumanising the Portuguese outgroup (t(26) = 2.49, p = .019, d =0.98).
8
 
The results of this first study replicate previous findings on ingroup identification 
(Demoulin et al., 2009; Paladino et al., 2004), confirm Leyens’s (2009) theoretical hypothesis 
that outgroup identification would decrease dehumanisation and, most importantly, give 
support to our hypothesis that an identity strategy based on identification with the outgroup 
but not with the ingroup is associated with the higher humanisation of the outgroup in 
comparison with the ingroup. 
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Figure 1: Mean (and standard deviation) of dehumanisation of the Portuguese majority by the 
Gypsy minority, in function of their preferred identification strategy. 
  
                                                 
8
 An analysis was not computed, contrasting the marginal identity quadrante mainly for two reasons: We already 
computed the limit number of contrasts (k - 1 = 3), and, most importantly, there is substantial disagreement as to 
the meaning and motivations behind this identification strategy, making it difficult to interpret any result. 
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Study 2: Acculturation and Dehumanisation 
When analysing intergroup differentiation among minority groups and immigrants, a 
natural parallel has to be drawn between a more cognitive closeness/distance between heritage 
and host groups, that is, identification, and a relational or ideological conceptualisation of 
such socio-psychological realities. This is, in effect, our aim in the forthcoming set of studies. 
The quadripolar model, and in particular Hutnik’s (1986) work, has been linked to a more 
general process that encloses a wide range of processes that take place within and between 
different cultural groups while dynamically adapting to one another, that is, acculturation 
(Brown & Zagefka, 2011).  
Within the multiple elements of acculturation, recent focus has been given to both 
dominant and dominated group preferences, and also to acculturation outcomes on the basis 
of the fit between such preferences (see, e.g. the Interactive Acculturation Model by Bourhis, 
Moïse, Perrault, & Senécal, 1997) or the fit between the minority preference and the 
perceived majority preference (Zagefka & Brown, 2002). However, to test the role of 
acculturation strategies within the dehumanisation framework in line with results of Study 1 
on group identification, we will focus solely on immigrant and cultural minorities’ 
acculturation orientations. Also, here, acculturation is acknowledged as a bidimensional 
process, where acculturation to the heritage and to the host culture are conceptualised 
orthogonally (Berry, 1980; Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000; Sayegh & Lasry, 1993). 
A great amount of acculturation models have been proposed in the literature (for a 
review, see Rudmin, 2003). Probably, the best well-known model is that of Berry (1980, 
1997, 2003). According to this model, four acculturation clusters emerge from two yes or no 
questions, the first related to one’s desire to maintain one’s heritage culture and the second 
refers to the willingness to engage in social contact with members of the host culture. Cultural 
minority members can therefore be classified according to an orientation of integration 
(yes/yes), assimilation (no/yes), separation (yes/no) or marginalisation (no/no; Berry, 2003). 
A second conceptualisation comes from the work of Bourhis and colleagues (1997), who 
focus on cultural minorities’ adoption not only of their heritage culture but also of the host 
culture. Several authors (Liebkind, 2001; Snauwaert, Soenens, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2003) 
who analysed the facets of different acculturation models distinguished a third one. This is 
exactly the one that emphasises an individual’s identification with both the minority and 
majority groups and is best embodied by Hutnik’s (1986) work.  
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The similarities and dissimilarities between these three conceptualisations are not 
straightforward. Snauwaert and colleagues (2003) made this very clear, showing that opting 
for one conceptualisation over the other can yield different results when mapping 
acculturation orientations (see also Hutnik, 1986). Overall, however, the contact and adoption 
models appear repeatedly together in the definition of the construct underlying acculturation 
measurements (Ryder et al., 2000). Their relationship to the identification model is less 
evident, the reason that Liebkind (2001) emphasised the need to disentangle ingroup and 
outgroup identifications from orientations towards the endorsement of those cultures. Still, a 
significant amount of research uses identification to measure acculturation (Abu-Rayya, 2009; 
Sánchez & Fernández, 1993; Snauwaert et al., 2003), and correlations between ethnic 
identification and other conceptualisations of acculturation are frequente throughout the 
literature (Hutnik & Barrett, 2003; Nesdale & Mak, 2000; Piontkowski, Florack, Hoelker, & 
Obdrzálek, 2000). Badea and colleagues tested a model that included group identification as a 
predictor of preferred acculturation strategy (Badea, Jetten, Iyer, & Er-Rafiy, 2011). The 
authors specifically concluded the positive association between ingroup identification and 
integration and separation strategies and its negative association with an assimilation strategy. 
As to outgroup identification, it was included as a negative predictor of separation, while 
being positively associated to integration and assimilation. 
In line with this conceptualisation, we argue that the term ‘identification’ should not 
be used interchangeably with the term ‘acculturation’, but nonetheless, both should be 
considered legitimate operationalisations of the process (Berry, 1997; Phinney, 2003). It is in 
this argument that we hypothesise that the results of Study 1, in which a lower degree of 
dehumanisation is evident in the assimilative cluster, will hold when changing from an 
identification conceptualisation to an acculturation one. 
Despite the fact that assimilation has not been contrasted with the other acculturation 
strategies in the realm of intergroup dehumanisation, some evidence supports the hypothesis 
that the more members of cultural minorities are willing to adopt and get in contact with the 
host culture, the less they should tend to dehumanise them. Zagefka and Brown (2002) 
demonstrated that acculturation to the host culture was negatively associated with ingroup 
bias. Further support comes from a longitudinal study in which emotional infrahumanisation 
was directly measured (Brown, Eller, Leeds, & Stace, 2007). Despite the fact that 
acculturation, that is, desire for contact, was not measured, authors did collect information on 
the quantity of contact with members of the outgroup, which can be a corollary of the first 
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(Brown & Zagefka, 2011). Results showed that the quantity of contact with an outgroup at 
time 1 predicted less emotional infrahumanisation at time 2, but not the reverse, giving us an 
important hint for the definition of the direction of the association of the variables we propose 
to analyse. 
In Study 2, we will test whether the effect of ingroup and outgroup acculturation as 
identification can be extended to other conceptualisations of acculturation that involve contact 
with and the adoption of the heritage and host culture (Ryder et al., 2000). At the same time, 
changes to the dehumanisation measures were introduced, making it more implicit than in 
Study 1, where social desirability concerns could have influenced participants’ responses. 
Moreover, the current measure allows a more stringent control of positivity biases in the 
attribution of humanness to the ingroup and the outgroup.  
Data were collected in Italy, a country in which the migration fluxes inverted about 30 
years ago when immigration surpassed emigration. The most numerous national group came 
from Albania but were recently outweighed by immigration from Romania (Italian National 
Institute of Statistics [ISTAT], 2014). The income of these immigrant families represents only 
50% to 60% of an average Italian families’ income (ISTAT, 2011). 
Participants. 
Participants were 41 (63.4% female) immigrants living in Italy, 92.7% of which 
resided legally in the country. Twenty came originally from Albania, 19 from Romania, one 
from Nigeria and one from Russia. They had been in Italy for 10.38 years on average (SD = 
5.57), and the overall self-rated proficiency in Italian was good (M = 5.15, SD = 1.40, on a 7-
point scale). Participants were 37.71 years old on average (SD = 10.76). 
Questionnaire and procedure. 
An Italian experimenter approached participants individually in an immigration centre 
where immigrants who live in the Italian territory can receive help to find work or arrange 
paper work. When they agreed to participate, they were handed over a questionnaire written 
in Italian that they completed on their own. The questionnaire started by asking participants 
some demographic information (age, gender, nationality, stay permit, length of stay in Italy 
and proficiency in Italian). It continued with an acculturation attitudes scale taken from Ryder 
and colleagues (2000). This scale consists of 20 questions, 10 of which regard the heritage 
culture (ingroup), whereas the other 10 questions asked the same issues but regarding the host 
culture. All questions assessed acculturation attitudes in different domains (values, social 
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networks, etc.). Sample items are ‘I am comfortable working with people from my 
heritage/host culture’, ‘I often behave in ways that are typical of my heritage/host culture’ and 
‘I am interested in having friends from my heritage/host culture’. All questions were 
answered on a 9-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 = not important to 9 = very 
important. 
Participants then completed a dehumanisation measure taken from Vaes and Paladino 
(2010). We presented them with a set of 24 desirable (e.g. ‘lavoratori’ [hard-working], 
‘amichevoli’ [friendly] and ‘affidabili’ [trustworthy]) and non-desirable traits (e.g. ‘ignoranti’ 
[ignorant], ‘freddi’ [cold] and ‘cattivi’ [bad]). These traits were taken from the work of Vaes 
and Paladino (2010) and were selected because they differentiated well between Italians and 
the low-status outgroups that were judged in their work (e.g. Gypsies, Albanians and 
Moroccans). For each trait, participants had to indicate the extent to which it was seen as 
typical in describing people from their heritage culture and of Italians, in two 7-point Likert-
type scales (1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree). Subsequently, traits were evaluated on 
the extent to which they were uniquely human (1 = shared with animals to 7 = uniquely 
human) and desirable to possess (1 = very undesirable to 7 = very desirable). 
After completing the questionnaire, which took around half an hour, participants were 
thanked and fully debriefed.  
Results and discussion. 
The amount of human uniqueness that was attributed to the ingroup and the outgroup 
was derived by calculating withinsubject correlations between the groups’ typicality ratings 
and the human uniqueness ratings of the same traits (see Vaes, Heflick, & Goldenberg, 2010, 
for a similar procedure). In order to ensure that participants’ attribution of humanness could 
be disentangled from a mere positivity bias, the desirability ratings were partialled out from 
these correlations. Both the resulting ingroup and outgroup correlations were subsequently 
transformed into Z-Fisher values, in order to normalise distributions. The dehumanisation 
index was computed by subtracting the outgroup humanness correlations from those of the 
ingroup.
9
 Therefore, positive values stand for a greater attribution of humanness to the 
ingroup when compared with the outgroup (i.e. outgroup dehumanisation), values close to 
                                                 
9
 We were unable to compute within-subject correlation of three participants because of a large portion of 
missing data in human uniqueness and desirability ratings in one case, absence of human uniqueness ratings in a 
second case and because the same human value was attributed to all traits in the last case. 
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zero for an absence of a dehumanisation bias and negative values for the lower attribution of 
humanness to the ingroup, when compared with the outgroup (i.e. ingroup dehumanisation). 
As in Study 1, low-status immigrants attributed the highstatus Italian outgroup an 
overall equal amount of uniquely human traits, given that the dehumanisation index was not 
significantly different from zero (M = -0.042, SD = 0.315, t(37) = -0.827, p = .414). 
An ingroup acculturation index was computed by averaging the 10 items of the 
ingroup acculturation scale (α = .934, M = 6.68, SD = 1.70). The same was performed for the 
outgroup acculturation index (α = .643, M = 6.34, SD = 1.21). Again, there was no correlation 
between the two acculturation scales (r(41) = .067, p = .679), but in this intergroup context, 
participants’ ingroup acculturation was not significantly higher than their willingness to 
acculturate with the host outgroup, t(40) = 1.05, p = .301. 
As in Study 1, a hierarchical multiple regression was performed by inserting ingroup 
and outgroup acculturation indices as predictors of the dehumanisation index in the first step. 
Results show that outgroup acculturation did not significantly predict dehumanisation (boutgroup 
= -0.077, SE = 0.05, p = .138) and that ingroup acculturation did only marginally so (bingroup = 
0.091, SE = 0.05, p = .080). The full model was only marginally significant (R
2
 = .126, F(2, 
35) = 2.52, p = .095) and was improved when, in a second step, the interaction term was 
added (R
2
 = .276, F(3, 34) = 4.33, p = .011, Fchange(1, 34) = 7.07, p = .012). The interaction 
between ingroup and outgroup acculturation yielded a significant effect (binteraction = 0.119, SE 
= 0.045, p = .012).
10
 Following Aiken and West’s (1991) recommendations, simple slopes of 
the link between outgroup acculturation and dehumanisation were calculated at three 
established cut-off points in ingroup acculturation: the mean, the mean plus and the mean 
minus one SD (Figure 2). 
Results showed that outgroup acculturation was not significantly linked with 
dehumanisation when ingroup acculturation was high (b = 0.03, SE = 0.06, p = .62). When 
ingroup acculturation was low, however, the more participants acculturated to the Italian host 
culture, the more this group was humanised in comparison with their heritage ingroup (b = -
0.21, SE = 0.06, p = .003). A marginally significant link was observed at the mean of ingroup 
acculturation (b = -0.09, SE = 0.05, p = .07). 
                                                 
10
 In the second model, when adding the interaction term, we found a reverse pattern of main effects, as ingroup 
acculturation was not significantly correlated to dehumanisation (b = 0.052, SE = 0.049, p = .294), and outgroup 
acculturation was only marginally so (b =_0.087, SE = 0.047, p = .07). 
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Figure 2: Relative dehumanisation as a function of the interaction between acculturation to 
participants’ heritage culture and their acculturation towards the Italian culture. 
 
Drawing a parallel with the fourfold typology of acculturation, the present results 
suggest that those group members who prefer to assimilate with the host culture show the 
lowest level of dehumanisation. Following Berry’s (2003) typology, groups were defined by 
calculating the median split of ingroup and outgroup acculturation and dividing them in one 
of the four resulting quadrants. A direct test of our hypothesis was carried out contrasting (-3, 
1, 1, 1) participants’ dehumanisation bias in the assimilation cluster (M = -0.25, SD = 0.39), to 
the dehumanisation displayed by participants in the integration (M = -0.01, SD = 0.28), 
separation (M = -0.02, SD = 0.24) and marginalisation clusters (M = -0.03, SD = 0.32). 
Results show that there is indeed a tendency to dehumanise the host culture less compared 
with the heritage cluster in immigrants who wish to assimilate to the host culture, t(34) = 
1.942, p = .060, d =0.67. 
Again, the alternative hypothesis that especially those immigrants who express a 
preference to acculturate display the lowest level of dehumanisation was discarded (t(34) = -
0.633, p = .531). Also, and unlike in Study 1, the separation strategy did not reflect in a higher 
humanisation of the heritage group compared with the host group (t(34) = -0.434, p = .667). 
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Marginal effects do not, however, allow us to soundly confirm the hypothesis that the 
assimilation effect measured  through group identification can be generalised to the 
acculturation to the outgroup on the basis of desired contact and culture adoption. To establish 
whether these differences are mainly linked to the actual change in the chosen intergroup 
context, to the change in the conceptualisation of acculturation or both, we will conduct a 
third study, using the same measurement of acculturation in a different intergroup setting.  
Also, acculturation to the ingroup only marginally predicted the dehumanisation 
effect, whereas ingroup identification did in Study 1. Unlike the preceding study, there were 
no differences in preference between ingroup and outgroup acculturation strategies. Also, the 
fact that we never named the exact heritage culture (i.e. Albanians and Romanians), given that 
our participants came from different national groups, could have made the ingroup less 
salient. Therefore, in the next study, the meaning of the ingroup in the intergroup setting will 
be explicitly mentioned. 
Study 3: Acculturation and Dehumanisation, a Replication 
A third study was conducted to replicate the assimilation effect operationalised 
according to the contact and adoption conceptualisations of acculturation on dehumanisation 
in a different intergroup context: Brazilian immigrants in Portugal. Brazilians are the largest 
foreign national group in Portugal (Portuguese Immigration and Borders Service, 2013). 
Several waves of immigration can be differentiated, and the latest is mostly made up of a low 
qualified work force. Brazilians are, however, the immigrant group that Portuguese perceive 
as the closest to them, mainly because of their colonial history and shared language 
(Malheiros, 2007). 
Particular care was given to the definition of the group labels, so that the ingroup and 
the outgroup were defined at the same categorisation level. Another limitation of both Studies 
1 and 2 was the fact that the experimenter was a member of the majority outgroup. This, on 
the one hand, could have led to the expression of an acculturative identity on the part of 
minority group members in order to make a good impression (Barreto, Spears, Ellemers, & 
Shahinper, 2003). On the other hand, the presence of an outgroup member could have 
activated self-presentational motivations that could have attenuated the differences between 
the evaluation of the ingroup and the outgroup (Klein & Azzi, 2001; Marques, Yzerbyt, & 
Rijsman, 1988). Therefore, in this study, the  experimenter was a minority ingroup member. 
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Participants. 
Thirty-one Brazilian immigrants (18 women and 13 men) in Portugal completed this 
study. Two participants had a double nationality – Brazilian and Portuguese – and were 
therefore excluded. A bit more than half of the participants (58.1%) resided  legally in the 
country (one participant did not answer this question), and their average age was 32.29 years 
old (SD = 8.73). 
Questionnaire and procedure. 
A pilot study was conducted in order to determine which traits would be used in this 
study. We asked seven Brazilian immigrants (three men and four women), with ages ranging 
from 20 to 56 years (M = 37.86, SD = 12.78), to list up to five stereotypical and five counter-
stereotypical traits for the ingroup (Brazilians) and outgroup (Portuguese). Seventy-four 
different traits were gathered for the Brazilian group and 73 different traits for the Portuguese 
outgroup. Each trait was then evaluated on the extent to which it was typical in describing 
both groups by another 20 Brazilian immigrants (11 women and nine men that were on 
average 38.27 years old, SD = 10.86) who were not part of the main sample and received €2 
for their participation. We then selected the 10 most stereotypical traits for the Brazilian (e.g. 
‘alegres’ [joyful], ‘extrovertidos’ [extroverts] and ‘sexuais’ [sexual]) and for the Portuguese 
groups (e.g. ‘desconfiados’ [suspicious], ‘trabalhadores’ [hard-working] and ‘idealistas’ 
[idealists]) and 10 most counter-stereotypical again for the Brazilian group (e.g. ‘egoístas’ 
[selfish], ‘ignorantes’ [ignorant] and ‘mal-educados’ [rude]) and for the Portuguese group 
(e.g. ‘tolerantes’ [tolerant], ‘descontraídos’ [relaxed] and ‘insensíveis’ [insensible]). 
Apart from the difference in selecting the traits of the dehumanisation measure, the 
questionnaire of the third study was identical to the one of Study 2. Given that all participants 
were Brazilian immigrants, the heritage and host culture in the acculturation attitudes scale 
(Ryder and colleagues, 2000) were directly referred to as the Brazilian culture and the 
Portuguese culture, respectively.  
A Brazilian experimenter (ingroup member) approached participants in several 
associations working with Brazilian immigrants in Lisbon. All participants were approached 
individually and completed the questionnaire on their own. The questionnaire took about half 
an hour to complete, and afterwards, participants were thanked, fully debriefed and paid €5.  
Results and discussion. 
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As in the previous study, within-participant correlations between the human 
uniqueness ratings of the 40 traits and their ascription to both the ingroup and the outgroup 
were computed, partialling out the desirability of possessing these traits. The dehumanisation 
index was calculated by subtracting the outgroup correlation from the one of the ingroup.
11
  
As such, positive values represent a tendency to dehumanise the outgroup, values close to 
zero an equal attribution of humanness to the ingroup and the outgroup, and negative values a 
tendency to dehumanise one’s group in comparison with the outgroup. Results show an 
overall tendency to dehumanise the low-status ingroup in comparison with the high-status 
outgroup, as the mean dehumanisation index is significantly below zero (M = -0.17, SD = 
0.25, t(27) = -3.65, p < .001, d = 1.40).  
Two group acculturation indices were computed by averaging the 10 items of the 
ingroup acculturation scale (α = .85, M = 5.32, SD = 1.14) and the 10 items of the outgroup 
acculturation scale (α = .82, M = 4.33, SD = 1.23). There was no correlation between the two 
group acculturation scales (r = .21, p = .26), and ingroup acculturation was significantly 
higher than outgroup acculturation, t(30) = 3.71, p <.001, d =1.35.  
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Figure 3: Relative dehumanisation as a function of Brazilian immigrants preference to 
acculturate to the Brazilian and the Portuguese culture 
                                                 
11
 The dehumanisation variable had not a normal distribution (W(28) = 0.265, p ≤ .001). Normality of the 
distribution was restored (W(28) = 0.995, p = .263) after the exclusion of three extreme observations. 
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A hierarchical multiple regression equation was computed. The first block with 
ingroup and outgroup acculturation  predicting dehumanisation was only marginally 
significant (R
2
 = .17, F(2, 25) = 2.57, p = .10). Here, ingroup acculturation positively 
predicted biases in dehumanisation (b = 0.09, SE = 0.040, p = .032), whereas outgroup 
acculturation was not a significant predictor (b = -0.015, SE = 0.040, p = .70), replicating the 
main effects of Study 2. The second model, in which the interaction between ingroup and 
outgroup acculturation was added, not only proved to explain a significant amount of variance 
(R
2
 = .22, F(3, 24) = 3.46, p = .03), but it also showed to be a significant improvement 
compared with the first one (Fchange(1, 24) = 4.52, p = .04). The interaction between the two 
acculturation indices did significantly predict relative dehumanisation (b = 0.090, SE = 0.042, 
p = .04; Figure 3). 
Results replicated the effects described in Study 2 showing that only when ingroup 
acculturation was low was outgroup acculturation significantly and negatively associated with 
relative dehumanisation (b = -0.18, SE = 0.09, t(24) = -2.08, p = .05). As such, outgroup 
acculturation was not correlated with dehumanisation when ingroup acculturation was high (b 
= 0.042, SE = 0.05, t(24) = 0.82, p = .42) or medium (b = -0.07, SE = 0.05, t(24) = -1.40, p = 
.17). To confirm whether the assimilation cluster was driving the effect, the same analysis 
used in Studies 1 and 2 was conducted. Four groups of acculturation strategies were first 
defined through the combination of ingroup and outgroup acculturation variables after median 
splits. A planned contrast (assimilation = -3, integration = 1, separation = 1, marginalisation = 
1) showed that the Brazilian immigrants who assimilate (M = -0.36, SD= 0.31) do display 
lower and negative levels of dehumanisation against the Portuguese majority than the ones 
who integrate (M = -0.04, SD = 0.25), separate (M = -0.06, SD = 0.2) or feel marginalised (M 
= -0.21, SD = 0.18), t(24) = 2.4, p = .024, d = 0.98. Also, the planned contrast that compared 
the dehumanisation pattern in the integration quadrant with all other preferred acculturation 
strategies did not yield significance (t(24) = -1.605, p = .122), nor did the one contrasting the 
separation quadrant, t(24) = 1.365, p = .185. 
General Discussion  
In this paper, we presented three studies, in which our hypotheses were tested in 
natural settings using correlational designs. Between participants’ variability in acculturation 
orientations was expected, even within the same cultural group, as the preference for certain 
acculturation strategies also depends on individual factors (Berry, 2003; Kosic, Kruglansky, 
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Pierro,& Mannetti, 2004). Moreover, we conducted our analysis in three different intergroup 
settings, gathering responses from cultural minorities and immigrants, who vary extensively 
in overall acculturation strategies, time in the host country, and their linguistic and cultural 
similarity with members of the host society. Despite this heterogeneity,minority group 
members consistently showed to dehumanise the majority outgroup to a lesser extent when 
they preferred an assimilative strategy (Study 1) or an assimilation strategy (Studies 2 and 3) 
in comparison with all other strategies of acculturation. 
Interestingly, these lower levels of dehumanisation that were observed in the 
assimilation quadrant seem to suggest to the attribution ofmore humanness to the host rather 
than the heritage group (MStudy1 = -0.85; MStudy2 = -0.25, MStudy3 = -0.36). As such, this finding 
does not necessarily pose a limit to the existence of an ethnocentric motive in explaining 
intergroup dehumanisation. Rather, what seems to happen is an inversion of the group on 
which it is centred. It this sense, the assimilation effect reported here does not represent a 
limit to the classical understanding of the dehumanisation bias (Leyens et al., 2000). If 
anything, it reinforces its pervasiveness despite the presence of a contextual modulation. 
Already, Cohen (1956, cit. by Rudmin, 2003) argued that separation together with 
assimilation is a form of ethnocentrism, as it entails the rejection of other cultures. On the 
other hand, Lambert (1967) specifically used the label ‘nonethnocentric’ to describe a high 
acculturation towards both the host culture and the heritage culture. 
Also, the absence of an overall dehumanisation bias in the three studied intergroup 
contexts is interesting in this regard and is in line with similar reports of an absence of 
dehumanisation biases of some low-status groups (Capozza et al., 2012; Iatridis, 2013). Still, 
it seems unlikely that these findings are the result of an internalisation of one’s own group 
inferiority, in a consensual and legitimised system (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Indeed, separatist 
Gypsies did dehumanise the majority outgroup and ingroup identification/acculturation was 
positively related to outgroup dehumanisation in all studies. Instead, we proposethat cultural 
minorities and immigrant groups often refrain from dehumanising members of their host 
culture because some of them desire to abandon psychologically and culturally their heritage 
group and blend in with the host society. Furthermore, these results help us to integrate 
inconsistent findings regarding the moderating role of status on dehumanisation, in the sense 
that identification with or acculturation to the higher status host society varies across different 
low-status groups and their members and might determine (more than status) whether 
members of a low-status ingroup dehumanise the high-status outgroup. 
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At the same time, the reported results confirm previous findings on the role of ingroup 
identification on dehumanisation (Demoulin et al., 2009; Paladino et al., 2004). Indeed, in 
Study 1, despite the assimilation effect diminishing outgroup dehumanisation, ingroup 
identification showed to increase it. Furthermore, Studies 2 and 3 extended the effects of 
ingroup identification to the willingness to adopt the ingroup culture and maintain a relation 
with its members. In both studies, ingroup acculturation was positively related to the 
dehumanisation of the host society. 
Two further sets of findings deserve our attention. First of all, despite the stable 
confirmation of our hypotheses, the results of some variables showed some variation in 
between studies. Namely, the assimilation effect on dehumanisation resulted from two 
independent effects of ingroup and outgroup identifications in Study 1 and from an interaction 
between ingroup and outgroup acculturation in the following studies. Descriptive analyses 
seem to suggest that this difference is due to the dissociative cluster, which displays a higher 
outgroup dehumanisation effect (the only positive average) in the Gypsy sample, than in the 
separation cluster in the other two. This finding seems to mirror identification preferences. 
We suggest that this can be due to either a difference in the conceptualisation of acculturation 
or a difference in the intergroup settings. In the first case, the explanation revolves around the 
idea that contact with outgroup members is a less conservative measure than outgroup 
identification. When mapping acculturation strategies in the same sample using different 
conceptualisations, Snauwaert and colleagues (2003) showed that integration was the 
preferred strategy when based on the desire for maintaining contact with the host culture, but 
separation was the preferred one when participants were asked about their identification with 
the ingroup and the host culture. 
A second explanation might be found in the specific history of the Gypsy minority in 
Portugal. Despite a long list of measures designed to force their assimilation, Gypsies have 
demonstrated a remarkable resistance to change (Moscovici & Pérez, 1999). According to our 
results, a dissociative identity was the preferred acculturation strategy in the Gypsy sample, 
followed by an acculturative identity, probably motivated by public policies that recently 
encouraged this group to send their kids to public schools. Similar results were described by 
Alexandre (2003), who reported that Gypsy children in Portugal self-identified mainly as only 
Gypsy, or as both Gypsy and Portuguese. In contrast, the minority group members in the other 
studies clearly preferred an integration strategy. 
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It is important to note, however, that we do not want to claim that one identity or 
acculturation strategy is preferable to another. There is a general understanding that sustaining 
different group memberships in an integrated fashion provides better adaptation (e.g. Berry, 
2003; Iyer & Jetten, 2011; Iyer, Jetten, Tsivrikos, Postmes, & Haslam, 2009). For instance, a 
perceived fit between new and old identities, that is, identity compatibility, has been described 
as positively associated with well-being (Iyer et al., 2009). However, there is still much 
debate on this point, as empirical data steaming from acculturation literature do not mimic this 
assumption consistently (for a review, see Brown & Zagefka, 2011). Bourhis and colleagues 
(1997) proposed that this effect depends on the  larger cultural context that endorses 
multiculturalism. Support for this hypothesis comes from Zagefka and Brown’s (2002) work, 
in which intergroup favourability was best achieved when there was a fit between the 
acculturation strategies of minorities and the majority (especially in favour of integration or 
assimilation). Nonetheless, the current results suggest that the most favourable outcomes in 
the intergroup context might be expected when minority group member wish to acculturate 
(Study 1) or integrate (Studies 2 and 3). It was these minority group members who most 
consistently displayed an equal distribution of humanness to the heritage and host groups, 
resulting in the absence of an intergroup bias (-0.04 ≤ M ≥ 0.06), a finding that is in line with 
that reported by Gaunt (2009). 
Finally, the present analysis only allows to make comparative judgments regarding the 
humanisation of the ingroup and  the outgroup. Therefore, we should refrain from 
understanding the decrease in dehumanisation as a strait improvement in intergroup 
perceptions. We should pay special attention to the potential loss of the beneficial aspects of 
considering one’s group fully human—for instance, as a buffer against existential concerns 
(e.g. Vaes et al., 2010)—particularly when assimilation does not directly result in social 
mobility—as is the case of the described groups. It is also important to replicate this pattern of 
findings beyond a Western European context, in which a prominent assimilationist ideology 
has been reported among majority members (for a review see Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 
2007). 
All in all, the present findings constitute an importante extension of our knowledge on 
both processes of dehumanisation and intergroup relations demonstrating that minority group 
members who prefer to assimilate with the host society dehumanise the majority outgroup to a 
lesser extent. 
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Levine and Campbell (1972) built on Sumner’s (1906) work, to define ethnocentrism 
as the lay theory through which values and beliefs are scaled in reference to the ingroup. 
There is a long tradition of analysing the relation – or conflict – between this motivation and 
the social contingencies of intergroup behaviour (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Tajfel, 1982). 
Recently, this debate has been adapted to people’s general tendency to humanise one’s 
ingroup and dehumanise other groups (Iatridis, 2013; Leyens et al., 2001; for a review Vaes, 
Leyens, Paladino, & Miranda, 2012). In this paper we will disentangle group status from 
another stratification variable - group power - already known to be associated with outgroup 
dehumanisation (Lammers & Stapel, 2010; Gwinn, Judd, & Park, 2013). Focusing on groups 
ranked low on the social hierarchy, we will confront the symbolic aspects of social ranking 
(i.e., status) to a more objective socio-structural variable, like power (Magee & Galinsky, 
2008). 
Dehumanisation  
Leyens and colleagues (2000; 2001) introduced the term infrahumanisation in 
intergroup relations to stress a subtle, but pervasive form of dehumanisation (Staub, 1989). 
They presented a paradigm based on the attribution of uniquely human (e.g., hope, 
resentment) and non-uniquely human emotions (e.g., joy, anger) (Demoulin et al., 2004), in 
which participants showed to differentiate their group from the outgroup on the basis of the 
first, but not the latter. This finding was replicated using other research paradigms (Boccato, 
Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2007; Paladino et al., 2002; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2006), 
measuring the attribution of non-emotional uniquely human attributes (Vaes & Paladino, 
2010; Viki, Winchester, Titshall, & Chisango, 2006) and other senses of humanness, i.e., 
human nature (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005). The wide dissemination of this 
line of research led to a proliferation of terminology to name the scaling of others on the 
human dimension, which we will name dehumanisation, for reasons of simplicity. 
Dehumanisation and Socio-Structural Variables 
Since its first formulation, dehumanisation was considered the result of ethnocentric 
motives (Leyens et al., 2000). As such, the ingroup became the central point of reference 
representing what it means to be uniquely human and all other groups are scaled in 
comparison (see also, Paladino & Vaes, 2009). Being independent from ingroup favouritism 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and dealing with a deep-seated dimension of social judgment, 
differentiating the ingroup from the outgroup on a human dimension was thought to be 
independent from socio-structural constrains. Indeed, in a first set of studies group status did 
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not impact dehumanisation (Boccato et al., 2007; Cortes, Demoulin, Rodríguez-Torres, 
Rodríguez-Pérez, & Leyens, 2005; Demoulin et al., 2005; Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 
2002).  
More recently, however, Vaes and Paladino (2010) tested a large sample of intergroup 
contexts, showing variations in the dehumanisation of the outgroup in relation to status and 
competence. Other studies using different paradigms provided evidence of low status groups 
that do not privilege at all their ingroup in terms of humanness (Capozza, Andrighetto, Di 
Bernardo, & Falvo, 2012; Iatridis, 2013; Miranda, Gouveia-Pereira, & Vaes, in press). 
Iatridis (2013) argued that some status differences are more consensually accepted 
than others (e.g., occupational vs. national groups). Tajfel and Turner (1979) already proposed 
that in the case of a long lasting status asymmetry, low status group members might not 
perceive cognitive alternatives to the intergroup situation and therefore stop showing an 
ethnocentric bias. Such mechanisms have been described by system justification theory as 
well, interpreting the absence of this ethnocentric bias of low status groups as an expression 
of their support for the existing status quo (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Accordingly, members of 
low status groups preferred to accept the existing status system granting the outgroup better 
outcomes even against their own interest. Still, it is conceivable that low status groups have 
“an implicit conflict between ingroup favouring tendencies and the acknowledged realities of 
social differentials in power, status, rank, or privilege” (Tajfel, 1982, p.19). This postulation 
suggests that members of low status groups would favour their ingroup if given the resources 
to do so. 
Focusing on ingroup favouritism, Sachdev and Bourhis (1985; 1987; 1991) showed 
that this might be the case. Status differences manipulated in a minimal group setting led a 
low status group to show outgroup favouritism on status relevant dimensions. However, 
when group power was manipulated simultaneously with group status (Sachdev & Bourhis, 
1991), low status groups with power demonstrated a greater tendency to favour their ingroup 
than low status and low power ingroupers. As such, power constitutes a resource that allows 
low status group members to perceive themselves more favourably than high status 
outgroups.  
There is often a strong correlation between variables that rank social categories 
vertically (Fiske, 2010). Nevertheless, status and power represent different constructs that 
have been disentangled both in natural settings and experimentally (Boldry & Gaertner, 
2006; Bruins, Ellemers, & De Gilder, 1999; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991; Willer, Youngreen, 
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Troyer, & Lovaglia, 2012). If status refers to a relative position of groups in a social 
hierarchy based on prestige (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), power differentials in intergroup 
settings can be defined as the control one group has over his and another group’s fate (Fiske, 
1993; 2010; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Thus, whereas status is of 
symbolic nature, power is a resource, which according to Social Identity Theory (SIT, Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979) confers the ability to function freely from constrains. 
The Present Research 
Georgesen and Harris (1998) performed a meta-analysis of power effects on social 
perception, demonstrating its negative correlations with evaluations of other persons or 
groups. As to dehumanisation, Lammers and Stapel (2011) showed that the greater the sense 
of power, the greater the dehumanisation of the outgroup. Gwinn and colleagues (2013) re-
enacted power differentials between dyads, confirming a lower attribution of uniquely 
humanness to a low power pair, compared to a high power one.  
The following studies were designed to go beyond the reported findings on the 
relationship between power and dehumanisation in two ways. First, and given that some of 
the power manipulations used in previous work might overlap with status differences (e.g., 
the dyad of a manager versus an assistant, Gwinn et al., 2013, Study 1), we aim to provide 
evidence of the influence of power on dehumanisation independently of other stratification 
variables, like status. More specifically, the current studies take the point of view of low 
status groups, both in a laboratory (Study 1) and in a natural setting (Study 2). This power 
manipulation aims to clarify the inconsistent effects of status on intergroup dehumanisation 
that were reported above. In line with Sachdev and Bourhis (1991), having power is expected 
to increase the tendency of low status group members to dehumanise a high status outgroup, 
while no dehumanisation should occur in the absence of power.  
Second, dehumanised perceptions of the outgroup need to be disentangled from a 
negativity bias, something that was only accounted for indirectly in previous research in an 
intergroup setting (Lammers & Stapel, 2011).  
Study 1 
Study 1 was designed to test the effect of power among low status group members on 
the dehumanisation of the outgroup. Using a quasi-minimal group paradigm (cfr. Sachdev & 
Bourhis, 1991), participants had a (constant) low status membership and perceived group 
power was manipulated. Following Boldry and Gaertner (2006), unrelated tasks were 
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introduced to inform participants of their status and power ranking to make sure that our 
manipulations were orthogonal.  
Method. 
Participants and design. 
Participants were 45 undergraduate Psychology students at a Portuguese University, 
two of which were excluded for not being Portuguese native speakers. Most (76.7%) were 
female and their mean age was 21.62 years old (SD = 4.65). All participants were assigned to 
a low status condition and randomly assigned to two experimental power conditions, either 
high (n = 21) or low (n = 22).  
Procedure. 
Participants arrived at the laboratory in groups of 5 to 13 and received course credits 
for their participation. The experiment started with a study on “social perception”, in which 
they were told an intergroup context would be recreated. Groups would differ in terms of 
status, and group status would be determined on the basis of the results of a “very well known 
and frequently used creativity test”, chosen because “levels of creativity are highly associated 
with social and occupational status that people have or will have” (Bruins et al., 1999; 
Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). The bogus test was presented as a free association task and 
required participants to generate words from “verbal stimuli”, which consisted of ten non-
words pre-tested as neutral (Domingos & Garcia-Marques, 2008; sample stimulus: 
“cantasia”).  
Subsequently, participants read a news story (neutral in mood; Garcia-Marques, 2005), 
while they waited for “the computer that was comparing individual results and generating two 
groups”. All participants were assigned to the low status group (group K), composed of 
people who had the lowest scores on the creativity test. They were informed that the outgroup, 
named W, included all participants with the highest scores.  
Participants were then informed about the existence of a second unrelated study that 
was presented as a stimulus pre-test (15 minutes to complete). Only half of the participants 
were required to respond to this pre-test and the decision of who would have to participate 
was the basis for the power manipulation. The computer randomly selected one of the two 
groups formed earlier, and the chosen group would be able to decide whether it would be their 
group or the members of the outgroup who would participate in the second study. In the high 
power condition, the selected group consisted of the ingroup, the K group and participants 
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were asked to decide individually which group had to do the pre-test. In the low power 
condition, the W group was selected and the ingroupers had to wait a few seconds while the 
decision was being made by the members of the outgroup. While “the computer was 
generating the final decision”, participants were asked to complete the first study, judging 
each group on several dimensions in the following order: 1) ingroup identification; 2) ingroup 
and outgroup human uniqueness; 3) manipulation checks of ingroup and outgroup power; 4) 
and ingroup and outgroup status. At the end participants were asked questions about the 
power manipulation, namely: 1) legitimacy; 2) feelings of injustice and frustration; and 3) 
their expected and desired outcomes in line with the cover story. Participants were informed 
that there would not be a second study, were thanked and debriefed.  
Materials. 
Ingroup identification. The identification scale comprised 6 items (Miranda et al, in 
press) and participants indicated their agreement with them on 7-point scales (α = .76).  
Ingroup and outgroup humanness. Participants completed a dehumanisation measure 
taken from Vaes and Paladino (2010). A list of 20 traits was put together, encompassing the 
two fundamental dimensions of social perception (Fiske et al., 2002): five competence, five 
incompetence, five warmth and five negative warmth traits. Participants were then asked to 
ascribe each of these traits to the K (in)group and to the W (out)group (1 = Not at all; 7 = 
Totally). Afterwards, they were asked to evaluate each of these traits on their level of human 
uniqueness (1 = Animal heritage to 7 = Uniquely human) and desirability (1 = Very 
undesirable to 7 = Very desirable).  
Manipulation checks. Four affirmations regarding ingroup and outgroup power tested 
the effect of the power manipulation (sample item: “The members of my [the other] group 
have control over my group participation in the second study”). Two indexes of ingroup 
power (α = .71) and outgroup power (α = .75) were computed from the mean of the respective 
four items. Ingroup and outgroup status indices were computed by averaging the participants’ 
responses on two items: “The members of my [the other] group had high scores on the 
creativity test” and “My [the other] group occupies a low position” (reversed) (ringroup = .443, 
p = .003, routgroup = .464, p = .002). 7-Point scales were used throughout (1 = Totally disagree; 
7 = Totally agree). 
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Real, expected, desired outcomes. We recorded not only the actual decision made by 
the high power group members, but also the extent to which all participants wanted and 
expected to take part in the second study (1 = Not at all; 7 = Totally ). 
Legitimacy measure, feelings of frustration. Participants also answered two questions 
concerning the legitimacy of the criterion that decided which group would participate in the 
second study and concerning their feelings of frustration (1 = Not at all; 7 = Totally ). 
Results and discussion. 
In order to verify the success of our manipulations we started analysing the power 
differentials between conditions. An ANOVA with power (low vs. high) as a between subject 
factor and group as a within subject factor revealed a target main effect, showing that ingroup 
power (M = 3.66, SD = 1.16) was judged marginally lower than outgroup power (M = 4.06, 
SD = 1.40, F(1, 41) = 3.103, p = .086, ηp
2
 = .070). Also, the predicted interaction between 
power and group was significant (F(1, 41) = 6.068, p = .018, ηp
2
 = .129). Contrast analyses 
show that outgroup power was indeed lower when power was granted to the ingroup (M = 
3.58, SE = .25) compared to outgroup (M = 4.51, SE = .29, F(1, 41) = 5,181, p = .028, ηp
2
 = 
.112). However, the power manipulation did not significantly change participants perception 
of ingroup power (MLowPower = 3.58, SELowPower = .25, MHighPower = 3.74, SEHighPower = .26, F(1, 
41) = 0.196, p = .660 ηp
2
 = .005). This absence of a power effect was somewhat unexpected as 
a similar manipulation also changed the perception of ingroup power in other research 
(Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). We can only assume that the resource over which participants 
had gained control did not have an empowering effect. Indeed, further analyses revealed that 
the power manipulation did not affect participants’ identification with the ingroup (Moverall = 
3.26, SD = 0.98, t(41) = 0.919, p = .364), one of the necessary components to feel empowered 
(Van Zomeren, Drury, & Van Der Staaij, 2014). As such, these manipulation checks reinforce 
the need to analyse ingroup and outgroup ratings separately to determine the effects of our 
power manipulation. 
Importantly, the status manipulation checks allowed us not only to verify that ingroup 
status (M = 2.99, SD = 1.45) was overall significantly lower than outgroup status (M = 5.24, 
SD = 1.47, F(1, 41) = 32.100, p <. 001, ηp
2
 = .439), also the power manipulation did not 
influence ingroup or outgroup status, F(1, 41) = .206, p = .653, ηp
2
 = .005. 
An index of ingroup and outgroup humanness was computed for each participant 
following the procedure described in Vaes, Heflick and Goldenberg (2010). Within subject 
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correlations between ingroup typicality and uniquely humanness ratings were calculated 
partialling out the desirability ratings of the 20 traits presented in the questionnaire. The 
variable was subsequently Z-transformed, to assure normality of the distribution. This 
procedure was repeated to create the outgroup uniquely humanness index
14
. As such, positive 
values stand for the humanisation of the ingroup, whereas negative values correspond to its 
dehumanisation. 
Both humanness indices were analysed in a 2 (Group: ingroup vs. outgroup) X 2 
(Power: high vs. low) mixed ANOVA. The expected Group X Power interaction was not 
significant ((F(1, 36) = 2.387, p = .131, ηp
2
 = .062). Still, given that the power manipulation 
check only showed variance in the perception of outgroup power, we looked at the effect of 
power only on the attribution of human uniqueness to the outgroup.  
 
 
Figure 1: Mean (and standard errors) of the low status ingroup and high status outgroup 
uniquely humanness ratings in the low and the high power conditions. 
 
Results confirm our hypothesis that in the high power condition the outgroup was 
perceived as significantly less uniquely human (M = -.10, SE = .07) compared to the low 
power condition (M = .13, SD = .07, F(1, 36) = 5.677, p = .023, ηp
2
 = .136). This increase in 
                                                 
14
 We were unable to compute within-subject correlation of five participants because they assigned the same 
value to all traits when judging the outgroup (4) or uniquely humanness (1).  
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the dehumanisation of the outgroup as a function of power was nonetheless insufficient to 
produce a significant differentiation between the ingroup (M = -.08, SE = .06) and the 
outgroup (M = -.10, SE = .07) in human terms in the high power condition, i.e., a 
dehumanisation bias, F (1, 36) = 0.036, p = .851 (see Figure 1).  
The choice participants made in the high power condition about who would participate 
in the announced pre-test was even-handed (43%, ingroup; 57%, outgroup). Neither the 
expected, nor the desired outcome varied according to the power manipulation (t’s < 1). 
Perceived legitimacy of the random criteria for power differentials (M = 4.47; SD = 1.75) was 
ruled out as a potential alternative explanation of the effect of power on attributions of 
humanness towards the outgroup, as no differences in legitimacy were found between power 
conditions (t(41) = -1.454, p = .154). The same was found for feelings of frustration (M = 
2.67; SD = 1.69, t(41) = 0.933, p = .357).  
Despite the confirmation of our hypothesis, our manipulation check did not have an 
impact on ingroup power. Nonetheless, changing perceived outgroup power seemed to be 
enough for low status group members to increase the dehumanisation of a high status 
outgroup. However, this change in power perception was not enough to make members of the 
low status group to dehumanise the high status outgroup relative to the ingroup. A look at 
Figure 1 suggests that this was mostly due to the fact that the ingroup was never truly 
humanised. One possible post-hoc explanation is that ingroup identification among 
participants was low due to a minimal group setting. Ingroup identification is necessary for 
ingroup humanisation to occur (Demoulin et al., 2009; Miranda et al., in press; Paladino et al., 
2004) and as we were unable to motivate participants to identify with the ingroup, a 
differentiation between ingroup and outgroup in human terms proved to be challenging. The 
forthcoming study will take place in a natural group setting, where pre-existing low status is 
known to coexist with high ingroup identification.  
Study 2 
In Study 2, we tested whether granting power (vs. no power) in a natural setting to 
members of a low status group would allow them to dehumanise a high status outgroup. If we 
are able to overrule the absence of dehumanisation using a situational resource as power, 
further insight can be gained about the universality of the tendency to dehumanise other 
groups relative to the ingroup. In order to compare and extend our findings with those of 
Iatridis (2013), this study will use occupational groups.  
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Method. 
Participants and design. 
One hundred and thirty eight Italian Psychology students from a large Italian 
University (84.1% female; Mage = 23.07, SDage = 3.68) took part in this study. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: either a high power (n = 71) 
or a low power (n = 67) condition and either evaluating their ingroup first (n = 70) or the 
outgroup first (n = 68).  
Procedure. 
Participants were approached individually in common areas within the Psychology 
Department and presented with two separate studies. The first consisted in a “survey on 
academic life” conducted by the central offices of the University inquiring Psychology and 
Medicine
15
 students. This part contained the power manipulation. The second part was 
presented as a study on social perception and included the main dependent variables. The 
experimenter explained that because she was working for the University collecting data for 
the survey with Psychology and Medicine students, she asked the students from those 
faculties to participate in a study for her graduation thesis on the topic of social perception. 
The dependent measures were presented in the following order: 1) an ingroup identification 
scale; 2) attribution of humanness to the ingroup and the outgroup; 3) ingroup and outgroup 
status; 4) legitimacy; and 5) socio-demographic information. At the end participants were 
thanked and fully debriefed.   
Materials.  
Power manipulation. Participants were told that the University was conducting a year-
round survey on some aspects of academic life, and in this phase, Psychology and Medicine 
students were being asked to give their opinion about the “management of the students’ 
academic career”16. Participants were then asked to complete the survey, which consisted of 
ten questions on that topic (e.g., “It is important to be able to attend advanced classes or 
                                                 
15
 A pilot-study asserted which intergroup context to use. We asked 20 Psychology students (95% female, Mage = 
22.45, SDage = 1.73) to rate the status of groups of students from six different faculties, including their own. 
Participants responded on 5-point scales (1 = Not at all; 5 = Totally) how prestigious and economically 
successful they thought the usual occupations of the members of these faculties were. The groups were listed in 
two different random orders. Psychology students’ status rates were averaged (r = .538, p = .014, M = 3.00, SD = 
.56) and perceived significantly lower than the highest status outgroup: Medicine students (r = .394, p = .086, M 
= 4.28, SD = .57, t(19) = 9.575, p ≤. 001, d = 2.265).  
16
 In the pilot-study mentioned before, participants were also asked to judge on a 5-point scale how important (1 
= Not at all; 5 = Totally) it was to be able to decide on a set of ten different topics related to academic life. The 
management of students’ academic career was considered the most relevant (M = 4.45; SD = .510). 
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seminars for free”). At the end, participants read that given the differences in the number of 
Psychology and Medicine students, different weights would be given to each group when 
assessing the final opinion from the students of the University. After this justification, a 
power manipulation following Sachdev and Bourhis (1991) was introduced. Half of the 
participants were assigned randomly to the high power condition and were told that the 
answers of the Psychology students would weigh for 80% of the final decision and the 
answers from the Medicine Students would only weigh for 20%. The other half were in the 
low-power condition and the presented weight given to each group was reversed.  
Ingroup and outgroup uniquely humanness measures. Participants completed the same 
uniquely humanness measures as in Study 1, judging both “Psychology students” (ingroup) 
and “Medicine students” (outgroup).  
Status measures. Participants answered the same status questions as in the pre-test and 
two indices were computed by averaging those two items for Psychology (r = .527, p ≤ .001) 
and Medicine Students (r = .467, p ≤ .001). 
Ingroup identification and legitimacy measures. Participants answered an ingroup 
identification scale (Cadinu & Cerchioni, 2001), which consisted of four items answered on 7-
point scales (1 = Not at all, 7 = Totally). We then computed an index from the mean of the 
four items (α = .82). Participants were also asked to judge the legitimacy of the University’s 
decision rules using the same 7-point scale. 
Results and discussion. 
Ingroup and outgroup humanness was computed following the same procedure 
described in Study 1
17
. To test our hypothesis we computed an ANOVA, with power (high vs. 
low) and order (ingroup first vs. outgroup first) as a between and target (ingroup vs. outgroup) 
as a within-subjects factor. Results showed that only the interaction between target and power 
yielded a significant effect, F(1, 129) = 8.251, p = .005, ηp
2
 = .06 (all other F’s < 1, see Figure 
2). Contrast analyses, with sidak adjustments, revealed significant differences between the 
attributed human uniqueness of the outgroup in the low power (M = .09, SE = .04) and the 
high power conditions (M = -.03, SE = .37, F(1, 129) = 5.407, p = .022, ηp
2
 = .040), Also, in 
the high power condition the ingroup (M = .11, SE = .39) was considered significantly more 
                                                 
17
 We were unable to compute within-subject correlation of five participants due to a lack of variance in 
participants responses on uniquely humanness ratings (2), ingroup ratings (1), and outgroup ratings (1). One 
participant did not provide any outgroup ratings. 
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human that the high status outgroup (M = -.03, SE = .37, F(1, 129) = 5.976, p = .016, ηp
2
 = 
.044).  
To verify whether status varied as a function of our manipulation, we ran an ANOVA 
with ingroup vs. outgroup status as a repeated measure and the power manipulation as a 
between-subjects factor. Psychology students do see their ingroup (M = 4.10, SD = 1.26) as 
lower in status compared to medical students (M = 6.00; SD = 0.81, F(1, 136) = 238.972;  p ≤ 
.001, ηp
2
 = .637) and this effect did not change and was not qualified by the power 
manipulation (F(1, 136) = 2.635; p = .107, ηp
2
 = .019). The role of other alternative variables 
was excluded, as neither identification with Psychology students (M=5.08; SD=1.10, t(136) = 
.959; p = .342), nor legitimacy (M=4.57; SD=1.53, t(136) = -.262; p = .794) were affected by 
the power manipulation.  
Moreover, in this natural intergroup setting and compared to Study 1, identification 
with the low status ingroup was higher, as was the attribution of humanness to the ingroup. 
This increase in ingroup humanness was sufficient to produce a significant differentiation 
between ingroup and outgroup in human terms when power was given to the low status 
ingroup. 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean (and standard errors) of the Psychology Students ingroup and the Medicine 
Students outgroup uniquely humanness ratings in the low and the high power conditions. 
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General Discussion  
The results reported confirm that granting power to members of a low status ingroup is 
a sufficient condition to dehumanise a high status outgroup.  
The independence of effects as to status and power reinforces the first as a subjective 
dimension that depends on other’s agreement, and the latter as a more objective construal. We 
argue that this distinction helps clarify the inconsistent pattern of results on outgroup 
dehumanisation (e.g., Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino & Vaes, 2009, vs. Capozza et al., 2012; 
Iatridis, 2013). Iatridis (2013) explained the lack of dehumanisation in lower status 
occupational groups through the role of consensus in the distribution of social value. 
However, in his work neither legitimacy, nor power was measured. Also, when we accounted 
for these variables in the present paper, the role of legitimacy was not confirmed. On the 
contrary, only power seemed to make a difference corroborating the contextual dependency of 
dehumanisation effects (e.g., Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009). We could indeed argue that in 
the context of national and regional groups, in which low status groups dehumanised a higher 
status outgroup, participants felt powerful enough to do so. Leyens and colleagues (2001) 
found that Canary Island Spanish do dehumanise the higher status mainland Spanish, but one 
might argue that due to their political status as an autonomous community together with their 
representation in the national Spanish parliament, these ingroupers perceived a relative larger 
control over their fate and that of the outgroup compared to participants in a minimal group 
setting (Capozza et al., 2012).  
As such, our data are in line with SIT that states that a conflict exists between 
individuals’ acknowledgment of lasting status differences and their strive for a favourable 
social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and concur with research that shows a direct relation 
between indices of social change and the decrease of outgroup preferences (Vaughan, 1978). 
We do not state that low status groups never internalise inequality, or even reinforce it 
behaviourally (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). However, even when describing the 
endorsement of an hierarchical system across society, low status groups do endorse it less 
(Sidanius, Liu, Shaw, & Pratto, 1994), or are less motivated to believe in a just world (Krauss 
& Keltner, 2013). 
In addition to the effects on outgroup dehumanisation, a measure of ingroup 
humanness was included. The latter was never significantly influenced by our power 
manipulation reinforcing the idea that the attribution of humanness to ingroups and outgroups 
is governed by different processes (Vaes et al., 2012). The fact that we only found variations 
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in the attribution of humanness to the outgroup is in line with other work that looked at the 
impact of processes of re-categorisation (Gaunt, 2009), conservative ideologies (DeLuca-
McLean & Castano, 2009), and status (Vaes & Paladino, 2010). As reported here, none of 
these studies found any effects on ingroup humanisation.  
Altogether and in line with Ng (1982) - “instead of asking what causes intergroup 
discrimination, we ask what makes it possible” (p. 180) - this paper strongly suggests that 
power makes outgroup dehumanisation possible, even in low status groups. 
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General Discussion 
The thesis presented here deals with the dynamics between the pervasive nature of the 
dehumanisation process and the socio-structural disadvantages low status groups face in a 
hierarchical society. Specifically, two overarching goals were outlined. 
The first goal aimed at testing the existence of a moderating effect of group status in 
intergroup dehumanisation. In the initial studies on dehumanization, status was defined as a 
non-sufficient and non-necessary condition (Leyens, 2009), but new evidence has put this 
assertion under increased presure showing the moderating role of status diferences on the 
dehumanisation process (Capozza et al., 2012; Iatridis, 2013).  
In the first paper presented here we contributed to this debate by systematically 
varying the competence and the warmth of the ingroup and the outgroup to test their impact 
on emotional dehumanisation. Results seemed to suggest that ingroup competence, which 
served as a proxy for status, did moderate the display of emotional dehumanisation. On the 
one hand, high competence ingroup members did attribute more uniquely human emotions to 
their group in comparison to outgroups, while non-uniquely human emotions were attributed 
equaly to both groups. On the other hand, members of a low competence ingroup did not 
differentiate their ingroup from the outgroup in terms of uniquely human emotions. This 
pattern of results not only replicated the findings of Vaes and Paladino (2010), Capozza and 
colleagues (2012) and Iatridis (2013), they also extend them in several ways.  
While Vaes and Paladino (2010) selected and Capozza and colleagues (2013) 
manipulated intergroup contexts that systematically varied in terms of competence, their 
operationalization of dehumanisation consisted in a trait measure. Leyens and colleagues 
(2001; 2003) theoretically based their hypothesis that status is neither a sufficient, nor a 
necessary variable for dehumanistation to occur, sustaining that emotions and their attribution 
are independent from socio-structural variables. However, even at a conceptual level, this 
argument has been contested (Kemper, 1991; Tiedens, 2001; Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 
2000). One significant difference between the material presented in the selection task in the 
study in the first paper and in Leyens and colleagues’ work (2001), is that the latter also 
included traits in the attribution measure that were directly related to competence (e.g., 
competence, intelligence). It is possible that the comparison with the set of competence traits 
lessened the association of the emotions to the status dimension.  
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As such, our first study has strengthened the argument already forwarded by Iatridis 
(2013) that uniquely human emotions are not sufficient to promote social creativity led 
dehumanisation in low status groups (Leyens et al., 2001). Moreover, and unlike Leyens and 
colleagues’ studies, we have shown it in a minimal group context. This approach allowed us 
to isolate the competence effect and to disentangle it from other variables. Indeed, we found 
that the effect of warmth did not not qualify the competence effect on dehumanisation. 
Moreover, differences in warmth between the ingroup and the outgroup showed to 
consistently predict the valence-based differentiation between both groups, but not the 
attribution of uniquely human emotions. This is especially significant considering that these 
variables do not behave orthogonally in non-experimental contexts (Kervyn, Yzerbyt, & Judd, 
2010). 
Despite the fact that Paper 1 was the only one designed to respond directly to our first 
goal, that is, asserting whether belonging to a low status group refrains people from 
dehumanizaing high status outgroup members, additional confirmation can be gathered from 
the studies performed in Papers 2 and 3. In all these studies the low status ingroup was never 
considered more uniquely human than the high status outgroup. This was true in the 
correlational data gathered with Gipsies, immigrants in Italy and Brazilian immigrants in 
Portugal in Paper 2 and again in the low status (and low power) conditions with Psychology 
Students and in a quasi-minimal group reported in Paper 3.  
Together these results can inform us that status is a boundary condition for 
dehumanisation processes in intergroup relations. Moreover, status differences seem to exert 
their influence regardless of the categorisation criteria (national, cultural, occupational or 
minimal) or of variations within these criteria (different nations, cultures or occupations). 
Nevertheless, dehumanisation is still described as an intergroup phenomenon that occurs 
independently of group status in the literature. So, how can we explain this difference 
between the current literature and the data presented in this thesis? A first analysis of the 
different experiments that have been conducted on this topic seems to suggest the answer 
might be linked to the definition of a group typology. 
When defining the future challenges to Social Identity Theory, Brown (2000) 
highlighted the necessity of comprising in its theoretical formulation different kinds of 
groups. There has been an initial effort to define taxonomies of different groups on a large set 
of characteristics. Lickel and colleagues (2000), for example, identified different groups 
which properties varied, namely: intimacy groups, task groups, social categories and loose 
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associations. Specifically, when comparing task groups (e.g., Blue collars) and social 
categories (e.g., Americans), some differences were highlighted, like: entitativity, importance 
for the self, interaction, goals, outcomes, similarity among group members being perceived as 
higher in the first and duration and size being greater in the latter case. A similar pattern of 
results had been obtained by Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi and Ethier (1995). These authors defined 
different types of groups based on perceived similarity. The first two types can be directly 
linked to the typology of Lickel and colleagues (2000): personal relationships and 
vocations/avocations groups. However, these authors further distinguished between three 
types of social categories: national/religious, political affiliations and stigma-based groups. 
Focusing on national/religious groups, only one important dimension of differentiation 
emerged, that the authors labelled as people of colour (e.g., African Americans) and people 
not of colour (e.g., Caucasians).  
Following Brown (2000) one might be inclined to sustain that variations in the 
dehumanisation effect might be dependent on group typology. And we do are able to identify 
sets of social categories who dehumanise and the ones who do not. On the one hand, we have 
seen that the low status groups who dehumanise outgroup members were national or regional 
groups that represent a majority in their intergroup context (Cortes et al., 2005; Demoulin et 
al., 2005; Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002; Paladino and Vaes, 2009; Vaes & 
Paladino, 2010). On the other hand, we were able to identify that all other cases that did not 
display dehumanisation were regional or cultural minorities (Capozza et al, 2012, Studies 1 
and 2; Miranda, Gouveia-Pereira, et al., 2014a; 2014b; Miranda, Vaes, et al., 2014). Along 
these last groups are the results obtained by Iatridis (2013) with task groups. These might be 
due to variations in the properties present in each type. However, nor the current research, 
neither the outstanding literature allow us to draw clear conclusions in this sense.  
Given that an analysis in terms of group typology cannot be conclusive, we moved to 
our second goal, that is, defining the conditions under which low status groups will be 
inclined to dehumanise high status outgroups. As such, we aimed at contrasting group 
conditions that might change outgroup dehumanisation from a pervasive to a contextually 
limited phenomenon.  
The first variable that focused on contact with the high status outgroup was explored 
in Paper 2. Using acculturation as a general framework, three studies showed that when 
minority group members identify with, wish to maintain contact and/or endorse an ideology 
of culture adoption with the majority host group, they not only cease to dehumanise the 
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outgroup, but even start to perceive their own heritage group as less human. Across three 
correlational studies, with varying intergroup settings, acculturation orientations have shown 
to moderate the extent to which low status groups dehumanise the high status outgroup. We 
argue that the need for acculturation of low status groups, in function of the specific strategy 
that is adopted, constitutes an important moderating factor in the dehumanisation of high 
status outgroups. It is important to highlight that this variable might not be relevant in all 
intergroup situations that are marked by status differences. The identification with a higher 
status outgroup hardly seems psychologically relevant for national groups, outside of an 
immigration context (e.g. Portuguese identifying with Danish?). In all other cases, however, 
assimilative processes are expected to make an important difference in outgroup perceptions. 
The second condition that was systematically manipulated, was the presence or 
absence of power. In Paper 3, we have shown that group status and power effects on 
dehumanisation can be disentangled. Moreover, we have shown that power constitutes a 
condition according to which low status groups dehumanise (or not) the high-status outgroup. 
Therefore, we argue that being able or not to have a significant degree of control over own 
outcomes (e.g., regional legislative autonomy), a characteristic that might vary across 
different types of groups (e.g. national vs. stigma-based), is able to explain the differences in 
the display of dehumanisation on behalf of low status groups. 
We do not wish to discuss the results of these two Papers here in detail, we have 
already done so elsewhere. The contribution we wish to make in this section relates to the way 
these two conditions intertwine with our general goal. The theoretical and empirical 
contribution of this thesis is that status differences between groups do not constitute a 
boundary condition to the display of dehumanisation of minority group members per se. Nor 
may we conclude that dehumanisation is a pervasive phenomenon that is not affected by 
differences in the social hierarchy. The results of this thesis, instead, have demonstrated that 
different variables associated to group status do moderate outgroup dehumanisation on behalf 
of low status group members. Interestingly, the set of studies that are presented here have 
shown that the conditions in which dehumanisation by low status groups is blocked, seems to 
constitute the normal context in which low status groups are often inserted. Indeed, often low 
status and low power go hand in hand, and a tendency to acculturate with the high status 
outgroup persists.  
Importantly, we are not able to determine if one of these variables, per se, is sufficient 
to make low status group members dehumanise high status outgroups. The fact that the 
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arguments presented in Papers 2 and 3 were tested independently from each other constitutes 
a handicap to the definition of an integrated taxonomy of low status groups which do or do 
not dehumanise. We have nevertheless paved the road in that direction defining the key role 
of assimilation and power in moderating the tendency of low status groups to dehumanise 
high status outgroup members.  
The other fundamental contribution of these Papers is related to the tangential question 
that accompanied this thesis, namely whether or not ethnocentric motives are at the basis of 
the dehumanisation bias in intergroup relations. The data we collected in our three Papers 
allow us to draw some comments in this regard.  
Firstly, we observe a widespread display of an absence of dehumanisation in the 
intergroup contexts we studied. Following System Justification Theory this might signal that 
the members of the low status groups we studied internalized their inequality (Jost, Pelham, & 
Carvallo, 2002). This general pattern was interrupted under two conditions giving us further 
insights into the interpretation of the absence of outgroup dehumanisation. The first, low 
status minority group members who chose to acculturate in any way except to assimilate with 
the majority outgroup, generally displayed a pattern of equal attribution of humanness to both 
groups. As such, the only situation where the outgroup was favoured in terms of human 
uniqueness occurred when group members where distancing themselves from their ingroup in 
the direction of the majority outgroup. One might argue that there is no direct support for 
social mobility. Indeed, as for now we have not measured the perceived permeability of 
boundaries amongst those low status groups who wish to assimilate. Nonetheless, in the 
dissociative group (Paper 2, Study 1) a clear pattern of outgroup dehumanisation was 
displayed, showing that when only their identification with the ingroup is of clear importance, 
low status group members show a pattern of outgroup dehumanisation that seems as much 
motivated by ethnocentrism as the dehumanising tendencies of majority outgroup members. 
The second exception was the empowered low status group in Paper 3. To understand 
this we may recur to one reinterpretation of one of the basic hypotheses of System 
Justification Theory: the rationalization of the status quo. According to Kay, Jimenez and Jost 
(2002), when people are highly motivated, they increase the desirability of an event as its 
probability increases and vice-versa. As such, according to this theory, people would consider 
their inferior status more desirable if they infer that it is likely to persist. It is plausible that the 
power effect described in Paper 3 is based on such an effect. Indeed the acknowledgment that 
their low status group had power might have indicated a possible future change in the 
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comparative position of the groups, if not in terms of status, then in the definition of one or 
the others’ outcomes. This might have had an influence on the desirability of the new balance 
between groups and the consequent reduction of the display of inequality. In fact, Vaughan 
(1978) has consistently shown that indices of social change are accompanied by the decrease 
of outgroup preferences in low-status-minorities.  
In other words, and based on Social Categorisation Theory (Turner, 1987/1990) and 
the Ingroup Projection Model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), our results seem to imply that 
a shared representation of the superordinate category of humanness based on the majority 
high status group exists indeed. That is, high status groups projecting their ingroup features as 
the super-ordinate uniquely human category, and low status groups projecting those same 
features. However, because when given the resources (power) or sometimes when identifying 
woth one’s groups id the only self-categorisation, our interpretation of this fact is in 
accordance with the principles of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) which state 
that individuals strive for a desirable social identity even when faced with an unfavourable 
context. This is even more plausible when considering the psychological disadvantages for 
low-status group members who endorse the inequality (Jost & Thompson, 2000). The 
interpretation of System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2003) of 
low-status groups motivated to endorse the unfavourable context, on the other hand, seems to 
fit the current data less clearly.  
We do not wish to enter the discussion on whether the latter is redundant to the first, 
nonetheless we agree with those who argue that Social Identity Theory is the only theory that 
can explain system stability and change (Reicher, 2004; Rubin, & Hewstone, 2004). As such, 
returning to the question of what allows one or the other may be fruitful in the study of this 
particular bias: dehumanisation. Hereof, we are inclined to sustain that there is a conflict 
within low-status group members between the acknowledgment of lasting inequalities and the 
motivation to display ethnocentric believes. The important question left is when one or the 
other situation arises. And this was what we intended to accomplish in this thesis.  
Future research 
A. ends his letter with a plight: “I do not want to live in such a world. Do you? If not, 
then please use the power and influence your position offers you, to instigate positive changes 
in the world”. So we end this thesis with a few stepping stones for the road in front of us. 
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Taken together, granting power to low status groups does not seem to be a solution to 
improve the relations with high status outgroups. Given that there were no changes in ingroup 
humanness, granting power to low status groups can worsen intergroup relations increasing 
the dehumanization of the outgroup, while not contributing to favourable outcomes associated 
with a uniquely human social identity of the ingroup (e.g., Vaes, Heflick, & Goldenberg, 
2010). In parallel, one might argue that assimilation is not in the best interest of low-status 
group members neither. This consideration is of particular relevance if one takes into 
consideration that the discrepancy between the desires and actual participation in the host 
society from the parts of minorities is strongly correlated with measures of psychological 
well-being (Latrofa, Vaes, Pastore, & Cadinu, 2009; Ramos, Cassidy, Reicher, Haslam, 
2014). 
As described earlier in the introduction, Vaes and colleagues (2012) have 
recommended separate analyses of the attribution of humanness to the ingroup and 
outgroups. This approach was not only based on evidence that pointed to separate results for 
the attribution of humanness to both types of targets, it can also be of service when trying to 
define which conditions do indeed allow low-status groups to confer a uniquely human, and 
thus favourable, social identity to themselves. Hence, future research should focus on 
analysing those conditions that allow low status group members to humanise their own 
group.  
There are indeed very few described moderators of ingroup humanization. Vaes and 
colleagues (2012) mention mortality salience, neurobiologically induced cooperation and 
ingroup identification. The studies introduced here allowed ingroup acculturation to be added 
to this list. On the other hand, our results on power are aligned with former work, including 
identification with a super-ordinate category (Gaunt, 2009), conservative ideologies 
(DeLuca-McLean & Castano, 2009), and status (Vaes & Paladino, 2010) as moderators of 
outgroup dehumanization given that ingroup humanisation did not change consistently when 
these variables were manipulated. 
Nonetheless, defining and operationalizing power more as it is conceptualised in the 
collective action literature might yield different results. The operationalization of power used 
in these studies, i.e., the ability to affect ones own and others’ outcomes, mirrors Drury and 
Reicher’s (1999) definition of collective empowerment. Interestingly, the authors present a 
second power related concept, which they called empowerment, aimed at mapping “a more 
general [than self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977)] subjective sense of ability and confidence” (p. 
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384). In fact self-efficacy has shown to conduce to collective action, and thus resulting in 
increased ingroup identification (Van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2010). Van Zomeren, 
Drury and Der Saaij (2014) conceptualized empowerment based on indicators including 
ingroup identification. Given the known relationship between ingroup identification and 
ingroup (but not outgroup) humanisation (Paladino et al., 2004), comparing collective 
empowerment and empowerment might be an interesting endeavor for future research as they 
might uniquely influence respectively outgroup and ingroup humanisation on behalf of low 
status groups. This extension of the results of Paper 3 might lead the way to a model of social 
change providing a uniquely human social identity to low-status groups. 
 
Proud, strong minorities are possible despite the ‘marks of oppression’ 
Thomas Pettigrew, 1978, p.60 
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Appendix A: Material and Measures of Stereotypes and Dehumanisation: 
Competence (and not Warmth) Moderating the Attribution of Uniquely Human 
Emotions in a Minimal Group Paradigm 
 
 
 
Competence and Warmth Manipulations 
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Table 1 
Non-words used in bogus task. 
 
Non-words 
Compreste; Justificatão; Vuola; Fari; Diapasãe; Tai; Enião; 
Cavalé; Reloiço; Cabini; Sonte; Cantasia; Omeralda; 
Gubmarino; Chuve; Ilcatifa; Alpendro; Locomotave; 
Tripulaçai; Edancipação. 
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Table 2 
Feedback on ingroup’s competence and warmth by condition. 
 
Condition Feedback 
High-Competence 
&  
High-Warmth 
O seu grupo é caracterizado por pessoas de fácil convivência social. Para tal, 
frequentemente organizam convívios sociais, fora do contexto de trabalho. Do mesmo 
modo, mantêm-se acolhedores sempre que têm ligações com pessoas fora do seu grupo. 
Sempre que têm de escolher qual a tarefa sobre a qual vão trabalhar, os membros deste 
grupo selecionam tarefas com temáticas relacionadas com causas ambientais, que sejam 
de grande visibilidade ou importância e que façam uso dos seus conhecimentos 
tecnológicos muito avançados. Os elementos deste grupo apostam num atempado 
planeamento das tarefa, sendo que, ao mesmo tempo, todos os membros colaboram entre 
si em todas as fases da realização da tarefa. É assim um grupo simultaneamente 
direcionado para a realização da tarefa e para uma interação positiva entre os seus 
membros. Por todos estes motivos, é um grupo de alto prestígio, sendo os seus membros 
frequentemente convidados para dar palestras em conferências públicas. 
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High-Competence 
&  
Low-Warmth 
O seu grupo é caracterizado por pessoas que raramente convivem socialmente, uma vez 
que não têm muitos tempos livres e nem estão interessados em manter ligações fora do 
contexto de trabalho. Sempre que têm de escolher qual a tarefa sobre a qual vão 
trabalhar, os membros deste grupo selecionam tarefas que sejam de maior visibilidade ou 
importância e que façam uso dos seus conhecimentos tecnológicos muito avançados. Os 
elementos deste grupo apostam num atempado planeamento das tarefas, sendo que cada 
um desempenha a sua função autonomamente, pelo que não há o hábito de se 
entreajudarem. Assim, a preocupação dos membros deste grupo não é tanto assegurar 
uma interação positiva entre os seus membros, estando principalmente direcionados para 
a realização da tarefa. Devido a estes fatores este grupo é um grupo de alto prestígio, 
sendo os seus membros frequentemente convidados para dar palestras em conferências 
públicas. 
 
Low-Competence &  
High-Warmth 
O seu grupo é caracterizado por pessoas de fácil convivência social. Para tal, 
frequentemente organizam convívios sociais, fora do contexto de trabalho. Do mesmo 
modo, mantêm-se acolhedores sempre que têm ligações com pessoas fora do seu grupo. 
Sempre que têm de escolher qual a tarefa sobre a qual vão trabalhar, os membros deste 
grupo selecionam tarefas com temáticas relacionadas com causas ambientais, mas que 
não sejam de grande visibilidade ou importância. Não existe investimento num 
planeamento detalhado das tarefas, pelo que muitas vezes os prazos não são cumpridos. 
No entanto, todos os membros colaboram entre si em todas as fases da realização da 
tarefa. Devido ao empenho com outras questões não relacionadas com a tarefa em mãos, 
nomeadamente a interação positiva entre os seus membros, este grupo não é um grupo de 
alto prestígio, o que se reflete no facto de rarearem os convites para palestras em 
conferências públicas. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Feedback on outgroup’s competence and warmth by condition. 
 
Condition Feedback 
High-Competence 
&  
High-Warmth 
O outro grupo é caracterizado por pessoas de fácil convivência social. Para tal, 
frequentemente organizam convívios sociais, fora do contexto de trabalho. Do mesmo 
modo, mantêm-se acolhedores sempre que têm ligações com pessoas fora do seu grupo. 
Sempre que têm de escolher qual a tarefa sobre a qual vão trabalhar, os membros deste 
grupo selecionam tarefas com temáticas relacionadas com causas ambientais, que sejam 
de grande visibilidade ou importância e que façam uso dos seus conhecimentos 
tecnológicos muito avançados. Os elementos deste grupo apostam num atempado 
planeamento das tarefa, sendo que, ao mesmo tempo, todos os membros colaboram entre 
si em todas as fases da realização da tarefa. É assim um grupo simultaneamente 
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direcionado para a realização da tarefa e para uma interação positiva entre os seus 
membros. Por todos estes motivos, é um grupo de alto prestígio, sendo os seus membros 
frequentemente convidados para dar palestras em conferências públicas 
 
High-Competence 
&  
Low-Warmth 
O outro grupo é caracterizado por pessoas que raramente convivem socialmente, uma 
vez que não têm muitos tempos livres e nem estão interessados em manter ligações fora 
do contexto de trabalho. Sempre que têm de escolher qual a tarefa sobre a qual vão 
trabalhar, os membros deste grupo selecionam tarefas que sejam de maior visibilidade ou 
importância e que façam uso dos seus conhecimentos tecnológicos muito avançados. Os 
elementos deste grupo apostam num atempado planeamento das tarefas, sendo que cada 
um desempenha a sua função autonomamente, pelo que não há o hábito de se 
entreajudarem. Assim, a preocupação dos membros deste grupo não é tanto assegurar 
uma interação positiva entre os seus membros, estando principalmente direcionados para 
a realização da tarefa. Devido a estes fatores este grupo é um grupo de alto prestígio, 
sendo os seus membros frequentemente convidados para dar palestras em conferências 
públicas. 
 
Low-Competence  
&  
High-Warmth 
O outro grupo é caracterizado por pessoas de fácil convivência social. Para tal, 
frequentemente organizam convívios sociais, fora do contexto de trabalho. Do mesmo 
modo, mantêm-se acolhedores sempre que têm ligações com pessoas fora do seu grupo. 
Sempre que têm de escolher qual a tarefa sobre a qual vão trabalhar, os membros deste 
grupo selecionam tarefas com temáticas relacionadas com causas ambientais, mas que 
não sejam de grande visibilidade ou importância. Não existe investimento num 
planeamento detalhado das tarefas, pelo que muitas vezes os prazos não são cumpridos. 
No entanto, todos os membros colaboram entre si em todas as fases da realização da 
tarefa. Devido ao empenho com outras questões não relacionadas com a tarefa em mãos, 
nomeadamente a interação positiva entre os seus membros, este grupo não é um grupo de 
alto prestígio, o que se reflete no facto de rarearem os convites para palestras em 
conferências públicas. 
Low-Competence 
&  
Low-Warmth 
O outro grupo é caracterizado por pessoas que raramente convivem socialmente, uma 
vez que não estão interessados em manter ligações com os colegas de trabalho. Ao 
mesmo tempo não são muito acolhedores quando interagem com pessoas fora do seu 
grupo. Sempre que têm de escolher qual a tarefa sobre a qual vão trabalhar, os membros 
deste grupo selecionam tarefas que sejam de menor visibilidade ou importância e com 
temáticas que não necessitem de grande conhecimento tecnológico, uma vez que 
procuram não ter de despender muito esforço. Não existe investimento num planeamento 
detalhado das tarefas, nem muita comunicação entre os seus membros. Preferem ir 
desempenhando tarefas isoladamente, pelo que não há o hábito de se entreajudarem. 
Devido às características apontadas, este grupo não é um grupo de alto prestígio, o que se 
reflete no facto de rarearem os convites para palestras em conferências públicas. 
 
 
 
Identification Scale 
 
1. Peço-lhe agora que pense no seu grupo. Diga em que medida cada afirmação que lhe iremos apresentar está de 
acordo com a sua opinião acerca de si e do seu grupo. 
 
 
Discordo  
Fortemente 
Concordo  
Fortemente 
Pertencer ao meu grupo é importante para mim        
Tenho orgulho em pertencer ao meu grupo.        
Às vezes, sinto-me incomodado quando penso que sou 
um membro do meu grupo.  
       
De um modo geral sinto-me feliz por ser um membro 
do meu grupo. 
       
Sinto que gostaria de não pertencer ao meu grupo.        
Sinto-me identificado com o meu grupo.        
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Dehumanisation measure 
 
 
 
 
 
The procedure was then repeated for the outgroup and thus replacing “o seu grupo” with “o outro grupo”. 
 
 
 
Manipulation Checks 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Competence and warmth traits used for manipulation checks. 
 
 Traits 
Competence Capaz; Competente; Dotado; Eficiente; Inteligente. 
Warmth Agradável; Amigável; Caloroso; Gentil; Sociável. 
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Appendix B: Statistics of Stereotypes and Dehumanisation: Competence (and not 
Warmth) Moderating the Attribution of Uniquely Human Emotions in a Minimal 
Group Paradigm 
 
 
Pretest Report 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Emotions pretest: Descriptive statistics of emotions as to uniquely humanness and desirability. 
 
  Uniquely Humaness Desirability 
  M SD M SD 
Non-
Uniquely 
Human 
Desirable 
Tranquilidade 3,700 1,803 6,567 0,626 
Conforto 3,867 1,756 6,667 0,606 
Satisfação 2,862 2,031 6,700 0,596 
Prazer 3,655 2,595 6,667 0,758 
Total 3,411 1,153 6,650 0,423 
Non-
Uniquely 
Human 
Undesirable 
Tristeza 4,133 2,013 1,833 1,177 
Medo 3,100 1,989 2,300 1,579 
Pavor 3,533 1,943 1,500 0,861 
Dor 2,900 2,107 1,933 1,202 
Total 3,417 1,018 1,892 0,611 
Uniquely 
Human 
Desirable 
Esperança 6,233 1,382 6,467 0,819 
Otimismo 6,133 1,196 6,433 0,774 
Felicidade 4,967 1,810 6,867 0,346 
Paixão 5,867 1,252 6,267 1,048 
Total 5,800 0,810 6,508 ,37418 
Non-
Uniquely 
Human 
Undesirable 
Humilhação 5,333 1,863 1,400 0,621 
Culpa 5,500 1,697 2,367 1,629 
Angústia 5,333 1,647 2,000 1,114 
Desconsolo 5,379 1,425 1,828 0,848 
Total 5,386 0,865 1,899 0,686 
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Table 2 
Emotions pretest: Repeated Measures ANOVA on uniquely humanness and desirability of proposed 
categorisation of emotions  
 
 Uniquely Humanness Ratings Desirability Ratings 
 SS df MS F p ηp
2
 SS df MS F p ηp
2
 
UH 129,473 1 129,473 130,830 ,000 ,834       
Error (UH) 25,730 26 ,990          
Des       636,621 1 636,621 2231,481 ,000 ,988 
Error (Des)       7,988 28 ,285    
UH * Des 1,172 1 1,172 1,367 ,253 ,050 ,065 1 ,065 ,215 ,646 ,008 
Error (UH*Des) 22,281 26 ,857    8,482 28 ,303    
UH = Uniquely Humaness; Des = Desirability 
 
 
Study 1 
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of sociodemographic information. 
 
Gender 
Male Female 
Age 
M SD 
22 88 24,85 8,23 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics and reliability of manipulation check. 
 
 M SD α 
Ingroup competence 5,6891 ,99044 ,832 
Outgroup competence 4,4473 1,47963 ,936 
Ingroup warmth 5,3800 1,37952 ,912 
Outgroup warmth 3,8182 1,64781 ,924 
 
 
 
Table 5 
MANOVA with manipulation checks for ingroup and outgroup competence 
 
 Dependent Variable SS df MS F p ηp
2
 
Intercept Ingroup competence 2502,116 1 2502,116 2778,164 ,000 ,963 
 Outgroup competence 1638,620 1 1638,620 865,943 ,000 ,891 
Ingroup competence 
condition 
Ingroup competence 7,283 1 7,283 8,087 ,005 ,071 
Outgroup competence 3,762 1 3,762 1,988 ,161 ,018 
Outgroup competence 
condition 
Ingroup competence ,587 1 ,587 ,652 ,421 ,006 
Outgroup competence 21,555 1 21,555 11,391 ,001 ,097 
Ingroup*Outgroup 
competence condition 
Ingroup competence ,535 1 ,535 ,594 ,442 ,006 
Outgroup competence 1,679 1 1,679 ,887 ,348 ,008 
Error Ingroup competence 95,467 106 ,901    
 Outgroup competence 200,583 106 1,892    
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Table 6 
MANOVA with manipulation checks for ingroup and outgroup warmth 
 
 Dependent Variable SS df MS F p ηp
2
 
Intercept Ingroup warmth 2235,020 1 2235,020 1709,218 ,000 ,942 
 Outgroup warmth 1287,575 1 1287,575 945,179 ,000 ,899 
Ingroup warmth 
condition 
Ingroup warmth 51,360 1 51,360 39,278 ,000 ,270 
Outgroup warmth 5,479 1 5,479 4,022 ,047 ,037 
Outgroup warmth 
condition 
Ingroup warmth ,735 1 ,735 ,562 ,455 ,005 
Outgroup warmth 103,362 1 103,362 75,875 ,000 ,417 
Ingroup*Outgroup 
warmth condition 
Ingroup warmth 2,012 1 2,012 1,539 ,218 ,014 
Outgroup warmth 3,844 1 3,844 2,822 ,096 ,026 
Error Ingroup warmth 138,608 106 1,308    
 Outgroup warmth 144,399 106 1,362    
 
 
 
Table 7 
Descriptive statistics and reliability of ingroup identification. 
 
 M SD α 
Ingroup identification 5,047 1,393 ,912 
 
 
 
Table 8 
ANOVA comparing ingroup identification by experimental condition. 
 
 SS df MS F p ηp
2
 
Intercept 2742,259 1 2742,259 1991,390 ,000 ,343 
Version 72,480 8 9,060 6,579 ,000 ,952 
Error 139,083 101 1,377   ,343 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Homogeinity of variances of dependent variables between conditions of high and low ingroup competence, 
outgroup competence, ingroup warmth and outgroup warmth. 
 
    Ingroup 
Competence 
Outgroup 
Competence 
Ingroup 
Warmth 
Outgroup 
Warmth 
  df1 df2 Levene  
Statistic 
p Levene  
Statistic  
p Levene  
Statistic 
p Levene  
Statistic 
p 
Primary Ingroup 1 108 2,193 ,142 2,990 ,087 2,546 ,113 2,148 ,146 
 Outgroup 1 108 1,750 ,189 ,000 ,992 ,348 ,557 2,995 ,086 
Secondary Ingroup 1 108 ,012 ,914 4,142 ,044 ,336 ,563 ,539 ,465 
 Outgorup 1 108 ,118 ,732 ,045 ,832 1,888 ,172 ,230 ,632 
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Table 10 
Repeated measures ANOVA on emotion attribution by group competence, with ingroup identification as a 
covariate. 
 
 SS df MS F p  ηp
2
 
UH ,023 1 ,023 ,057 ,812 ,001 
UH * Identification ,669 1 ,669 1,633 ,204 ,015 
UH * Ingroup competence ,424 1 ,424 1,035 ,311 ,010 
UH * Outgroup competence ,236 1 ,236 ,576 ,450 ,005 
UH * Ingroup competence * Outgroup competence ,187 1 ,187 ,457 ,500 ,004 
Error (UH) 43,005 105 ,410    
Desirability 25,313 1 25,313 14,612 ,000 ,122 
Desirability * Identification 2,577 1 2,577 1,487 ,225 ,014 
Desirability * Ingroup competence 1,879 1 1,879 1,085 ,300 ,010 
Desirability * Outgroup competence 1,074 1 1,074 ,620 ,433 ,006 
Desirability * Ingroup competence * Outgroup competence 6,471 1 6,471 3,736 ,056 ,034 
Error (Desirability) 181,890 105 1,732    
Target 3,638 1 3,638 9,257 ,003 ,081 
Target * Identification 7,806 1 7,806 19,862 ,000 ,159 
Target * Ingroup competence ,717 1 ,717 1,825 ,180 ,017 
Target * Outgroup competence ,042 1 ,042 ,108 ,743 ,001 
Target * Ingroup competence * Outgroup competence ,182 1 ,182 ,463 ,498 ,004 
Error (Target) 41,268 105 ,393    
UH * Desirability ,019 1 ,019 ,035 ,853 ,000 
UH * Desirability * Identification ,360 1 ,360 ,665 ,416 ,006 
UH * Desirability * Ingroup competence ,004 1 ,004 ,008 ,928 ,000 
UH * Desirability * Outgroup competence ,001 1 ,001 ,002 ,962 ,000 
UH * Desirability * Ingroup competence * Outgroup comp. ,447 1 ,447 ,826 ,365 ,008 
Error (UH * Desirability) 56,756 105 ,541    
UH * Target 1,840 1 1,840 2,800 ,097 ,026 
UH * Target * Identification 2,759 1 2,759 4,199 ,043 ,038 
UH * Target * Ingroup competence 2,930 1 2,930 4,459 ,037 ,041 
UH * Target * Outgroup competence ,792 1 ,792 1,206 ,275 ,011 
UH * Target * Ingroup competence * Outgroup competence ,162 1 ,162 ,246 ,621 ,002 
Error (UH*Target) 68,993 105 ,657    
Desirability * Target 71,875 1 71,875 26,854 ,000 ,204 
Desirability * Target * Identification 175,996 1 175,996 65,755 ,000 ,385 
Desirability * Target * Ingroup competence  2,938 1 2,938 1,098 ,297 ,010 
Desirability * Target * Outgroup competence 13,864 1 13,864 5,180 ,025 ,047 
Desirability * Target * Ingroup competence * Outgroup comp. 38,252 1 38,252 14,292 ,000 ,120 
Error (Desirability * Target) 281,039 105 2,677    
UH * Desirability * Target ,394 1 ,394 ,702 ,404 ,007 
UH * Desirability * Target * Identification ,237 1 ,237 ,423 ,517 ,004 
UH * Desirability * Target * Ingroup competence ,378 1 ,378 ,674 ,413 ,006 
UH * Desirability * Target * Outgroup competence ,646 1 ,646 1,151 ,286 ,011 
UH * Desirability * Target * Ingroup comp. * Outgroup comp. ,656 1 ,656 1,170 ,282 ,011 
Error (UH * Desirability * Target) 58,895 105 ,561    
Within factors = UH (Primary vs. Secondary); Desirability (Desirable vs. Undesirable); Target (Ingroup vs. Outgroup). 
Between factors = Ingroup competence (High vs. Low); Outgroup competence (High vs. Low) 
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Table 11 
Contrast analysis of differential attribution of primary and secondary emotions to the ingroup and the outgroup. 
 
Emotion Target M SE Mean 
Difference 
F(1, 105) p
b
 ηp
2
 
Primary Ingroup 1,429a ,057 ,272* 11,037a ,001 ,095 
 Outgroup 1,158a ,067     
Secondary Ingroup 1,199a ,068 ,141 3,047a ,084 ,028 
 Outgroup 1,059a ,063     
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: Identification = 5,047. b. Adjustment for multiple 
comparisons: Sidak 
 
 
 
Table 12 
Repeated measures ANOVA on primary and secondary emotion attribution, with ingroup identification as a 
covariate, splitting by group competence. 
 
 Low Ingroup Competence  High Ingroup Competence  
 SS df MS F p ηp
2
 SS df MS F p  ηp
2
 
UH * Target ,323 1 ,323 ,716 ,404 ,023 2,546 1 2,546 3,383 ,070 ,044 
UH * Target * Identification ,855 1 ,855 1,894 ,179 ,058 1,955 1 1,955 2,597 ,111 ,034 
UH * Target * Outgroup comp ,631 1 ,631 1,398 ,246 ,043 ,210 1 ,210 ,278 ,599 ,004 
Error (UH*Target) 13,987 31 ,451    54,955 73 ,753    
UH * Desirability * Target ,174 1 ,174 ,425 ,519 ,014 ,135 1 ,135 ,214 ,645 ,003 
UH * Des. * Target * Identif. ,070 1 ,070 ,171 ,682 ,005 ,171 1 ,171 ,270 ,605 ,004 
UH * Des. * Target * 
Outgroup competence 
,884 1 ,884 2,155 ,152 ,065 ,000 1 ,000 ,001 ,982 ,000 
Error (UH * Desirability * 
Target) 
12,709 31 ,410    46,182 73 ,633    
Within factors = UH (Primary vs. Secondary); Desirability (Desirable vs. Undesirable); Target (Ingroup vs. Outgroup). 
Between factors = Outgroup competence (High vs. Low) 
 
 
 
Table 13 
Contrast analysis of differential attribution of primary and secondary emotions to the ingroup and the outgroup 
when ingroup competence is high. 
 
Emotion Target M SE Mean 
Difference 
F(1, 73) p
b
 ηp
2
 
Primary Ingroup 1,337a ,062 ,074 ,638 ,427 ,009 
 Outgroup 1,263a ,075     
Secondary Ingroup 1,290a ,073 ,211 6,056 ,016 ,077 
 Outgorup 1,079a ,067     
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: Identification = 5,070. b. Adjustment for multiple 
comparisons: Sidak 
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Table 14 
Repeated measures ANOVA on emotion attribution by group warmth, with ingroup identification as a covariate. 
 
 SS df MS F p  ηp
2
 
UH ,074 1 ,074 ,209 ,649 ,002 
UH * Identification ,077 1 ,077 ,218 ,641 ,002 
UH * Ingroup warmth ,113 1 ,113 ,321 ,572 ,003 
UH * Outgroup warmth 6,348 1 6,348 18,037 ,000 ,147 
UH * Ingroup warmth * Outgroup warmth ,732 1 ,732 2,080 ,152 ,019 
Error (UH) 36,955 105 ,352    
Desirability 13,267 1 13,267 7,913 ,006 ,070 
Desirability * Identification ,018 1 ,018 ,011 ,918 ,000 
Desirability * Ingroup warmth 1,607 1 1,607 ,958 ,330 ,009 
Desirability * Outgroup warmth 7,377 1 7,377 4,401 ,038 ,040 
Desirability * Ingroup warmth * Outgroup warmth ,009 1 ,009 ,005 ,943 ,000 
Error (Desirability) 176,031 105 1,676    
Target 1,452 1 1,452 3,853 ,052 ,035 
Target * Identification 3,398 1 3,398 9,019 ,003 ,079 
Target * Ingroup warmth ,891 1 ,891 2,365 ,127 ,022 
Target * Outgroup warmth 1,009 1 1,009 2,678 ,105 ,025 
Target * Ingroup warmth * Outgroup warmth ,477 1 ,477 1,266 ,263 ,012 
Error (Target) 39,554 105 ,377    
UH * Desirability ,007 1 ,007 ,013 ,908 ,000 
UH * Desirability * Identification ,507 1 ,507 ,937 ,335 ,009 
UH * Desirability * Ingroup warmth ,271 1 ,271 ,501 ,481 ,005 
UH * Desirability * Outgroup warmth ,007 1 ,007 ,013 ,911 ,000 
UH * Desirability * Ingroup warmth * Outgroup warmth ,111 1 ,111 ,205 ,651 ,002 
Error (UH * Desirability) 56,831 105 ,541    
UH * Target 1,533 1 1,533 2,249 ,137 ,021 
UH * Target * Identification 1,704 1 1,704 2,501 ,117 ,023 
UH * Target * Ingroup warmth ,030 1 ,030 ,044 ,834 ,000 
UH * Target * Outgroup warmth ,083 1 ,083 ,122 ,727 ,001 
UH * Target * Ingroup warmth * Outgroup warmth ,343 1 ,343 ,503 ,480 ,005 
Error (UH*Target) 71,552 105 ,681    
Desirability * Target 31,020 1 31,020 12,381 ,001 ,105 
Desirability * Target * Identification 73,806 1 73,806 29,458 ,000 ,219 
Desirability * Target * Ingroup warmth 7,224 1 7,224 2,884 ,092 ,027 
Desirability * Target * Outgroup warmth 33,497 1 33,497 13,370 ,000 ,113 
Desirability * Target * Ingroup warmth * Outgroup warmth ,587 1 ,587 ,234 ,629 ,002 
Error (Desirability * Target) 263,069 105 2,505    
UH * Desirability * Target ,404 1 ,404 ,726 ,396 ,007 
UH * Desirability * Target * Identification ,407 1 ,407 ,732 ,394 ,007 
UH * Desirability * Target * Ingroup warmth ,048 1 ,048 ,086 ,771 ,001 
UH * Desirability * Target * Outgroup warmth 1,123 1 1,123 2,017 ,159 ,019 
UH * Desirability * Target * Ingroup warmth* Outgroup w. ,018 1 ,018 ,032 ,857 ,000 
Error (UH * Desirability * Target) 58,481 105 ,557    
Within factors = UH (Primary vs. Secondary); Desirability (Desirable vs. Undesirable); Target (Ingroup vs. Outgroup). 
Between factors = Ingroup warmth (High vs. Low); Outgroup warmth (High vs. Low) 
Table 15 
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Appendix C: Measures of When in Rome... Identification and Acculturation strategies 
among minority members moderate the dehumanisation of the majority outgroup 
 
 
Identification Scale 
 
Todos nós pertencemos a diferentes grupos. Gostaria que pensasses agora nos grupos de pessoas que vou 
descrever nas questões abaixo e que nos desses a tua opinião acerca de ti e desses grupos. 
1/2. Peço-lhe agora que pense no grupo dos [grupo de herança/acolhimento]. Para cada frase ponha uma cruz no 
número que mais estiver de acordo com a sua opinião acerca de si e do grupo dos [grupo de 
herança/acolhimento]. 
 
 
Discordo  
Fortemente 
Concordo  
Fortemente 
Pertencer ao grupo dos [grupo de 
herança/acolhimento] é importante para mim 
       
Tenho orgulho em pertencer ao grupo dos [grupo de 
herança/acolhimento] 
       
Às vezes, sinto-me incomodado quando penso que sou 
um membro do grupo dos [grupo de 
herança/acolhimento] 
       
De um modo geral sinto-me feliz por ser um membro 
do grupo dos [grupo de herança/acolhimento] 
       
Sinto que gostaria de não pertencer ao grupo dos 
[grupo de herança/acolhimento] 
       
Sinto-me identificado com o grupo dos [grupo de 
herança/acolhimento] 
       
 
 
 
Acculturation Scale 
 
1. Abaixo vai encontrar perguntas relacionadas com a sua [cultural hereditária] e com a [cultura de acolhimento]. 
Indique o grau em que concorda ou discorda delas, colocando uma cruz no número que melhor representa a sua 
opinião.  
 
 
Discordo  
Fortemente 
Concordo  
Fortemente 
Eu participo frequentemente em tradições [cultura 
[hereditária]. 
       
Eu participo frequentemente em tradições [cultura 
de acolhimento]. 
       
Eu estaria disposto(a) a casar com um(a) [membro 
da cultura hereditária]. 
       
Eu estaria disposto(a) a casar com um(a) [membro 
da cultura de acolhimento]. 
       
Eu gosto de participar em atividades sociais com 
[membros da cultura hereditária]. 
       
Eu gosto de participar em atividades sociais com 
[membros da cultura de acolhimento] típicos. 
       
134 
 
Eu sinto-me confortável a trabalhar com 
[membros da cultura hereditária].. 
       
Eu sinto-me confortável a trabalhar com 
[membros da cultura de acolhimento] típicos. 
       
Eu gosto de entretenimento [cultura hereditária]. 
(por exemplo, filmes, música). 
       
Eu gosto de entretenimento [cultura de 
acolhimento] (por exemplo, filmes, música). 
       
Eu comporto-me frequentemente de formas que 
são tipicamente [cultura hereditária].. 
       
Eu comporto-me frequentemente de formas que 
são tipicamente [cultura de acolhimento]. 
       
Para mim é importante manter e desenvolver 
práticas culturais [hereditárias]. 
       
Para mim é importante manter e desenvolver 
práticas culturais [de acolhimento]. 
       
Eu acredito nos valores da cultura [hereditária].        
Eu acredito nos valores centrais da cultura [de 
acolhimento]. 
       
Eu gosto de piadas e do humor [cultura 
hereditária].o 
       
Eu gosto de piadas e do humor tipicamente [ 
cultura de acolhimento] 
       
Eu tenho interesse em ter amigos [membros da 
cultura hereditária]. 
       
Eu tenho interesse em ter amigos [membros da 
cultura de acolhimento].. 
       
 
 
 
Dehumanisation measure 
 
 
 
Study 1. 
 
 
 
1. Gostaria que pensasses nas características que, na tua opinião, definem o ser humano. Já pensaste? Gostaria 
então que escrevesses todas as características que, na tua opinião, só os seres humanos têm. 
[Características x]: _________________________. 
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2. A partir das características que escreveste na questão 1, gostava que pensasses qual é a probabilidade de 
encontrar cada uma delas num cigano típico. Para isso põe uma cruz no espaço que melhor representa a tua 
opinião. Para te ajudar, volta a escrever as características que já escreveste na questão 1 nesta questão.  
Característica 1__________________________________. 
 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Muito baixa probabilidade de a 
encontrar num cigano típico 
 Muito alta probabilidade de a 
encontrar num cigano típico 
 
 
 
3. A partir das características que escreveste na questão 1, gostava que pensasses qual é a probabilidade de 
encontrar cada uma delas num cigano típico. Para isso põe uma cruz no espaço que melhor representa a tua 
opinião. Para te ajudar, volta a escrever as características que já escreveste na questão 1 nesta questão. 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Muito baixa probabilidade de a 
encontrar num português típico 
 Muito alta probabilidade de a 
encontrar num português típico 
 
 
 
4. Gostaria agora que dissesses quanto cada uma das características que escreveste na questão 1 é negativa ou 
positiva. Para isso põe uma cruz no espaço que melhor representa a tua opinião. Para te ajudar, volta a escrever 
as características que já escreveste na questão 1 nesta questão. 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Muito negativa  Muito positiva 
 
 
 
 
Studies 2 and 3
18
. 
 
 
 
1. Quanto é que você acha que os [endogrupo]  são:  
(Para todas as palavras, coloque uma cruz no número que melhor representa a sua opinião) 
 
 Nada Muito 
[Traços]        
 
 
 
2. Quanto é que você acha que os [exogrupo] são:  
(Para todas as palavras, coloque uma cruz no número que melhor representa a sua opinião) 
 
 Nada Muito 
[Traços]        
                                                 
18
 Study 2 corresponded to the Italian translated version of the questionnaire presented here in Portuguese. 
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3. Quanto é que você acha que cada uma das seguintes características são exclusivas dos seres humanos (só as 
pessoas é que as têm) ou são partilhadas com os animais (as pessoas e os animais têm-nas). 
(Para todas as palavras, coloque uma cruz no número que melhor representa a sua opinião) 
 
 Partilhadas com os 
Animais  
Exclusivas dos  
Seres Humanos 
[Traços]        
 
 
 
4. Quanto é que você acha desejável ter as seguintes características: 
(Coloque uma cruz no número que melhor representa a sua opinião) 
 
 Nada Muito 
[Traits]        
 
 
 
Table 1 
Traits used in the dehumanisation measure in Study 2 and Study 3. 
 
 Study 2 Study 3 
[Traits] 
Affidabili; Aggressivi; Allegri; 
Amichevoli; Bugiardi; Cattivi; 
Competenti; Creativi; Disorganizzati; 
Educati; Freddi; Furbi; Generosi; 
Ignoranti; Irresponsabili; Ladri; 
Lavoratori; Onesti; Pacifici; Sensibili; 
Simpatici; Stupidi; Superficiali; 
Violenti 
Abertos; Acomodados; Alegres; Arrogantes; Bem-
humorados; Bons; amigos; Bons; dançarinos; 
Brincalhões; Calorosos; Conservadores; Corajosos; 
Covardes; Deprimidos; Desagradáveis; 
Desconfiados; Descontraídos; Egoístas; Espontâneos; 
Extrovertidos; Hospitaleiros; Idealistas; Ignorantes; 
Impontuais; Inconvenientes; Insensíveis; Ladrões; 
Malandros; Mal-educados; Mentirosos; Nervosos; 
Orgulhosos; Patriotas; Responsáveis; Rígidos; 
Sexuais; Simpáticos; Teimosos; Tolerantes; 
Trabalhadores; Tradicionais. 
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Appendix D: Statistics of When in Rome... Identification and Acculturation strategies 
among minority members moderate the dehumanisation of the majority outgroup 
 
 
 
Study 1: Ingroup and outgroup identification and dehumanisation 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of sociodemographic information. 
 
Gender 
Male Female 
 
19 11  
Age 
M SD  
13,83 1,74  
School grade 
Med Min Max 
4th 3rd 8th 
History of failing 
in school 
<1 ≥1 NR. 
1 28 1 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and reliability of ingroup and outgroup identification. 
 
 M Med  SD α 
Ingroup identification 5,933 6,08 ,962 ,586 
Outgroup identification 4,289 4,25 1,648 ,794 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of uniquely human features. 
 
 M SD 
Number 5,200 2,384 
Desirability 6,053 ,998 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Tests of normality of dehumanisation, ingroup identification and outgroup identification. 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 
 Statistic df p 
Dehumanisation Index ,132 30 ,192 
Ingroup identification ,194 30 ,005 
Outgroup identification ,098 30 ,200 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Table 5 
T-tests for dehumanisation against zero. 
 
     CI 95% 
 
M SD Mean 
Difference 
t(29) p LL UL 
Dehumanisation Index -,004 1,262 -,004 -,017 ,986 -,475 ,467 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Correlation and paired T-test of ingroup identification and outgroup identification. 
 
     CI 95% 
 
r p Mean 
Difference 
t(29) p LL UL 
Ingroup identification - 
Outgroup identification 
,068 ,723 1,644 4,866 ,000 ,95322 2,33567 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Regression analyses of group identification on dehumanisation: model summary. 
 
    Change Statistics 
Model R R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 SE of 
Estimate 
R
2 
Change 
F
 
Change 
df1 df2 p 
1 ,505a ,255 ,200 1,129 ,255 4,621 2 27 ,019 
2 ,505b ,255 ,169 1,151 ,000 ,000 1 26 ,997 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Ingroup identification (MC), Outgroup identification (MC) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Ingroup identification (MC), Outgroup identification (MC), Ingroup identification (MC)* 
Outgroup identification (MC) 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Regression analyses of group identification on dehumanisation: ANOVA. 
 
Model SS df MS F p 
1 Regression 11,781 2 5,891 4,621 ,019a 
 Residual 34,421 27 1,275   
 Total 46,203 29    
2 Regression 11,781 3 3,927 2,966 ,050b 
 Residual 34,421 26 1,324   
 Total 46,203 29    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Ingroup identification (MC), Outgroup identification (MC) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Ingroup identification (MC), Outgroup identification (MC), Ingroup identification (MC)* 
Outgroup identification (MC) 
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Table 9 
Regression analyses of group identification on dehumanisation: coefficients. 
 
 
Unstandardized 
Cofficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity Statistics 
Model B SD Beta t p Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -,004 ,206  -,020 ,984   
 Ingroup identification (MC) ,505 ,219 ,385 2,311 ,029 ,995 1,005 
 Outgroup identification (MC) -,271 ,128 -,354 -2,127 ,043 ,995 1,005 
2 (Constant) -,004 ,211  -,020 ,984   
 Ingroup identification (MC) ,505 ,230 ,385 2,193 ,037 ,930 1,075 
 Outgroup identification (MC) -,271 ,136 -,354 -1,998 ,056 ,911 1,098 
 
Ingroup identification (MC)* 
Outgroup identification (MC) 
,001 ,186 ,001 ,004 ,997 ,868 1,153 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Descriptive statistics of dehumanisation according to identification strategy. 
 
 M  SD 
Acculturative ,0620 ,99638 
Dissociative ,9334 1,42512 
Assimilative -,8452 1,05458 
Marginal -,1542 1,13863 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 
Contrast analysis on dehumanisation of acculturative, dissociative and assimilative against others. 
 
 
Value of 
Contrast 
SE t df p 
Assimilative (1, 1, -3, 1) 3,377 1,501 2,250 26 ,033 
Acculturative (-3, 1, 1, 1) -,252 1,435 -,176 26 ,862 
Dissociative (-1, 3, -1, -1) 3,738 1,501 2,491 26 ,019 
 
 
 
Study 2: Acculturation and Dehumanisation 
 
 
 
Table 12 
Descriptive statistics of sociodemographic information. 
 
Gender 
Male Female 
  
15 26   
Age 
M SD  
 
37,71 10,759   
Country of origin 
Albania Romania Nigeria Russia 
20 19 1 1 
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Years in Italy 
M SD  
 
10,382 5,568   
Self-rated proficiency 
in Italian 
M SD  
 
5,15 1,40   
 
 
 
Table 13 
Descriptive statistics and reliability of ingroup and outgroup acculturation. 
 
 M Med  SD α 
Ingroup acculturation 6,679 6,900 1,700 ,934 
Outgroup acculturation 6,3485 6,500 1,21068 ,843 
 
 
 
Table 14 
Tests of normality of dehumanisation, ingroup acculturation and outgroup acculturation. 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 
 Statistic df p 
Dehumanisation Index ,169 38 ,008 
Ingroup acculturation ,108 41 ,200 
Outgroup acculturation ,102 41 ,200 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
 
Table 15 
T-tests for dehumanisation against zero. 
 
     CI 95% 
 
M SD Mean 
Difference 
t(37) p LL UL 
Dehumanisation Index -,0422 ,31472 -,04220 -,827 ,414 -,1456 ,0612 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
 
Table 16 
Correlation and paired T-test of ingroup acculturation and outgroup acculturation. 
 
     CI 95% 
 
r p Mean 
Difference 
t(40) p LL UL 
Ingroup identification - 
Outgroup identification 
,067 ,679 ,33035 1,047 ,301 -,30737 ,96807 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
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Table 17 
Regression analyses of acculturation on dehumanisation: model summary. 
 
    Change Statistics 
Model R R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 SE of 
Estimate 
R
2 
Change 
F
 
Change 
df1 df2 p 
1 ,355a ,126 ,076 ,303 ,126 2,520 2 35 ,095 
2 ,526b ,276 ,212 ,279 ,150 7,067 1 34 ,012 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Ingroup acculturation (MC), Outgroup acculturation (MC) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Ingroup acculturation (MC), Outgroup acculturation (MC), Ingroup acculturation (MC)* 
Outgroup acculturation (MC) 
 
 
 
Table 18 
Regression analyses of acculturation on dehumanisation: ANOVA. 
 
Model SS df MS F p 
1 Regression ,461 2 ,231 2,520 ,095a 
 Residual 3,203 35 ,092   
 Total 3,665 37    
2 Regression 1,013 3 ,338 4,327 ,011b 
 Residual 2,652 34 ,078   
 Total 3,665 37    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Ingroup acculturation (MC), Outgroup acculturation (MC) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Ingroup acculturation (MC), Outgroup acculturation (MC), Ingroup acculturation (MC)* 
Outgroup acculturation (MC) 
 
 
 
Table 19 
Regression analyses of acculturation on dehumanisation: coefficients. 
 
 
Unstandardized 
Cofficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity Statistics 
Model B SD Beta t p Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -,036 ,049  -,726 ,472   
 Ingroup identification (MC) ,091 ,050 ,287 1,806 ,080 ,989 1,011 
 Outgroup identification (MC) -,077 ,050 -,241 -1,518 ,138 ,989 1,011 
2 (Constant) -,049 ,046  -1,082 ,287   
 Ingroup identification (MC) ,052 ,049 ,164 1,066 ,294 ,899 1,112 
 Outgroup identification (MC) -,087 ,047 -,275 -1,870 ,070 ,981 1,019 
 
Ingroup identification (MC)* 
Outgroup identification (MC) 
,119 ,045 ,409 2,658 ,012 ,897 1,114 
 
 
 
Table 20 
Regression analyses of acculturation on dehumanisation: Covariance matrix of model 2. 
 
Model  1 2 3 
2 Covariance Ingroup identification (MC) ,002 ,000 -,001 
  Outgroup identification (MC) ,000 ,002 ,000 
 
 Ingroup identification (MC)* 
Outgroup identification (MC) 
-,001 ,000 ,002 
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Table 21 
Simple slope computations for continuous moderation of acculturation on dehumanisation. 
 
Level of the moderating variable 
Simple 
Slope 
SE t df p 
High ,032 ,063 0,506 34 ,616 
Medium -,087 ,046 -1,905 34 ,065 
Low -,206 ,063 -3,257 34 ,003 
 
 
 
Table 22 
Descriptive statistics of dehumanisation according to acculturation strategy. 
 
 M  SD 
Integration -,0077 ,27695 
Separation -,0221 ,24435 
Assimilation -,2522 ,39210 
Marginalisation ,0320 ,32127 
 
 
 
Table 23 
Contrast analysis on dehumanisation of acculturative, dissociative and assimilative against others. 
 
 
Value of 
Contrast 
SE t df p 
Assimilation (1, 1, -3, 1) ,7588 ,39072 1,942 34 ,060 
Integration (-3, 1, 1, 1) -,2191 ,34597 -,633 34 ,531 
Separation (-1, 3, -1, -1) ,1617 ,37273 ,434 34 ,667 
 
 
 
Study 3: Acculturation and Dehumanisation, a Replication 
 
 
 
Table 24 
Descriptive statistics of sociodemographic information. 
 
Gender 
Male Female 
 
13 18  
Age 
M SD  
32,29 8,73  
Permit to stay 
Yes No NA 
18 12 1 
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Table 25 
Descriptive statistics and reliability of ingroup and outgroup acculturation. 
 
 M Med  SD α 
Ingroup acculturation 5,322 5,500 1,139 ,846 
Outgroup acculturation 4,326 4,400 1,233 ,822 
 
 
 
Table 26 
Tests of normality of dehumanisation, ingroup acculturation and outgroup acculturation. 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 
 Statistic df p 
Dehumanisation Index ,463 31 ,000 
Dehumanisation Index 
without outliers 
,107 28 ,200 
Ingroup acculturation ,098 31 ,200 
Outgroup acculturation ,141 31 ,118 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
 
Table 27 
Stem-and-leaf of the dehumanisation index. 
 
Frequency Stem &  Leaf 
1 Extremes ≤-19,10 
1 -7. 5 
1   -6. 0 
2 -5. 22 
1 -4. 7 
2 -3. 06 
5 -2. 57789 
3 -1. 026 
5 -0. 15699 
2 0. 02 
6 1. 003349 
2 Extremes ≥,83 
Stem width = ,10; Each leaf = 1 case. 
 
 
 
Table 28 
Correlation and paired T-test of ingroup acculturation and outgroup acculturation. 
 
     CI 95% 
 
r p Mean 
Difference 
t(30) p LL UL 
Ingroup identification - 
Outgroup identification 
208 ,262 ,26838 3,710 ,001 ,44759 1,54381 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
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Table 29 
T-tests for dehumanisation against zero. 
 
     CI 95% 
 
M SD Mean 
Difference 
t(27) p LL UL 
Dehumanisation Index -,172 ,250 -,172 -3,647 ,001 -,269 -,075 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
 
Table 30 
Regression analyses of acculturation on dehumanisation: model summary. 
 
    Change Statistics 
Model R R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 SE of 
Estimate 
R
2 
Change 
F
 
Change 
df1 df2 p 
1 ,413a ,171 ,104 ,23629 ,171 2,571 2 25 ,096 
2 ,550b ,302 ,215 ,22122 ,132 4,524 1 24 ,044 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Ingroup acculturation (MC), Outgroup acculturation (MC) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Ingroup acculturation (MC), Outgroup acculturation (MC), Ingroup acculturation (MC)* 
Outgroup acculturation (MC) 
 
 
 
Table 31 
Regression analyses of acculturation on dehumanisation: ANOVA. 
 
Model SS df MS F p 
1 Regression ,287 2 ,144 2,571 ,096a 
 Residual 1,396 25 ,056   
 Total 1,683 27    
2 Regression ,509 3 ,170 3,464 ,032b 
 Residual 1,174 24 ,049   
 Total 1,683 27    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Ingroup acculturation (MC), Outgroup acculturation (MC) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Ingroup acculturation (MC), Outgroup acculturation (MC), Ingroup acculturation (MC)* 
Outgroup acculturation (MC) 
 
 
Table 32 
Regression analyses of acculturation on dehumanisation: coefficients. 
 
 Unstandardized 
Cofficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity Statistics 
Model B SD Beta t p Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -,168 ,045  -3,760 ,001   
 Ingroup acculturation (MC) ,090 ,040 ,421 2,267 ,032 ,964 1,037 
 Outgroup acculturation (MC) -,015 ,040 -,072 -,388 ,701 ,964 1,037 
2 (Constant) -,192 ,043  -4,427 ,000   
 Ingroup acculturation (MC) ,135 ,043 ,630 3,155 ,004 ,730 1,369 
 Outgroup acculturation (MC) -,069 ,045 -,322 -1,534 ,138 ,662 1,511 
 
Ingroup acculturation (MC)* 
Outgroup acculturation (MC) 
,090 ,042 ,467 2,127 ,044 ,604 1,656 
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Table 33 
Regression analyses of acculturation on dehumanisation: Covariance matrix of model 2. 
 
Model  1 2 3 
2 Covariance Ingroup acculturation (MC) ,002 -,001 ,001 
  Outgroup acculturation (MC) -,001 ,002 -,001 
 
 Ingroup acculturation (MC)* 
Outgroup acculturation (MC) 
,001 -,001 ,002 
 
 
 
Table 34 
Simple slope computations for continuous moderation of acculturation on dehumanisation. 
 
Level of the moderating 
variable 
Simple 
Slope 
SE t df p 
High ,042 ,051 0,823 24 ,418 
Medium -,069 ,049 -1,401 24 ,173 
Low -,180 ,087 -2,077 24 ,049 
 
 
 
Table 35 
Descriptive statistics of dehumanisation according to acculturation strategy. 
 
 M  SD 
Integration -,0372 ,24996 
Separation -,0564 ,20081 
Assimilation -,3576 ,30981 
Marginalisation -,2111 ,17566 
 
 
 
Table 36 
Contrast analysis on dehumanisation of acculturative, dissociative and assimilative against others. 
 
 
Value of 
Contrast 
SE t df p 
Assimilation (1, 1, -3, 1) ,7682 ,32006 2,400 24 ,024 
Integration (-3, 1, 1, 1) -,5136 ,32006 -1,605 24 ,122 
Separation (-1, 3, -1, -1) ,4368 ,32006 1,365 24 ,185 
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Appendix E: Material and Measures of When the small feel strong enough: The role of 
power in low status groups on outgroup dehumanisation 
 
 
Defining Status 
 
 
 
Study 1 – status manipulation. 
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           Table 1 
            Non-words used in bogus task. 
 
Non-words 
Compreste; Justificatão; 
Vuola; Fari; Diapasãe; Tai; 
Enião; Cavalé; Reloiço; 
Cabini; Sonte; Cantasia; 
Omeralda; Gubmarino; 
Chuve. 
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Study 2 – Pilot test selecting different status groups. 
 
1. Ti chiediamo di rispondere alle prossime domande che riguardano gli studenti di 
[Psicologia/Medicina]. Annerisci il numero della scala che meglio corrisponde alla tua opinione. 
 
 Per niente Del Tutto 
Quanto prestigiosi sono i lavori che di solito svolgono i 
membri di questo gruppo? 
     
In che misura i membri di questo gruppo hanno/avranno 
successo dal punto di vista economico? 
     
 
 
Power Manipulation  
 
 
Study 1. 
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High Power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vs. 
Low Power 
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Study 2. 
 
 
Pilot Test on the Topic. 
 
Ti chiediamo di rispondere alle prossime domande. Annerisci il numero della scala che meglio 
corrisponde alla tua opinione. 
 
 Per niente Del Tutto 
Quanto ritieni importante poter decidere rispetto alle regole 
e le modalità di utilizzo della mensa? 
     
Quanto ritieni importante poter decidere rispetto alle regole 
riguardanti lo svolgimento degli esami? 
     
Quanto ritieni importante poter decidere rispetto alla 
gestione del tuo percorso accademico? 
     
Quanto ritieni importante poter decidere rispetto alle 
modalità di accesso al corso di laurea magistrale? 
     
Quanto ritieni importante poter decidere rispetto alla 
formulazione di una nuova riforma universitaria avente un 
impatto simile all’attuale 3+2? 
     
Quanto ritieni importante poter decidere rispetto alle regole 
e modalità con cui affittare una stanza o un appartamento 
nella città dove studi? 
     
Quanto ritieni importante poter decidere rispetto al prezzo 
dei libri universitari che devi acquistare? 
     
Quanto ritieni importante poter decidere rispetto 
all’attribuzione dei crediti previsti per ogni insegnamento? 
     
Quanto ritieni importante poter decidere rispetto ai 
contenuti degli insegnamenti proposti? 
     
 
 
Manipulation. 
 
L'Università di Padova sta conducendo un importante indagine della durata di un anno, per ottenere 
l’opinione degli studenti circa alcuni aspetti riguardanti la vita accademica. Questa indagine sarà 
realizzata in diverse fasi. Durante ogni fase saranno selezionati gli studenti di due facoltà per 
esprimere il loro parere su un tema riguardante la vita accademica. In questa fase l'Università di 
Padova sta chiedendo agli studenti sia della facoltà di Psicologia sia della facoltà di Medicina il loro 
parere sull’argomento della gestione del percorso accademico. Così, se siete un di Psicologia o di 
Medicina, per cortesia rispondete ai quesiti qui riportati. 
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 Per niente Del Tutto 
1. E’ importante poter inserire degli esami a scelta nel 
piano di studi. 
     
2. E’ importante avere più curricula fra cui scegliere.      
3. E’ importante poter scegliere a quale ordinamento 
iscriversi. 
     
4. E’ importante poter partecipare alla scelta dei contenuti 
degli esami da sostenere. 
     
5. E’ importante poter inserire un’attività di tirocinio 
durante il percorso accademico. 
     
6. E’ importante poter decidere la distribuzione annuale 
degli insegnamenti. 
     
7. E’ importante poter partecipare gratuitamente ai corsi di 
approfondimento e/o ai seminari. 
     
8. E’ importante poter affiancare alle lezioni teoriche delle 
attività pratiche 
     
 
 
Poichè esiste un numero disuguale di studenti tra le due facoltà, la facoltà di Psicologia ha un numero 
maggiore di studenti in confronto alla facoltà di Medicina, saranno dati pesi differenti alle risposte dei 
membri di ogni facoltà durante la composizione dell’opinione finale degli studenti dell’Università di 
Padova riguardo al tema della gestione del percorso accademico. 
 
High Power 
In altre parole, le risposte degli studenti di Psicologia contribuiranno nella misura del 80% 
sull’opinione finale mentre le risposte degli studenti di Medicina contribuiranno nella misura dell’20% 
sulla decisione finale relativa al tema della gestione del percorso accademico. 
Vs. 
Low Power 
In altre parole, le risposte degli studenti di Psicologia contribuiranno nella misura del 20% 
sull’opinione finale mentre le risposte degli studenti di Medicina contribuiranno nella misura dell’80% 
sulla decisione finale relativa al tema della gestione del percorso accademico. 
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Dehumanisation measure
19
  
 
 
 
1. Quanto é que você acha que os [endogrupo]  são:  
(Para todas as palavras, coloque uma cruz no número que melhor representa a sua opinião) 
 
 Nada Muito 
[Traços]        
 
 
 
2. Quanto é que você acha que os [exogrupo] são:  
(Para todas as palavras, coloque uma cruz no número que melhor representa a sua opinião) 
 
 Nada Muito 
[Traços]        
 
 
 
3. Quanto é que você acha que cada uma das seguintes características são exclusivas dos seres humanos (só as 
pessoas é que as têm) ou são partilhadas com os animais (as pessoas e os animais têm-nas). 
(Para todas as palavras, coloque uma cruz no número que melhor representa a sua opinião) 
 
 Partilhadas com os 
Animais  
Exclusivas dos  
Seres Humanos 
[Traços]        
 
 
 
4. Quanto é que você acha desejável ter as seguintes características: 
(Coloque uma cruz no número que melhor representa a sua opinião) 
 
 Nada Muito 
[Traços]        
 
 
Table 2 
Traits used in the dehumanisation measure in Study 1 and Study 2. 
 
 Study 1 Study 2 
[Traços] 
Competenti; Dotati; Intelligenti; Capaci; Efficienti; 
Incompetenti; Disorganizzati; Nullafacenti; 
Ignoranti; Improduttivi; Socievoli; Piacevoli; 
Amichevoli; Gentili; Calorosi; Spiacevoli; Egoisti; 
Asociali; Ostili; Freddi. 
Competente; Inteligente; Capaz; Dotado; Eficiente; 
Desocupado; Improdutivo; Desorganizado; 
Ignorante; Incompetente; Gentil; Sociável; 
Agradável; Caloroso; Amigável; Hostil; Frio; 
Desagradável; Insociável; Egoísta. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 In Study 2 this measure corresponded to the Italian translated version of the questionnaire presented here in 
Portuguese. 
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Manipulation checks and control measures 
 
 
 
Study 1. 
 
 
 
Identification. 
 
 
Discordo  
Fortemente 
Concordo  
Fortemente 
Pertencer ao meu grupo é importante para mim        
Tenho orgulho em pertencer ao meu grupo.        
Às vezes, sinto-me incomodado quando penso que sou 
um membro do meu grupo.  
       
De um modo geral sinto-me feliz por ser um membro 
do meu grupo. 
       
Sinto que gostaria de não pertencer ao meu grupo.        
Sinto-me identificado com o meu grupo.        
 
 
 
Power and Status. 
 
 
Discordo  
Fortemente 
Concordo  
Fortemente 
São as respostas dos membros do meu/outro grupo que 
têm impacto sobre a decisão quem realizará a segunda 
tarefa extra. 
       
Os membros do meu/outro grupo têm controlo sobre a 
situação do seu próprio grupo. 
       
Os membros do meu/outro grupo têm controlo sobre a 
situação dos membros do outro grupo, o grupo W. 
       
Os membros do meu/outro grupo têm poder.        
Os membros do meu/outro grupo tiveram resultados 
altos no teste de criatividade 
       
O meu/outro grupo ocupa uma posição baixa        
 
 
 
Desired and expected results, legitimation and feelings of frustration. 
 
 Nada Muito 
Em que medida desejava participar na segunda 
experiência? 
       
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Em que medida considera que os membros do seu 
grupo vão ser seleccionados para participar na segunda 
experiência 
       
Em que medida considera legitimo o critério aleatório 
de seleccção do grupo que vai decidir quem fica a 
fazer a segunda experiência? 
       
Em que medida se sente frustrado?        
 
 
 
Study 2. 
 
 
 
Status. 
 
 Per Niente Del Tutto 
Quanto prestigiosi sono i lavori che di solito svolgono o 
svolgeranno gli studenti di [psicologia/medicina]: 
       
In che misura hanno/avranno successo dal punto di vista 
economico gli studenti di [psicologia/medicina] 
       
 
 
 
Legitimation. 
 
 Nada Muito 
In che misura consideri legittime le regole prestabilite 
dall’Università di Padova per condurre l’indagine sulla 
gestione del percorso academico? 
       
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Appendix F: Statistics of When the small feel strong enough: The role of power in low 
status groups on outgroup dehumanisation 
 
 
 
Study 1: Power and dehumanisation in a minimal group paradigm 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of sociodemographic information. 
 
Gender 
Male Female 
Age 
M SD 
10 33 21.62 4,65 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and reliability of the manipulation checks for group power and status, and of the 
identification measure. 
 
   Reliability  
 M SD α r 
Ingroup Power 3.66 1.16 .708  
Outgroup Power 4.06 1.40 .754  
Ingroup Status 2.99 1.45  .442* 
Outgroup Status 5.24 1.47  .464* 
*p ≤ .05 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Repeated measures ANOVA on ingroup and outgroup power, by experimental condition 
 
 SS df MS F p  ηp
2
 
Target 3,244 1 3,244 3,103 ,086 ,070 
Target * Power 6,343 1 6,343 6,068 ,018 ,129 
Error (Target * Power) 42,854 41 1,045    
Within factors = Target (Ingroup vs. Outgroup power). Between factors = Ingroup power (High vs. Low). 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Contrast analysis of differential group power by power condition. 
 
Target Power 
condition 
M SE Mean 
Difference 
F(1, 41) p
a
 ηp
2
 
Ingroup Low  3,580 ,250 -,159 ,196 ,660 ,005 
 High 3,738 ,256 ,159    
Outgroup Low  4,511 ,285 ,928 5,181 ,028 ,112 
 High 3,583 ,292 -,928    
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Sidak 
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Table 5 
Repeated measures ANOVA on ingroup and outgroup status, by experimental condition 
 
 SS df MS F p  ηp
2
 
Target 108,942 1 108,942 32,100 ,000 ,439 
Target * Power ,698 1 ,698 ,206 ,653 ,005 
Error (Target * Power) 139,145 41 3,394    
Within factors = Target (Ingroup vs. Outgroup status). Between factors = Ingroup power (High vs. Low). 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Descriptive statistics, tests of normality homogeinity of variances of ingroup and outgroup uniquely humanness. 
 
   Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
   Power condition 
 M SD Statistic df p df1 df2 Levene  
Statistic 
p 
Ingroup UH -,0710 ,25914 ,071 42 ,200 1 40 0,014 ,905 
Outgroup UH ,0164 ,30523 ,084 38 ,200 1 36 2,909 ,097 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Repeated measures ANOVA on ingroup and outgroup uniquely humaness, by experimental condition. 
 
 SS df MS F p  ηp
2
 
Target ,145 1 ,145 1,631 ,210 ,043 
Target * Power ,212 1 ,212 2,387 ,131 ,062 
Error (Target * Power) 3,198 36 ,089    
Within factors = Target (Ingroup UH vs. Outgroup UH). Between factors = Power (High vs. Low). 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Contrast analysis of differential outgroup UH by experimental condition and of diferential UH in the high power 
condition. 
 
  M SE Mean 
Difference 
F(1, 36) p
b
 ηp
2
 
Outgroup UH Low Power ,128 ,066 ,222 5,677 ,023 ,136 
 High Power -,095 ,066     
High Power Ingroup UH -,076 ,060 ,018 ,036 ,851 ,001 
 Outgroup UH -,095 ,066     
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Sidak 
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Table 9 
T-tests comparing control measures according to power experimental condition. 
 
      CI 95% 
 
M SD α Mean 
Difference 
t(41) p LL UL 
Ingroup identification 3.26 0.98 .760 ,27489 ,919 ,364 -,32930 ,87908 
Expected outcome 4,19 1,314  -,102 -,251 ,803 -,920 ,717 
Desired outcome 3,33 1,569  -,387 -,806 ,425 -1,358 ,584 
Legitimacy  4,47 1,750  -,766 -1,454 ,154 -1,831 ,298 
Felling of frustration 2,67 1,686  ,48052 ,933 ,357 -,56011 1,52115 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
 
Study 2: Power and dehumanisation, a replication in a natural context. 
 
 
 
Pretest Report on Targets and Topics. 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Descriptive statistics of sociodemographic information. 
 
Gender 
Male Female 
Age 
M SD 
1 19 22.45 1,73 
 
 
 
Table 11 
Descriptive statistics and reliability of ingroup and other academic groups’ status. 
 
  M SD r p 
Ingroup Psychology students 3,00 ,56 ,394 ,086 
Outgroups Medicine students 4,28 ,57 ,538  ,014 
 Engineering students  3,95 ,51 ,467  ,038 
 Political Sciences students 3,13 ,79 ,829  ,000 
 Communication Sciences students 2,75 ,57 ,625  ,003 
 Philosophy students 2,20 ,70 ,533  ,015 
 
 
 
Table 12 
Paired T-test of ingroup status and outgroup status. 
 
    CI 95% 
 
Mean 
Difference 
t(19) p LL UL 
Ingroup Status - Outgroup Status 1,275 9,575 ,000 ,996 1,554 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
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Table 13 
Descriptive statistics of the importance of each topic. 
 
Topics M SD 
Managing your academic path 4,45 ,510 
New University reform with an impact similar to the current 3+2 4,25 ,716 
University book prices 4,15 ,933 
Renting a room or an apartment in the city where you study 3,95 ,999 
Exam regulation 3,90 ,912 
Access to the Master's degree 3,85 ,933 
Allocation of credits for each course 3,65 1,040 
Access to classrooms and libraries 3,45 ,887 
Content of courses 3,30 1,174 
Access to the canteen 3,05 ,887 
 
 
 
Main Study. 
 
 
Table 14 
Descriptive statistics of sociodemographic information. 
 
Gender 
Male Female 
Age 
M SD 
22 116 23,07 3,68 
 
 
 
Table 15 
Descriptive statistics, tests of normality homogeinity of variances of ingroup and outgroup uniquely humanness. 
 
   Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
   Power condition 
 M SD Statistic df p df1 df2 Levene  
Statistic 
p 
Ingroup UH ,0539 ,326 ,036 133 ,200 1 133 ,220 ,639 
Outgroup UH ,0298 ,307 ,052 133 ,200 1 132 ,000 ,995 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
 
Table 16 
Repeated measures ANOVA on ingroup and outgroup uniquely humaness, by experimental conditions. 
 
 SS df MS F p  ηp
2
 
Target ,031 1 ,031 ,298 ,586 ,002 
Target * Power ,852 1 ,852 8,251 ,005 ,060 
Target * Order ,001 1 ,001 ,008 ,929 ,000 
Target * Power * Order ,020 1 ,020 ,195 ,660 ,002 
Error (Target * Power * Order) 13,318 129 ,103    
Within factors = Target (Ingroup vs. Outgroup UH). Between factors = Power (High vs. Low), Order (Ingroup vs. Outgroup 
first) 
 
 
 
161 
 
Table 17 
Contrast analysis of differential outgroup UH by experimental condition and of diferential UH in the high power 
condition. 
 
  M SE Mean 
Difference 
F(1, 129) p
b
 ηp
2
 
Outgroup UH Low Power ,093 ,038 ,123 5,407 ,022 ,040 
 High Power -,030 ,037 -,123    
High Power Ingroup UH ,105 ,039 ,135 5,976 ,016 ,044 
 Outgroup UH -,030 ,037 -,135    
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Sidak 
 
 
 
Table 18 
Descriptive statistics and reliability of ingroup and outgroup status. 
 
   Reliability  
 M SD r 
Ingroup Status 4,10 1,26 ,527* 
Outgroup Status 6,00 ,81 ,467* 
*p ≤ .05 
 
 
 
Table 19 
Repeated measures ANOVA on ingroup and outgroup status, by experimental condition 
 
 SS df MS F p  ηp
2
 
Target 246,995 1 246,995 238,972 ,000 ,637 
Target * Power 2,724 1 2,724 2,635 ,107 ,019 
Error (Target * Power) 140,566 136 1,034    
Within factors = Target (Ingroup vs. Outgroup status). Between factors = Power (High vs. Low). 
 
 
 
Table 20 
T-tests comparing control measures according to power experimental condition. 
 
       CI 95% 
 
M SD α Mean 
Difference 
t(136) p LL UL 
Ingroup identification 5,08 1,10 ,832 ,17847 ,954 ,342 -,19166 ,54861 
Legitimacy  4,57 1,528  -,068 -,262 ,794 -,585 ,448 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit; *p ≤ .05 
 
 
 
